Economic reform in China: Logic and dynamism

International Interactions

Volumn 23, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 315-332

  Feng, Yi ^a  

^a CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

China; Economic reforms; Expected utility; Unemployment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0005052218     PISSN: 03050629     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03050629708434913     Document Type: Article

References (3)

1. Richard Caves (1976) discusses three similar models. They are the adding machine model, which argues that the party in power acts to maximize its chance of reelection by protecting the industries which have the largest votes, assuming that different issues can be packaged into one platform and that the threshold effects exist in elections; the interest group model, which maintains that the interest groups calculate their benefit and loss from a policy and lobby the party to set the policy to their advantage, assuming that organization costs go up as the size of the group increases and the most vulnerable interest groups have the largest incentive for protection; and finally, the national policy model, which stipulates that the government sets a policy for nationalistic and collective preferences, assuming that compromise among different groups gives a revealed collective preference for a "balanced" economy. Also see Pincus (1975).
2. The percentage of labor employed in manufacturing in Liaoning is 28%, compared to 7% in Guizhou and 12% in Shaanxi. See China Statistical Yearbook (1995), p. 86.
3. Also see Dorothy J. Solinger, Regional Government and Political Integration (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).