An economic analysis of matrix structure, using multinational corporations as an illustration

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 141-156

  Chi, Tailan ^a   Nystrom, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MILWAUKEE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0004910137     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199805)19:3<141::AID-MDE877>3.0.CO;2-D     Document Type: Article

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