Freedom of prices and the price of freedom: The miners' dilemmas in the Soviet Union and its successor states

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 1-27

  Siegelbaum, Lewis H ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0004899940     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523279708415358     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother et al. What About the Workers?: Workers and the Transition to Capitalism in Russia (London: Verso, 1993).
2. See, inter alia, Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Labor Pains in the Soviet Union', The Nation, 27 May 1991, pp.693-4; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, 'The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Goes to Ukraine', The Nation, 2 Nov. 1992, pp.502-6; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, "'We'll Remain in this Cesspool for a Long Time": The Miners of Donetsk Speak Out', The Oral History Review, Vol.XX, Nos.1-2 (1992), pp.67-86; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbas Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995).
3. See, inter alia, Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Labor Pains in the Soviet Union', The Nation, 27 May 1991, pp.693-4; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, 'The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Goes to Ukraine', The Nation, 2 Nov. 1992, pp.502-6; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, "'We'll Remain in this Cesspool for a Long Time": The Miners of Donetsk Speak Out', The Oral History Review, Vol.XX, Nos.1-2 (1992), pp.67-86; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbas Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995).
4. See, inter alia, Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Labor Pains in the Soviet Union', The Nation, 27 May 1991, pp.693-4; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, 'The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Goes to Ukraine', The Nation, 2 Nov. 1992, pp.502-6; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, "'We'll Remain in this Cesspool for a Long Time": The Miners of Donetsk Speak Out', The Oral History Review, Vol.XX, Nos.1-2 (1992), pp.67-86; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbas Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995).
5. See, inter alia, Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Labor Pains in the Soviet Union', The Nation, 27 May 1991, pp.693-4; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, 'The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Goes to Ukraine', The Nation, 2 Nov. 1992, pp.502-6; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, "'We'll Remain in this Cesspool for a Long Time": The Miners of Donetsk Speak Out', The Oral History Review, Vol.XX, Nos.1-2 (1992), pp.67-86; Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbas Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995).
6. Interview with Valery Samofalov, 2 Aug. 1989.
7. This brief summary of perestroika from above draws upon numerous works and my own assessment. Particularly valuable in understanding the inconsistencies and internal contradictions were Anders Asland, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse of Perestroika: The Soviet Labour Process and Gorbachev's Reforms, 1985-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
8. This brief summary of perestroika from above draws upon numerous works and my own assessment. Particularly valuable in understanding the inconsistencies and internal contradictions were Anders Asland, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse of Perestroika: The Soviet Labour Process and Gorbachev's Reforms, 1985-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
9. Simon Clarke, The Crisis of the Soviet System', in Clarke, Fairbrother et al., What About the Workers?, p 47.
10. The closest analogy to the Soviet enterprise in capitalist societies would be the company town.
11. 'Quicksand society' was a term coined by Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (New York: Pantheon, 1985), p.265. For the 'melting pot' and 'community organizer' functions of the Soviet factory of the Stalin era, see Kenneth M. Straus, Factory Work and Community Life in Moscow, 1928-1933 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming), Chs.6-7.
12. 'Quicksand society' was a term coined by Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (New York: Pantheon, 1985), p.265. For the 'melting pot' and 'community organizer' functions of the Soviet factory of the Stalin era, see Kenneth M. Straus, Factory Work and Community Life in Moscow, 1928-1933 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming), Chs.6-7.
13. Petr Bizyukov, 'The Mechanism of Paternalistic Management of the Enterprise: The Limits of Paternalism', in Simon Clarke (ed.), Management and Industry in Russia: Formal and Informal Relations in the Period of Transition (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp.99-127.
14. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, p.15. See also his Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), Ch.2; Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism (London: Verso, 1985), pp. 159-64; Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, 'The Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', New Left Review, No.198 (1993), pp.49-53.
15. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, p.15. See also his Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), Ch.2; Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism (London: Verso, 1985), pp. 159-64; Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, 'The Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', New Left Review, No.198 (1993), pp.49-53.
16. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, p.15. See also his Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), Ch.2; Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism (London: Verso, 1985), pp. 159-64; Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, 'The Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', New Left Review, No.198 (1993), pp.49-53.
17. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, p.15. See also his Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), Ch.2; Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism (London: Verso, 1985), pp. 159-64; Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, 'The Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', New Left Review, No.198 (1993), pp.49-53.
18. For examples, see Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, pp.85-6; Theodore H. Friedgut and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'The Soviet Miners' Strike, July 1989: Perestroika from Below', The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, No.804 (1990), p.15.
19. For examples, see Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, pp.85-6; Theodore H. Friedgut and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'The Soviet Miners' Strike, July 1989: Perestroika from Below', The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, No.804 (1990), p.15.
20. Stephen Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel: Russian and Ukrainian Workers from the End of the Soviet Union to the Post-Communist Transformations (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 10-12.
21. Trud v SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: 1988), pp.189-95.
22. Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, p.36. It is virtually impossible to be precise about the number of mining fatalities, a well-kept secret until the advent of glasnost. In Donetsk ablast alone, according to a study produced for the World Bank which relied on data supplied by the Centre for Labour and Trauma Prophylaxis in Donetsk, there were 985 fatal injuries among some 300,000 underground miners between 1986 and 1990. This represented about two occupation-related deaths for every three million tons of coal mined, or one death for every 1,500 miners per year: Barry S. Levy, 'Environment, Work, and Health in Ukraine' (unpublished report), p.20. By comparison, there were 48 underground mining fatalities in the United States in 1990, or one death for every 8.7 million tons produced: information supplied by Jim Albers, Occupational Health Foundation, Washington, DC.
23. Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, p.36. It is virtually impossible to be precise about the number of mining fatalities, a well-kept secret until the advent of glasnost. In Donetsk ablast alone, according to a study produced for the World Bank which relied on data supplied by the Centre for Labour and Trauma Prophylaxis in Donetsk, there were 985 fatal injuries among some 300,000 underground miners between 1986 and 1990. This represented about two occupation-related deaths for every three million tons of coal mined, or one death for every 1,500 miners per year: Barry S. Levy, 'Environment, Work, and Health in Ukraine' (unpublished report), p.20. By comparison, there were 48 underground mining fatalities in the United States in 1990, or one death for every 8.7 million tons produced: information supplied by Jim Albers, Occupational Health Foundation, Washington, DC.
24. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, p.156; data from the late 1980s.
25. To be sure, costs of production were considerably higher in the Donbas, where underground mining predominated, than elsewhere. But this did not include transportation costs which would have been considerably higher for the more remote Kuzbas and other coalfields had the state not kept them artificially low. The price of a ton of coal was 20 roubles, far below the world price which ranged from $25 to $49 (or 500 to 980 roubles) a ton; oil prices also were well below international levels: see Peter Rutland, 'Labor Unrest and Movements in 1989 and 1990', Soviet Economy, Vol. VI, No.3 (1990), pp.357-8, 374. According to the then Deputy Prime Minister, Ryabov, the annual subsidy to the coal industry amounted to 6 billion roubles: Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 1 Nov. 1989, p. 1.
26. To be sure, costs of production were considerably higher in the Donbas, where underground mining predominated, than elsewhere. But this did not include transportation costs which would have been considerably higher for the more remote Kuzbas and other coalfields had the state not kept them artificially low. The price of a ton of coal was 20 roubles, far below the world price which ranged from $25 to $49 (or 500 to 980 roubles) a ton; oil prices also were well below international levels: see Peter Rutland, 'Labor Unrest and Movements in 1989 and 1990', Soviet Economy, Vol. VI, No.3 (1990), pp.357-8, 374. According to the then Deputy Prime Minister, Ryabov, the annual subsidy to the coal industry amounted to 6 billion roubles: Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, 1 Nov. 1989, p. 1.
27. As long ago as the late 1970s, a report produced by the USSR Academy of Sciences suggested a policy of gradual disinvestment in the Donbas coal-mining industry: see Rutland, 'Labor Unrest and Movements', p.352. The USSR's energy balance remained fairly constant throughout the 1980s, but largely owing to increasing labour inputs in coal in contrast with technological inputs in natural gas, oil and nuclear energy.
28. Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbas Speak, p.28. See also the speech of a miner at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, quoted in P.M. Malyavin and A.V. Likhobabin, Shakhlery - gvardiya truda (Moscow: Trud, 1986), p. 183.
29. Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbas Speak, p.28. See also the speech of a miner at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, quoted in P.M. Malyavin and A.V. Likhobabin, Shakhlery - gvardiya truda (Moscow: Trud, 1986), p. 183.
30. Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbas Speak, p.28. See also the speech of a miner at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, quoted in P.M. Malyavin and A.V. Likhobabin, Shakhlery - gvardiya truda (Moscow: Trud, 1986), p. 183.
31. Viktor Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas: Zharkoe lew 89-ogo (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1990), p.81. For truly horrifying reports on health conditions in the Kuzbas' Kemerovo ablast, see Argumenty i fakty , no 30 (459), 28 July -4 Aug. 1989, and Pravda, 21 Aug. 1989.
32. Viktor Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas: Zharkoe lew 89-ogo (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1990), p.81. For truly horrifying reports on health conditions in the Kuzbas' Kemerovo ablast, see Argumenty i fakty , no 30 (459), 28 July -4 Aug. 1989, and Pravda, 21 Aug. 1989.
33. Viktor Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas: Zharkoe lew 89-ogo (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1990), p.81. For truly horrifying reports on health conditions in the Kuzbas' Kemerovo ablast, see Argumenty i fakty , no 30 (459), 28 July -4 Aug. 1989, and Pravda, 21 Aug. 1989.
34. For lists of demands from the Kuzbas, see L.N. Lopatin (ed.), Rabochee dvizhenie Kuzbasa: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Kemerovo: Sovremennaya otechestvennaya kniga, 1993), pp.42-3, 45-7. As the strike spread throughout the Kuzbas and to other coal-mining regions, demands proliferated. Analysing 1,760 demands advanced during the strike, I.P. Kiseleva categorized 88.7 per cent as either 'economic' or 'social' (the distinction between the two is not clear), with the remainder categorized as 'political' (restricted to Vorkuta), 'organizational', 'ecological', and 'technological'. See 'Chego zhe vse-taki khotyat shakhtery?' Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, No.3 (1990), p.90.
35. For lists of demands from the Kuzbas, see L.N. Lopatin (ed.), Rabochee dvizhenie Kuzbasa: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Kemerovo: Sovremennaya otechestvennaya kniga, 1993), pp.42-3, 45-7. As the strike spread throughout the Kuzbas and to other coal-mining regions, demands proliferated. Analysing 1,760 demands advanced during the strike, I.P. Kiseleva categorized 88.7 per cent as either 'economic' or 'social' (the distinction between the two is not clear), with the remainder categorized as 'political' (restricted to Vorkuta), 'organizational', 'ecological', and 'technological'. See 'Chego zhe vse-taki khotyat shakhtery?' Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, No.3 (1990), p.90.
36. In the Donbas, miners specified medical co-operatives as notorious for charging exorbitant prices for their services and contributing to the decline in the quality of public health facilities.
37. Clarke and Fairbrother (What About the Workers?, p.134) argue that the 'political' demands (by which they seem to mean the 'political attack on the bureaucratic structures of the ministerial system') 'were substantially influenced by enterprise directors and by the Union government.' But they offer no hard evidence to substantiate this claim. For evidence to the contrary, see Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas, pp.36, 63.
38. Clarke and Fairbrother (What About the Workers?, p.134) argue that the 'political' demands (by which they seem to mean the 'political attack on the bureaucratic structures of the ministerial system') 'were substantially influenced by enterprise directors and by the Union government.' But they offer no hard evidence to substantiate this claim. For evidence to the contrary, see Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas, pp.36, 63.
39. Elizabeth Teague, 'Perestroika and the Soviet Worker', Government and Opposition, Vol.XXV, No.2 (1990), p.202.
40. See, inter alia, Friedgut and Siegelbaum, 'The Soviet Miners' Strike;' Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas; Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother and Vadim Borisov, The Workers' Movement in Russia (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp.17-80.
41. See, inter alia, Friedgut and Siegelbaum, 'The Soviet Miners' Strike;' Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas; Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother and Vadim Borisov, The Workers' Movement in Russia (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp.17-80.
42. Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, p.43.
43. The protocol is reprinted in Rabochee dvizhenie Kuzbasa, pp.68-73. The fact that the highest official of the trade unions was part of the party-state's negotiating team spoke legions about the role of the unions.
44. This paragraph summarizes the argument presented in Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp.49-91. For examples of such propaganda in the form of published letters to the miners, see Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas, pp.54-5; Pravda, 28 Oct. 1989.
45. This paragraph summarizes the argument presented in Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp.49-91. For examples of such propaganda in the form of published letters to the miners, see Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas, pp.54-5; Pravda, 28 Oct. 1989.
46. This paragraph summarizes the argument presented in Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp.49-91. For examples of such propaganda in the form of published letters to the miners, see Kostyukovskii, Kuzbas, pp.54-5; Pravda, 28 Oct. 1989.
47. Trud, 18 Nov. 1989, p.4.
48. Rutland, 'Labor Unrest and Movements', p.374.
49. For a detailed account of these issues and developments as they pertained to the Kuzbas, see Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.81-132.
50. See Burawoy and Krotov, 'Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', pp.55-8.
51. As late as July 1992, several members of the Donetsk city strike committee left their office in the Donetskugol' association's headquarters and walked down the corridor to attend a plenary session of the NPG, also attended by 'delegates' from a handful of the city's mines. The relationship between the two bodies was explained by Mikhail Krylov in the following terms: ... the structures are separate, but we are still one family ... I am an NPG member, but at the same time I am co-chairman of the strike committee. Nikolai [Volhynko] is the Donetsk NPG chairman, but he is a member of the strike committee. We have common aims ... . Frequently, trade unions are accused of interfering in politics instead of dealing with the protection of workers' rights. To avoid such accusations, this dirty work is performed by the strike committee. (Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, pp.149-50)
52. Ibid., p.80; Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.141-2. It should be noted that, with an average life expectancy among coal-miners of 50 years, many never lived to draw their pensions.
53. Ibid., p.80; Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.141-2. It should be noted that, with an average life expectancy among coal-miners of 50 years, many never lived to draw their pensions.
54. For one such example, see Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, pp.109-10. For.the theorization of the role of merchant capital in Russia's transition from state socialism, see Burawoy and Krotov, 'Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', pp.52-5.
55. For one such example, see Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, pp.109-10. For.the theorization of the role of merchant capital in Russia's transition from state socialism, see Burawoy and Krotov, 'Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', pp.52-5.
56. The following summary is drawn from Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp. 123-33; Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.105-12; Rabochee dvizhenie Kuzbasa, pp.373-468; and my own notes taken in Moscow and Donetsk.
57. The following summary is drawn from Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp. 123-33; Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.105-12; Rabochee dvizhenie Kuzbasa, pp.373-468; and my own notes taken in Moscow and Donetsk.
58. The following summary is drawn from Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp. 123-33; Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.105-12; Rabochee dvizhenie Kuzbasa, pp.373-468; and my own notes taken in Moscow and Donetsk.
59. But, perhaps reflecting the deepening divisions among the different coal-mining regions, coordination of the strike was rudimentary at best, consisting of an ad hoc inter-regional group of 'delegates' functioning from a suite in Moscow's Hotel Rossiya and relying on telephone and fax connections with their respective regions. See Siegelbaum, 'Labor Pains in the Soviet Union', pp.693-94.
60. Leon Trotsky, 1905, translated by Anya Bostock (London: Allen Lane, 1972), p.85.
61. Quotation from Clarke, Fairbrother et al., What About the Workers?, p.167. As Clarke and Fairbrother point out, transferring the (loss-making) mines to Yeltsin's Russian government saddled the latter with financial responsibilities that the 'centre' was only too happy to give up.
62. Clarke, Fairbrother et al., What About the Workers?, p.162.
63. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, pp.101, 107, 108. For a variant on this argument which posits an inverse relationship between labour militancy, frequently instigated by management, and inter-sectoral co-operation, see Kyung Hoon Leem, 'Labour Solidarity and Militancy in Post-Communist Russia: Coal-miners and Railroad Workers in Kuzbas and Vorkuta', Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1996.
64. Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse, pp.101, 107, 108. For a variant on this argument which posits an inverse relationship between labour militancy, frequently instigated by management, and inter-sectoral co-operation, see Kyung Hoon Leem, 'Labour Solidarity and Militancy in Post-Communist Russia: Coal-miners and Railroad Workers in Kuzbas and Vorkuta', Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1996.
65. See Stephen F. Crowley and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, 'Survival Strategies: The Miners of Donetsk in the Post-Soviet Era', in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, pp.73-82.
66. Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.112, 144.
67. Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp. 132-3. Crowley quotes Nikolai Volhynko of Donetsk's city strike committee and Vyacheslav Golikov, head of the Kuzbas Regional Council of Workers' Committees. Further complicating the notion that rank-and-file workers struck for basically economic reasons, strike leaders in Donetsk referred to miners who did not participate in the strike as 'sausage lovers' (kolbasniki).
68. See Daniel Walkowitz, '"Normal Life": The Crisis of Identity Among Donetsk's Miners', in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, pp. 159-84.
69. Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.127, 129.
70. Institut problem zanyatnosti RAN i Ministerstva truda RF, Shakhterskoe dvizhenie: dokumental'nye i analiticheskie materialy (Moscow, 1992), p.234. The remainder either preferred a centralized planned economy, a basically centralized planned economy but with elements of market relations, or found it 'difficult to say'. The role of sociological data collection of this type (and the publicity given to results) in shaping miners' thinking is an interesting phenomenon worthy of further investigation.
71. Interview with Donetsk city strike committee, May 1991, in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p. 120.
72. Interview with Kuibyshev Mine leaders, May 1991 in ibid., pp.114-15.
73. Ibid., p. 120.
74. Quotations from Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp.134, 136.
75. Ibid., p.135; Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.195. The statement about the director represents the mentality of the miners as attributed to them by Valery Samofalov, one of the mine's strike leaders. Samofalov, who dissented from this outlook, insisted it was 'not their fault ... it's how they were raised'. Mikhail Krylov of the city strike committee claimed that he had nothing against engineers earning more, 'but for their engineering work, not for supervision'. See Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.121.
76. Ibid., p.135; Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.195. The statement about the director represents the mentality of the miners as attributed to them by Valery Samofalov, one of the mine's strike leaders. Samofalov, who dissented from this outlook, insisted it was 'not their fault ... it's how they were raised'. Mikhail Krylov of the city strike committee claimed that he had nothing against engineers earning more, 'but for their engineering work, not for supervision'. See Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.121.
77. Ibid., p.135; Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.195. The statement about the director represents the mentality of the miners as attributed to them by Valery Samofalov, one of the mine's strike leaders. Samofalov, who dissented from this outlook, insisted it was 'not their fault ... it's how they were raised'. Mikhail Krylov of the city strike committee claimed that he had nothing against engineers earning more, 'but for their engineering work, not for supervision'. See Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.121.
78. Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, p. 136. See also the interview with Mikhail Krylov in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p. 149: 'We want every person to be the master of the fruits of his labor.'
79. Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, p. 136. See also the interview with Mikhail Krylov in Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p. 149: 'We want every person to be the master of the fruits of his labor.'
80. Much as does the line from the old socialist song 'Solidarity Forever' ('Now we stand outcast and starving', 'mid the wonders we have made') and Clause IV of the British Labour Party Constitution from 1918 which assigned to workers the 'full fruits' of their industry. For a brief critique of this conflation, see G. A. Cohen, 'Is Socialism Inseparable from Common Ownership?' European Labour Forum Pamphlet No 1 (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1995), pp.1-4.
81. Crowley, Hot Coal, Cold Steel, pp. 138-9.
82. See, for example, Petr Bizyukov and Simon Clarke, 'Privatization in Russia - The Road to a People's Capitalism', Monthly Review, Vol.XLIV, No.6 (1992), pp.38-45, which deals with the Vakhrusheva mine in Kiselovsk; and on six mines in Vorkuta, Burawoy and Krotov, 'Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', esp. pp.55-60.
83. See, for example, Petr Bizyukov and Simon Clarke, 'Privatization in Russia - The Road to a People's Capitalism', Monthly Review, Vol.XLIV, No.6 (1992), pp.38-45, which deals with the Vakhrusheva mine in Kiselovsk; and on six mines in Vorkuta, Burawoy and Krotov, 'Economic Basis of Russia's Political Crisis', esp. pp.55-60.
84. When asked, six months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, about his attitude towards privatization, Mikhail Krylov responded: 'Speaking frankly, I support privatization. But which privatization? ... You need a great deal of money to create a commercial structure or a joint venture .... Now they are speaking about privatization of the mines. I am against that. Can you imagine the sum? Where can the workers get money for its privatization?' Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.149.
85. Laryssa H. Krywusha, 'The Coal Project/Ukraine: The Quick Start Phase' (unpublished report), preface.
86. World Bank, Russian Federation Restructuring the Coal Industry: Putting People First, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994), p.3.
87. 'The Coal Project/Ukraine', Executive Overview.
88. World Bank, Russian Federation Restructuring, pp.6, 11, 13, 20.
89. World Bank, Ukraine Coal Industry Restructuring Sector Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), pp.i, iv, 19-21.
90. New York Times, 16 Feb. 1992, A4. That 'independence', like the market, is a culture-bound concept also can be illustrated by the remark of Tatyana Samofalova, wife of the Kuibyshev mine-activist, Valery: 'My relatives ... live in Russia and it has become a problem now to go see them ... and letters don't get delivered. Why should I want such independence? What am I independent from? From my own relatives?': Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p. 197. The economic equivalent of this situation consisted of complications in the supply of timber used for propping which traditionally came from Russia.
91. New York Times, 16 Feb. 1992, A4. That 'independence', like the market, is a culture-bound concept also can be illustrated by the remark of Tatyana Samofalova, wife of the Kuibyshev mine-activist, Valery: 'My relatives ... live in Russia and it has become a problem now to go see them ... and letters don't get delivered. Why should I want such independence? What am I independent from? From my own relatives?': Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p. 197. The economic equivalent of this situation consisted of complications in the supply of timber used for propping which traditionally came from Russia.
92. Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p. 144.
93. Interview with Mikhail Krylov, 1 July 1992. Note that Krylov's rationale for closing the mines was not their unprofitabilily, but rather environmental damage. Others referred to increasingly dangerous working conditions. See, for example, Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.145. As of November 1996, Krylov was on trial in Zaporizhzhya for his leadership of illegal strikes in July protesting wage arrears. Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest, Part II, No.230, 27 Nov. 1996. Earlier, on 20 Aug. 1996, the Donetsk Court of Arbitration ruled to disband the Donetsk Workers' Committee.
94. Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, pp.71-2. See also Roman Solchanyk, 'The Politics of State Building: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.XLVI, No.1 (1994), pp.60-61.
95. Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, pp.71-2. See also Roman Solchanyk, 'The Politics of State Building: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.XLVI, No.1 (1994), pp.60-61.
96. Delovaya Ukraina (Kyiv), No.44 (96), 1993, p.1; Zhizn' (Donetsk), 11 June 1993, p.6; also Vechernii Donetsk, 9 June 1993, p. 1.
97. Delovaya Ukraina (Kyiv), No.44 (96), 1993, p.1; Zhizn' (Donetsk), 11 June 1993, p.6; also Vechernii Donetsk, 9 June 1993, p. 1.
98. Delovaya Ukraina (Kyiv), No.44 (96), 1993, p.1; Zhizn' (Donetsk), 11 June 1993, p.6; also Vechernii Donetsk, 9 June 1993, p. 1.
99. For a useful summary and analysis of the strike and its aftermath, see Rick Simon, 'Workers and Independence in Divided Ukraine', Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, No.46 (1993), pp.28-31.
100. A. A. Sergeev, president of NPG Russia, claimed at the union's second congress in December 1992 that membership had reached 50,000, still less than ten per cent of the number enrolled in Rosugleprof. It should be pointed out, however, that the NPG excluded auxiliary workers and managerial-technical personnel: Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, p.201. The AFL-CIO insisted that Rosugleprof should not be part of the Coal Project, arguing that it was still a 'communist' union. For a critical analysis of the AFL-CIO's role in Ukraine at this time, see Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, 'The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Goes to Ukraine', pp.502-6.
101. A. A. Sergeev, president of NPG Russia, claimed at the union's second congress in December 1992 that membership had reached 50,000, still less than ten per cent of the number enrolled in Rosugleprof. It should be pointed out, however, that the NPG excluded auxiliary workers and managerial-technical personnel: Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, p.201. The AFL-CIO insisted that Rosugleprof should not be part of the Coal Project, arguing that it was still a 'communist' union. For a critical analysis of the AFL-CIO's role in Ukraine at this time, see Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, 'The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Goes to Ukraine', pp.502-6.
102. Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.150-53. The agreement raised miners' wages to 9,000 roubles per month, compared to a national average of 900 roubles. The agreement coincided with Gaidar's shock therapeutic liberalization of prices. See Moskovskie novosti, 21 June 1992, p.11.
103. Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, pp.150-53. The agreement raised miners' wages to 9,000 roubles per month, compared to a national average of 900 roubles. The agreement coincided with Gaidar's shock therapeutic liberalization of prices. See Moskovskie novosti, 21 June 1992, p.11.
104. Subsidies increased from $102 million in 1991 to $844 million in 1992 and over one billion dollars in 1993. Citation in Clarke, Fairbrother and Borisov, Workers' Movement, p.201. As of May 1993, subsidies to the coal industry were absorbing 20 per cent of the state's budget.
105. Izvestiya, 23 June 1993, p.1, cited in Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press (CDPSP), Vol.XLV, No.26 (1993), p.9. As Izvestiya put it with only slight exaggeration, before the freeing of its price a ton of coal was cheaper than an imported Snickers bar. As a result of the decree, the price of coal rose from 5,700 roubles per ton to 11,500 roubles, but then began to fall back owing to a drop in demand.
106. Izvestiya, 23 June 1993, p.1, cited in Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press (CDPSP), Vol.XLV, No.26 (1993), p.9. As Izvestiya put it with only slight exaggeration, before the freeing of its price a ton of coal was cheaper than an imported Snickers bar. As a result of the decree, the price of coal rose from 5,700 roubles per ton to 11,500 roubles, but then began to fall back owing to a drop in demand.
107. Trud, 27 April 1995, p.2. By September, according to the FNPR, workers were owed eight trillion rubles and by December, 11.5 trillion roubles ($2.5 billion) in wage arrears. OMRI, Part I, No.297, 1 Dec. 1995, p.1. As of March 1997, the figure had reached nearly 50 trillion roubles ($8.2 billion) of which 9.5 trillion were owed directly by the Treasury and the remainder by enterprises indebted to local and federal tax authorities. Renfrey Clarke, 'Russian Unions Prepare Strikes, Demonstrations', David Johnson's Russia List, 13 March 1997, p.1.
108. Trud, 27 April 1995, p.2. By September, according to the FNPR, workers were owed eight trillion rubles and by December, 11.5 trillion roubles ($2.5 billion) in wage arrears. OMRI, Part I, No.297, 1 Dec. 1995, p.1. As of March 1997, the figure had reached nearly 50 trillion roubles ($8.2 billion) of which 9.5 trillion were owed directly by the Treasury and the remainder by enterprises indebted to local and federal tax authorities. Renfrey Clarke, 'Russian Unions Prepare Strikes, Demonstrations', David Johnson's Russia List, 13 March 1997, p.1.
109. See Sarah Ashwin, '"There's No Joy Any More": Experience of Reform in a Kuzbas Mining Settlement', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.XLVII, No.8 (1995), pp.1367-81.
110. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 Feb. 1995, p.1. The title of the article was 'Hot War in Chechnya, Cold War with the Miners'.
111. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 Feb. 1995, p.1. The title of the article was 'Hot War in Chechnya, Cold War with the Miners'.
112. Siegelbaum and Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak, p.87.
113. World Bank, Russian Federation Restructuring, p. 15. The Bank's report suggests 'setting up temporary special employment programs in the worst hit coal basins' but cautions against 'large infrastructure investments in localities with poor economic prospects' - that is, the same remote and environmentally degraded areas. This is not to suggest that the miners alone have prevented one or the other solution. Much of the political paralysis in Russia can be attributed to the irreconcilability of the executive branch's 'western' orientation favoured by oil, natural gas, precious metals and banking interests, and the 'eastern' military-industrial bloc, which includes the wheezing dinosaurs of the coal and steel industry, and is heavily represented in parliament. Political divisions in Ukraine have been more literally geographical, with the heavily industrialized east remaining a hotbed of opposition to the incumbent government in Kyiv.
114. OMRI, Part II, No.8, 12 Jan. 1996, p.3; Rick Simon, 'The Miners' Strike in Ukraine and Russia', Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, No.53 (1996), pp.38-46.
115. OMRI, Part II, No.23, 2 Feb. 1996, p.1; No.28, 8 Feb. 1996, p.1; Gorod (Donetsk), 1 Feb. 1996, p.5; 8 Feb. 1996, p.4; 22 Feb. 1996, p.7.
116. OMRI, Part II, No.23, 2 Feb. 1996, p.1; No.28, 8 Feb. 1996, p.1; Gorod (Donetsk), 1 Feb. 1996, p.5; 8 Feb. 1996, p.4; 22 Feb. 1996, p.7.
117. OMRI, Part II, No.23, 2 Feb. 1996, p.1; No.28, 8 Feb. 1996, p.1; Gorod (Donetsk), 1 Feb. 1996, p.5; 8 Feb. 1996, p.4; 22 Feb. 1996, p.7.
118. World Bank, Staff Appraisal Report: Ukraine Coal Pilot Project (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996). The Report states that 'to manage the mine closure process', UDKR will be 'closed (sic) modelled along the lines of British Coal Enterprise (BCE)'. That is, '[l]ike BCE, UDKR is expected to take a strong "partnership" approach to its task, working closely with local authorities and other key local players ... and acting as a catalyst for regional regeneration.' (Annex 12, p.1).
119. New York Times, 29 Feb. 1996, p.A5. The term 'bloated' is the New York Times's.
120. New York Times, 29 Feb. 1996, p.A5. The term 'bloated' is the New York Times's.