Political consequences of restructuring economic regimes: The Kuwait petroleum corporation

Millenium

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 379-401

  Tétreault, Mary Ann ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0004884816     PISSN: 03058298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/03058298970260021501     Document Type: Article

References (125)

1. The international oil regime tears space away from place by fostering relations between absent Others'. These relations are based not only on 'symbolic tokens' such as money and share certificates, but also on 'expert systems' of great technical intricacy. The concept of modernity adapted for use here comes from Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 18-36.
2. See, for example, P.H. Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum (London: Chapman and Hall, 1946).
3. This article takes as its starting point the definition of regimes as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', International Organization (Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982), p. 186.
4. Among the characteristics of the oil majors is that one or a very few of them have the capacity to exercise strategic control at industry 'choke points', those segments of the industry, such as refining, whose capital intensity makes monopolistic or oligopolistic control feasible. Additionally, they operate in more than one country of strategic importance to the regime - that is, in countries that are major producers and/or house large markets.
5. The structure and operation of international petroleum regimes during this period are summarised in Mary Ann Tétreault, Revolution in the World Petroleum Market (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1985), Chapter 1.
6. See, for example, Edith T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), and Maurice A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).
7. See, for example, Edith T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), and Maurice A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).
8. Giddens, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 38-39.
9. See Penrose, op. cit., in note 6, and Adelman, op. cit., in note 6. See also Edward L. Morse, 'The Oil Revolution: New Corporate Strategies', Research Report (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, May 1986).
10. See Penrose, op. cit., in note 6, and Adelman, op. cit., in note 6. See also Edward L. Morse, 'The Oil Revolution: New Corporate Strategies', Research Report (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, May 1986).
11. See Penrose, op. cit., in note 6, and Adelman, op. cit., in note 6. See also Edward L. Morse, 'The Oil Revolution: New Corporate Strategies', Research Report (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, May 1986).
12. See, for example, Ir. Wijarso, 'Marketing of Oil and Gas: The Pertamina Case', in OPEC, Proceedings of the OPEC Seminar on the Present and Future Role of the National Oil Companies (Vienna: OPEC, 1977).
13. See, for example, Maurice A. Adelman, 'Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as OPEC Tax Collectors', Foreign Policy (No. 9, 1972-73), pp. 69-107; Charles F. Doran, Myth, Oil, and Politics (New York, NY: Free Press, 1977); and Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky, 'Oil and the Decline of Western Power', Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 90, No. 3, 1975), pp. 437-50.
14. See, for example, Maurice A. Adelman, 'Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as OPEC Tax Collectors', Foreign Policy (No. 9, 1972-73), pp. 69-107; Charles F. Doran, Myth, Oil, and Politics (New York, NY: Free Press, 1977); and Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky, 'Oil and the Decline of Western Power', Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 90, No. 3, 1975), pp. 437-50.
15. See, for example, Maurice A. Adelman, 'Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as OPEC Tax Collectors', Foreign Policy (No. 9, 1972-73), pp. 69-107; Charles F. Doran, Myth, Oil, and Politics (New York, NY: Free Press, 1977); and Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky, 'Oil and the Decline of Western Power', Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 90, No. 3, 1975), pp. 437-50.
16. The antagonistic perspective is reflected in most of the essays in David A. Deese and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Energy and Security (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1981). Suggestions for a more cooperatively organised regime are offered in George Tomeh, 'Interdependence: A View from the Third World' and Richard B. Bilder, 'International Law and Natural Resource Policies', in Peter Dorner and Mahmoud A. EI-Shafie (eds.), Resources and Development: Natural Resource Policies and Economic Development in an Interdependent World (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 359-84, and pp. 385-421.
17. The antagonistic perspective is reflected in most of the essays in David A. Deese and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Energy and Security (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1981). Suggestions for a more cooperatively organised regime are offered in George Tomeh, 'Interdependence: A View from the Third World' and Richard B. Bilder, 'International Law and Natural Resource Policies', in Peter Dorner and Mahmoud A. EI-Shafie (eds.), Resources and Development: Natural Resource Policies and Economic Development in an Interdependent World (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 359-84, and pp. 385-421.
18. The antagonistic perspective is reflected in most of the essays in David A. Deese and Joseph S. Nye (eds.), Energy and Security (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1981). Suggestions for a more cooperatively organised regime are offered in George Tomeh, 'Interdependence: A View from the Third World' and Richard B. Bilder, 'International Law and Natural Resource Policies', in Peter Dorner and Mahmoud A. EI-Shafie (eds.), Resources and Development: Natural Resource Policies and Economic Development in an Interdependent World (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp. 359-84, and pp. 385-421.
19. Mary Ann Tétreault, The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and the Economics of the New World Order (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1995), Chapter 5.
20. The 'seven sisters' were the seven major oil firms nominated by Anthony Sampson as the core of the pre-1973 international oil regime. Using their recent names, they were Exxon, British Petroleum (BP), Shell, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, and Chevron. All but Gulf continue to operate today. Gulf was purchased by Chevron in 1984-see text below. Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped (New York, NY: Viking, 1975).
21. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational. State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Timothy W. Luke, 'Dependent Development and the Arab OPEC States', Journal of Politics (Vol. 45, No. 4, 1983), pp. 979-1003; and Raymond D. Duvall and John R. Freeman, 'The State and Dependent Capitalism', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981), pp. 99-118. For a somewhat different perspective, see Merrie G. Klapp, 'The State-Landlord or Entrepreneur?', International Organization (Vol. 36, No. 3, 1982), pp. 575-607. In Kuwait, the assumptions and conclusions of this literature formed the core of the arguments used by the political opposition to oppose state investment policy - interviews in Kuwait, Spring 1990, and March, September-October 1992.
22. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational. State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Timothy W. Luke, 'Dependent Development and the Arab OPEC States', Journal of Politics (Vol. 45, No. 4, 1983), pp. 979-1003; and Raymond D. Duvall and John R. Freeman, 'The State and Dependent Capitalism', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981), pp. 99-118. For a somewhat different perspective, see Merrie G. Klapp, 'The State-Landlord or Entrepreneur?', International Organization (Vol. 36, No. 3, 1982), pp. 575-607. In Kuwait, the assumptions and conclusions of this literature formed the core of the arguments used by the political opposition to oppose state investment policy - interviews in Kuwait, Spring 1990, and March, September-October 1992.
23. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational. State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Timothy W. Luke, 'Dependent Development and the Arab OPEC States', Journal of Politics (Vol. 45, No. 4, 1983), pp. 979-1003; and Raymond D. Duvall and John R. Freeman, 'The State and Dependent Capitalism', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981), pp. 99-118. For a somewhat different perspective, see Merrie G. Klapp, 'The State-Landlord or Entrepreneur?', International Organization (Vol. 36, No. 3, 1982), pp. 575-607. In Kuwait, the assumptions and conclusions of this literature formed the core of the arguments used by the political opposition to oppose state investment policy - interviews in Kuwait, Spring 1990, and March, September-October 1992.
24. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational. State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Timothy W. Luke, 'Dependent Development and the Arab OPEC States', Journal of Politics (Vol. 45, No. 4, 1983), pp. 979-1003; and Raymond D. Duvall and John R. Freeman, 'The State and Dependent Capitalism', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981), pp. 99-118. For a somewhat different perspective, see Merrie G. Klapp, 'The State-Landlord or Entrepreneur?', International Organization (Vol. 36, No. 3, 1982), pp. 575-607. In Kuwait, the assumptions and conclusions of this literature formed the core of the arguments used by the political opposition to oppose state investment policy - interviews in Kuwait, Spring 1990, and March, September-October 1992.
25. For Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the magnitude of their crude and cash reserves, along with their military vulnerability, pushed them to invest abroad. The advantages for Venezuela included a location close to the United States and a non-Arab/Middle East identity, while the push came from a declining home industry and the desire to diversify and increase value added to maximise profits and foreign exchange reserves. See Zuhayr Mikdashi, The Community of Oil Exporting Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); M.A. Ajtony, The Expanding Role of the KNPC in the Oil Business (Munich: Danubia-Druckerei, no date given); and interviews with James V. Knight, Vice President, ARAMCO, 1983.
26. For Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the magnitude of their crude and cash reserves, along with their military vulnerability, pushed them to invest abroad. The advantages for Venezuela included a location close to the United States and a non-Arab/Middle East identity, while the push came from a declining home industry and the desire to diversify and increase value added to maximise profits and foreign exchange reserves. See Zuhayr Mikdashi, The Community of Oil Exporting Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); M.A. Ajtony, The Expanding Role of the KNPC in the Oil Business (Munich: Danubia-Druckerei, no date given); and interviews with James V. Knight, Vice President, ARAMCO, 1983.
27. Examples include Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Ramond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagnen (eds.), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1967); and Karl Kaiser, 'The Interaction of Regional Subsystems', World Politics (Vol. 21, No. 1, 1968), pp. 84-102.
28. Examples include Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Ramond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagnen (eds.), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1967); and Karl Kaiser, 'The Interaction of Regional Subsystems', World Politics (Vol. 21, No. 1, 1968), pp. 84-102.
29. Examples include Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Ramond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagnen (eds.), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1967); and Karl Kaiser, 'The Interaction of Regional Subsystems', World Politics (Vol. 21, No. 1, 1968), pp. 84-102.
30. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
31. On spillover, see, for example, Philippe C. Schmitter, 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration', International Organization (Vol. 24, No. 4, 1970), pp. 836-68.
32. This arrangement allowed either partner to take as much oil as it needed from Kuwait without having to have its offtake matched by the other partner. See Penrose, op. cit., in note 6, p. 156. Anglo Persian later became Anglo Iranian and then British Petroleum (BP), the name I shall use for this firm hereafter.
33. Ibid., pp. 156-57, and Sampson, op. cit., in note 13, Chapter 6.
34. Ibid., pp. 156-57, and Sampson, op. cit., in note 13, Chapter 6.
35. One cause was the 'tanker shortage' created by the closure of the canal. See Edith Penrose, 'The Development of Crisis', in Raymond Vemon (ed.), The Oil Crisis (New York, NY: Norton, 1976), pp. 39-57. An analogous situation affected Kuwaiti oil during the 'tanker war' period of the Iran-Iraq conflict, when insurance rates skyrocketed for shippers going in and out of the Gulf. Iraq and Saudi Arabia had alternative pipeline transit available. Indeed, Saudi Arabia constructed a new pipeline to the Red Sea during the war to reduce its reliance on shipping from the Gulf.
36. These included relinquishment of concession areas that were not being explored or developed, and enhanced opportunities to train a skilled national workforce. See M.A. Ajtony, op. cit., in note 15, and Penrose, op. cit., in note 6.
37. These included relinquishment of concession areas that were not being explored or developed, and enhanced opportunities to train a skilled national workforce. See M.A. Ajtony, op. cit., in note 15, and Penrose, op. cit., in note 6.
38. John Daniel, Kuwait Journey (Luton: White Crescent Press, 1971), pp. 29-30, and Government of Kuwait, Ministry of Finance and Oil, The Oil of Kuwait: Facts and Figures (Kuwait: August 1970), pp. 70 and 81-82. Charges of government corruption made by members of the KNPC board tainted the joint venture with Hispanoil. In any event, its performance was lackluster at best and did virtually nothing to improve the position of Kuwait in the industry.
39. John Daniel, Kuwait Journey (Luton: White Crescent Press, 1971), pp. 29-30, and Government of Kuwait, Ministry of Finance and Oil, The Oil of Kuwait: Facts and Figures (Kuwait: August 1970), pp. 70 and 81-82. Charges of government corruption made by members of the KNPC board tainted the joint venture with Hispanoil. In any event, its performance was lackluster at best and did virtually nothing to improve the position of Kuwait in the industry.
40. Government of Kuwait, Ministry of Finance and Oil, op. cit., in note 23, p. 82. The defenders of the choice of Hispanoil over other firms emphasised the issue of foreign market access. In the end the controversy was moot because no oil was found.
41. Ajtony, op. cit., in note 15, p. 53.
42. Ibid., p. 50-57. This resistance reflected a then-common lack of faith in the technical capabilities of managers and workers from developing countries.
43. Interviews in Kuwait, January-May, 1990.
44. See Tétreault, op. cit., in note 5, Chapter 3.
45. Among the most contentious issues here was the failure of the government to force concessionholders to build projects to use more Kuwaiti associated gas. As a result, the Kuwaiti parliament pushed for a more rapid nationalisation of foreign oil holdings than the government had originally planned.
46. See Tétreault, op. cit., in note 12, Chapter 5.
47. Santa Fe was a partner in the Kuwait Drilling Company, a joint venture including the Kuwaiti government and Kuwaiti private sector shareholders. The motivations for buying Santa Fe were complicated and included a very strong desire on the part of KPC managing director, Sheikh Ali Khalifa, to acquire a US-based company.
48. The whole investment was politically controversial. It was very costly because Kuwait paid a premium for outstanding shares. This touched off charges of insider peculations that persist to this day. Additionally, the performance of CF Braun with respect to the refinery modernisation was technically excellent but highly unsatisfactory in virtually every other respect. A decision to sell the Santa Fe holdings was made in 1994.
49. Tétreault, op. cit., in note 12, Chapter 4.
50. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (Vol. 22, No. 4, 1983), p. 3.
51. Tétreault, op. cit., in note 5, pp. 123-24.
52. Information on KPC asset acquisitions in Europe came from interviews with Giuseppe Baratollo, then-Vice President of Strategic Planning, Kuwait Petroleum International (KP1), and Ralph Brown, thenVice President and Director of New Business Development, KPI, in April 1990, March 1991, and July 1992; with Kris Kopke, refinery manager of Gulfliaven, and other refinery personnel, Kuwait Petroleum Benelux, April 1990; and with KPC personnel in Kuwait, Spring 1990.
53. Tétreault, op. cit., in note 12, pp. 51-52.
54. Ibid., p. 52.
55. Interviews with officials of Kuwait Petroleum, Benelux, April 1990; officials of KPI in London, April 1990 and July 1992; and officials of KUPIT in Rome and Naples, July 1992. A decision to close the Naples refinery was made shortly afterward, but, in 1995, Kuwait signed an agreement providing for a 50/50 joint venture with Agip Petroli to own and manage the Agip refinery in Milazzo, Sicily, and the purchase of about three hundred service stations from the Agip and BP Italy network. See Middle East Economic Survey (Vol. 38, No. 49, 1995), pp. A1-A2 and A13.
56. Interview with Shaqib Otaki, at MEED House, London, April 1990. The correspondent made the link between previous portfolio investments and the lack of concern at direct investments in oil firms.
57. Petroleum Economist (Vol. 51, No. 10, 1984), p. 381.
58. Ibid.
59. Interviews with Giuseppe Baratollo, London, March 1990 and February 1991, see note 36.
60. The first Kuwaiti direct foreign investments, including parts of PIC, were generally disastrous money-losers, according to several of those involved in the initial decisions and then in their implementation. In interviews conducted during the spring of 1990, former Minister of Oil and Finance, Abdel Rahman al-Atiqi, then-Managing Director of PIC Abdul Baqi al-Nouri, and others, attributed the poor outcomes to the disadvantageous strategic position of Kuwait, as well as to its inexperience. Although a developing country itself, Kuwait was expected to make concessions to, rather than demands on, its developing-country hosts. Yet, even when such concessions were made, political exigencies in a host country dictating a tough stand against foreign investors found Kuwaiti investors in no better position than investors from Europe or the United States.
61. Tétreault, op. cit., in note 12, pp. 62-65.
62. Market share figures were as follows: Sweden, 11 per cent; Denmark, 24 per cent; United Kingdom, two per cent; Italy, 10.5 per cent; Netherlands, four per cent; Belgium, five and one-half per cent; and Luxembourg, 12 per cent. KPC was selling products in Germany and France, but not through its own outlets, so it did not have a 'market share' in those countries. However, market share by itself gives no indication of local concentration or the pattern of exchanges-deals between companies to trade products between themselves to supply both networks more efficiently. Being an integral element in a particular location can amplify the impact of national market share for a company with respect to its ability to mobilise others on its own behalf. For example, on exchanges, if KPC affiliates have their operations disrupted, so will their exchange partners, broadening the community of interests affected by the disruption and amplifying the voice calling for a solution which benefits KPC - and Kuwait. The three KPC refineries and associated facilities are important in this regard because they are significant employers in the places where they are located in terms of numbers of workers, ranges of skills, and salaries paid. Embeddedness means being a part of a highly interdependent system, reflecting an influence that ramifies far beyond the bare facts of the percentage total amount of a standard product a company contributes to a national market.
63. Venezuela markets its products under a brand name that does not incorporate linguistic or visual symbols of its national identity.
64. Information about operations during the occupation came from interviews with Ralph Brown (see note 36), Nader Sultan (then-president of KPI), and David Emmerson (KPI legal counsel) in London, March 1991; Khaled Buhamrah (then-Deputy Managing Director KNPC) in Kuwait, March and October 1992; and Kris Kopke, in Rotterdam, August 1992 (see note 36).
65. The coalition countries were those supporting, however lukewarmly, the 1990-1991 liberation effort. These primarily included the United States, Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, but also others.
66. Milton Viorst, Sandcastles: The Arabs in Search of the Modern World (New York, NY: Knopf, 1994), p. 257.
67. The direct payoffs included $18.5 billion to the United States, lesser amounts to other major coalition partners including Britain, France, Egypt, and Syria. See Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Kuwait: The Morning After', Current History (Vol. 91, No. 561, 1992), pp. 9. See also, Viorst, op. cit., in note 50, pp. 262 and 274. About two-thirds of Kuwaiti portfolio assets were liquidated during the crisis. A substantial portion of the liquidated funds-just how much has been the subject of intensive scrutiny by two post-liberation Kuwaiti parliaments-was embezzled.
68. The direct payoffs included $18.5 billion to the United States, lesser amounts to other major coalition partners including Britain, France, Egypt, and Syria. See Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Kuwait: The Morning After', Current History (Vol. 91, No. 561, 1992), pp. 9. See also, Viorst, op. cit., in note 50, pp. 262 and 274. About two-thirds of Kuwaiti portfolio assets were liquidated during the crisis. A substantial portion of the liquidated funds-just how much has been the subject of intensive scrutiny by two post-liberation Kuwaiti parliaments-was embezzled.
69. See the many quotes from interviews with KPC managers throughout Tétreault, op. cit., in note 12, pp. 54-60 and 167-68.
70. I am referring to people such as Brian McNicol, Managing Director of Kuwait Petroleum Research and formerly of Shell, and Giuseppe Baratollo (see note 36), formerly of Exxon, who chose to work for KPC, as opposed to individuals who came by virtue of occupying positions in KPC-acquired companies. Note also that crude oil is owned by the owner of the integrated firm. It is secure because this owner is the home country of the firm and, therefore, nationalisation is not a threat.
71. Interview with David Emmerson, London, 11 March 1991, see note 48.
72. Interview with Kris Kopke, Rotterdam, 4 August 1992, see note 36.
73. Interview with Ralph Brown, London, 8 March 1991, see note 36.
74. See Tétreault, op. cit., in note 12, Chapter 6.
75. Interviews with members of the Free Kuwait Association (London) and Citizens for a Free Kuwait (Washington), in London, Washington, and Kuwait, 1991-1992. The Free Kuwait Association was formed and run by volunteers, in contrast to Citizens for a Free Kuwait, which was created and run by the Kuwaiti government.
76. Interview with David Emmerson, London, 11 March 1991, see note 48.
77. The evidence is anecdotal, based on speaking with people working in the oil industry and those outside the industry in Washington, Virginia, Los Angeles, London, and Amsterdam during the Iraqi occupation and shortly after the liberation of Kuwait.
78. Interview with Ralph Brown, London, 8 March 1991, see note 36.
79. Interviews with Muna al-Mousa, London, March 1991.
80. Interview with Ralph Brown, in London, 8 March 1991, see note 36.
81. Status resources are assets that one has in consequence of holding a particular position. These include such things as authority, expertise, and preferential access to media.
82. Interviews with Santa Fe executives, Alhambra, CA, September 1990.
83. Interview with Michael Lynch, Managing Director of Santa Fe Exploration, London, 16 September 1993.
84. James Bennet, 'How the Media Missed the Story', The Washington Monthly (December 1990), reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York, NY: Times Books, 1991), pp. 355-67. Jean Smith of the University of Toronto attributes President Bush's decision to intervene to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. See Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 1992), p. 70. Margaret Thatcher underscores the importance of her role in urging Bush not to 'go wobbly' on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in her autobiography. See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 816-28. This brings us back to the crucial role of the British in orchestrating the coalition response, and the factors underlying British openhandedness to the Kuwaitis during the crisis.
85. James Bennet, 'How the Media Missed the Story', The Washington Monthly (December 1990), reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York, NY: Times Books, 1991), pp. 355-67. Jean Smith of the University of Toronto attributes President Bush's decision to intervene to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. See Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 1992), p. 70. Margaret Thatcher underscores the importance of her role in urging Bush not to 'go wobbly' on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in her autobiography. See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 816-28. This brings us back to the crucial role of the British in orchestrating the coalition response, and the factors underlying British openhandedness to the Kuwaitis during the crisis.
86. James Bennet, 'How the Media Missed the Story', The Washington Monthly (December 1990), reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York, NY: Times Books, 1991), pp. 355-67. Jean Smith of the University of Toronto attributes President Bush's decision to intervene to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. See Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 1992), p. 70. Margaret Thatcher underscores the importance of her role in urging Bush not to 'go wobbly' on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in her autobiography. See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 816-28. This brings us back to the crucial role of the British in orchestrating the coalition response, and the factors underlying British openhandedness to the Kuwaitis during the crisis.
87. James Bennet, 'How the Media Missed the Story', The Washington Monthly (December 1990), reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (eds.), The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York, NY: Times Books, 1991), pp. 355-67. Jean Smith of the University of Toronto attributes President Bush's decision to intervene to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. See Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 1992), p. 70. Margaret Thatcher underscores the importance of her role in urging Bush not to 'go wobbly' on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in her autobiography. See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 816-28. This brings us back to the crucial role of the British in orchestrating the coalition response, and the factors underlying British openhandedness to the Kuwaitis during the crisis.
88. Smith, op. cit., in note 65, pp. 63-68.
89. Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Interdependence, Sovereignty, and Vested Glory: Oil and Politics in the Second Gulf War', Orient (Vol. 34, No. 1, 1993), pp. 87-103.
90. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York, NY: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944), p. 15, emphasis in original.
91. Ibid.
92. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 38-40.
93. See, for example, Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), especially Chapter 2. See also David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York, NY: Avon Books, 1990), Part 1.
94. See, for example, Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), especially Chapter 2. See also David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York, NY: Avon Books, 1990), Part 1.
95. A number of US-based examples could be cited here. One includes the impression that, while European reconstruction after World War II required vigorous economic intervention by the US government, economic development in the Third World could be left almost entirely to private investors. See, for example, Nathan Godfried, Bridging the Gap Between Rich and Poor: American Economic Development Policy Toward the Arab East, 1942-1949 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). Another is the strategic errors that characterised US oil policy since the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and, even more, those following the Six Day War in 1967. This shortsightedness led the United States to delegate its participation in the Teheran-Tripoli negotiations to private oil companies, and then undercut its position by siding with the Shah of Iran for state security-Nixon doctrine-reasons. Even when it came to war, the inability of the United States to treat the economy or economic actors on a par with high politics concerns remains notable. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to take any advice from the ARAMCO parent companies about the likelihood of an imminent Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and viewed the war when it occurred through strategic lenses. Compare the account in Sampson, op. cit., in note 13, pp. 244-48 with Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), Chapter 11. See also Burton L. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), and Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Models, Metaphors, and Foreign Policy', in Mary Ann Tétreault and Charles Frederick Abel (eds.), Dependency Theory and the Return of High Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 23-42.
96. A number of US-based examples could be cited here. One includes the impression that, while European reconstruction after World War II required vigorous economic intervention by the US government, economic development in the Third World could be left almost entirely to private investors. See, for example, Nathan Godfried, Bridging the Gap Between Rich and Poor: American Economic Development Policy Toward the Arab East, 1942-1949 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). Another is the strategic errors that characterised US oil policy since the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and, even more, those following the Six Day War in 1967. This shortsightedness led the United States to delegate its participation in the Teheran-Tripoli negotiations to private oil companies, and then undercut its position by siding with the Shah of Iran for state security-Nixon doctrine-reasons. Even when it came to war, the inability of the United States to treat the economy or economic actors on a par with high politics concerns remains notable. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to take any advice from the ARAMCO parent companies about the likelihood of an imminent Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and viewed the war when it occurred through strategic lenses. Compare the account in Sampson, op. cit., in note 13, pp. 244-48 with Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), Chapter 11. See also Burton L. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), and Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Models, Metaphors, and Foreign Policy', in Mary Ann Tétreault and Charles Frederick Abel (eds.), Dependency Theory and the Return of High Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 23-42.
97. A number of US-based examples could be cited here. One includes the impression that, while European reconstruction after World War II required vigorous economic intervention by the US government, economic development in the Third World could be left almost entirely to private investors. See, for example, Nathan Godfried, Bridging the Gap Between Rich and Poor: American Economic Development Policy Toward the Arab East, 1942-1949 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). Another is the strategic errors that characterised US oil policy since the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and, even more, those following the Six Day War in 1967. This shortsightedness led the United States to delegate its participation in the Teheran-Tripoli negotiations to private oil companies, and then undercut its position by siding with the Shah of Iran for state security-Nixon doctrine-reasons. Even when it came to war, the inability of the United States to treat the economy or economic actors on a par with high politics concerns remains notable. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to take any advice from the ARAMCO parent companies about the likelihood of an imminent Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and viewed the war when it occurred through strategic lenses. Compare the account in Sampson, op. cit., in note 13, pp. 244-48 with Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), Chapter 11. See also Burton L. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), and Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Models, Metaphors, and Foreign Policy', in Mary Ann Tétreault and Charles Frederick Abel (eds.), Dependency Theory and the Return of High Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 23-42.
98. A number of US-based examples could be cited here. One includes the impression that, while European reconstruction after World War II required vigorous economic intervention by the US government, economic development in the Third World could be left almost entirely to private investors. See, for example, Nathan Godfried, Bridging the Gap Between Rich and Poor: American Economic Development Policy Toward the Arab East, 1942-1949 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). Another is the strategic errors that characterised US oil policy since the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and, even more, those following the Six Day War in 1967. This shortsightedness led the United States to delegate its participation in the Teheran-Tripoli negotiations to private oil companies, and then undercut its position by siding with the Shah of Iran for state security-Nixon doctrine-reasons. Even when it came to war, the inability of the United States to treat the economy or economic actors on a par with high politics concerns remains notable. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to take any advice from the ARAMCO parent companies about the likelihood of an imminent Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and viewed the war when it occurred through strategic lenses. Compare the account in Sampson, op. cit., in note 13, pp. 244-48 with Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), Chapter 11. See also Burton L. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), and Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Models, Metaphors, and Foreign Policy', in Mary Ann Tétreault and Charles Frederick Abel (eds.), Dependency Theory and the Return of High Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 23-42.
99. A number of US-based examples could be cited here. One includes the impression that, while European reconstruction after World War II required vigorous economic intervention by the US government, economic development in the Third World could be left almost entirely to private investors. See, for example, Nathan Godfried, Bridging the Gap Between Rich and Poor: American Economic Development Policy Toward the Arab East, 1942-1949 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). Another is the strategic errors that characterised US oil policy since the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and, even more, those following the Six Day War in 1967. This shortsightedness led the United States to delegate its participation in the Teheran-Tripoli negotiations to private oil companies, and then undercut its position by siding with the Shah of Iran for state security-Nixon doctrine-reasons. Even when it came to war, the inability of the United States to treat the economy or economic actors on a par with high politics concerns remains notable. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to take any advice from the ARAMCO parent companies about the likelihood of an imminent Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and viewed the war when it occurred through strategic lenses. Compare the account in Sampson, op. cit., in note 13, pp. 244-48 with Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), Chapter 11. See also Burton L. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), and Mary Ann Tétreault, 'Models, Metaphors, and Foreign Policy', in Mary Ann Tétreault and Charles Frederick Abel (eds.), Dependency Theory and the Return of High Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 23-42.
100. Examples include the articles in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (eds.), The Democratic State (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), and Graeme Duncan (ed.), Democracy and the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Among the most theoretically sophisticated analyses tying democratisation to economic liberalisation is Bromley, op. cit., in note 73. A meticulously elaborated view of the multiple and multidirectional connections between economic liberalisation and democratisation based on empirical surveys of three regions can be found in Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
101. Examples include the articles in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (eds.), The Democratic State (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), and Graeme Duncan (ed.), Democracy and the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Among the most theoretically sophisticated analyses tying democratisation to economic liberalisation is Bromley, op. cit., in note 73. A meticulously elaborated view of the multiple and multidirectional connections between economic liberalisation and democratisation based on empirical surveys of three regions can be found in Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
102. Examples include the articles in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (eds.), The Democratic State (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), and Graeme Duncan (ed.), Democracy and the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Among the most theoretically sophisticated analyses tying democratisation to economic liberalisation is Bromley, op. cit., in note 73. A meticulously elaborated view of the multiple and multidirectional connections between economic liberalisation and democratisation based on empirical surveys of three regions can be found in Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
103. Examples include the articles in Roger Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (eds.), The Democratic State (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), and Graeme Duncan (ed.), Democracy and the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Among the most theoretically sophisticated analyses tying democratisation to economic liberalisation is Bromley, op. cit., in note 73. A meticulously elaborated view of the multiple and multidirectional connections between economic liberalisation and democratisation based on empirical surveys of three regions can be found in Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
104. See, for example, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of the Republican Era (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995). These issues are prominent among those addressed in Kenneth P. Thomas and Mary Ann Tétreault (eds.), International Political Economy Yearbook (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming), which will be devoted to regionalism. The Yearbook is sponsored by the International Political Economy section of the International Studies Association. A recent analysis of contradictions between European economic integration and French domestic politics can be found in Stanley Hoffmann, 'Look Back in Anger', The New York Review of Books (Vol. 44, No. 10, 1997), pp. 45-50.
105. See, for example, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of the Republican Era (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995). These issues are prominent among those addressed in Kenneth P. Thomas and Mary Ann Tétreault (eds.), International Political Economy Yearbook (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming), which will be devoted to regionalism. The Yearbook is sponsored by the International Political Economy section of the International Studies Association. A recent analysis of contradictions between European economic integration and French domestic politics can be found in Stanley Hoffmann, 'Look Back in Anger', The New York Review of Books (Vol. 44, No. 10, 1997), pp. 45-50.
106. See, for example, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of the Republican Era (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995). These issues are prominent among those addressed in Kenneth P. Thomas and Mary Ann Tétreault (eds.), International Political Economy Yearbook (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming), which will be devoted to regionalism. The Yearbook is sponsored by the International Political Economy section of the International Studies Association. A recent analysis of contradictions between European economic integration and French domestic politics can be found in Stanley Hoffmann, 'Look Back in Anger', The New York Review of Books (Vol. 44, No. 10, 1997), pp. 45-50.
107. Tétreault, op. cit., in note 68, p. 100.
108. See, for example, the interview with former Saudi oil minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani by Adam Zagorin, Time (Vol. 136, No. 24, 1990), p. 22, 24, 26, and 28, or the article by US Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, 'The Stakes in the Gulf', The New Republic (Vol. 204, No. 1-2, 1991), p. 18. Both stressed the need to assure continued crude oil supplies as the rationale for rolling back the Iraqi invasion. A similar argument was reiterated in the context of a need to preserve US dominance over its allies. See Thomas Ferguson, 'The Economic Incentives for War', The Nation (Vol. 253, No. 3, 1991), p. 73, 76-77, and 92.
109. See, for example, the interview with former Saudi oil minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani by Adam Zagorin, Time (Vol. 136, No. 24, 1990), p. 22, 24, 26, and 28, or the article by US Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, 'The Stakes in the Gulf', The New Republic (Vol. 204, No. 1-2, 1991), p. 18. Both stressed the need to assure continued crude oil supplies as the rationale for rolling back the Iraqi invasion. A similar argument was reiterated in the context of a need to preserve US dominance over its allies. See Thomas Ferguson, 'The Economic Incentives for War', The Nation (Vol. 253, No. 3, 1991), p. 73, 76-77, and 92.
110. See, for example, the interview with former Saudi oil minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani by Adam Zagorin, Time (Vol. 136, No. 24, 1990), p. 22, 24, 26, and 28, or the article by US Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, 'The Stakes in the Gulf', The New Republic (Vol. 204, No. 1-2, 1991), p. 18. Both stressed the need to assure continued crude oil supplies as the rationale for rolling back the Iraqi invasion. A similar argument was reiterated in the context of a need to preserve US dominance over its allies. See Thomas Ferguson, 'The Economic Incentives for War', The Nation (Vol. 253, No. 3, 1991), p. 73, 76-77, and 92.
111. Costs are one issue here. Another is internal Kuwaiti opposition to large arms purchases, tied to allegations of kickbacks and corruption in the defence ministry. See, for example, Patrick Clawson, 'US-GCC Security Relations H: Growing Domestic Economic and Political Problems', Strategic Forum (No. 40, 1995), pp. 1-4.
112. During the 1996 parliamentary elections, there was widespread speculation that Iran and Saudi Arabia were financing candidates in order to shift Kuwaiti policy toward regional security arrangements. This information comes from interviews with a variety of candidates, observers, and diplomats, as well as Saif Abbas Abdullah, former chair of the political science department at Kuwait University, in an interview in Kuwait, 2 October 1996. Another harbinger of possible changes in defence arrangements was the attempted assassination of Abdulla Nibari, a prominent leader of the political opposition in the parliament, on 6 June 1997. Nibari's intense public criticism based on accumulating evidence of corruption in defence procurement had already begun to dissolve parliamentary and popular support for the lavish weapons systems whose purchase helps keep US, British, and French leaders interested in the continued survival of Kuwait as a sovereign state. On this issue, see Clawson, op. cit., in note 78.
113. Middle East Economic Digest (Vol. 39, No. 30, 1995), p. 14. This is not only because they were unprofitable, but also because they were politically controversial.
114. A July 1997 decision by the Supreme Petroleum Council of Kuwait to invite foreign companies to take shares in production projects so that the production capacity of Kuwait can be raised to 3.5 million barrels per day (MBD) by 2005 is motivated by both strategic security and economic concerns. See Arab Times (No. 9790, 1997), p. 4.
115. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals. With respect to 'traditional' views, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York, NY, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
116. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals. With respect to 'traditional' views, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York, NY, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
117. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals. With respect to 'traditional' views, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York, NY, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
118. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals. With respect to 'traditional' views, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York, NY, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
119. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals. With respect to 'traditional' views, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York, NY, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
120. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals. With respect to 'traditional' views, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York, NY, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
121. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals.
122. For a discussion of how smaller or weaker states have often been seen in terms of grand strategy, see Fromkin, op. cit., in note 73; Godfried, op. cit., in note 74; and Kissinger, op. cit., in note 74. For a discussion of this point with reference to Vietnam, see James William Gibson, The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York, NY: Vintage, 1988). Two interesting exceptions in the scholarly literature are Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). However, it is probably significant that each of these authors treats smaller or weaker states as working collectively to achieve their goals. With respect to 'traditional' views, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York, NY, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
123. For a discussion on modernity, overcoming traditional barriers of space and time, and retlexivity, see Giddens, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 17-21. Hannah Arendt defines 'action' in a similar fashion to the way in which Giddens defines 'reflexivity'. In contrast to Giddens, Arendt argues that even though the end of action cannot be known beforehand, it has a purpose derived from the desires and capacities of the individuals involved. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), Chapter 5. Both authors emphasise the role of fragmentation as one of the reasons why the ends of action or retlexivity cannot be pre-determined regardless of the intentions of the actors.
124. For a discussion on modernity, overcoming traditional barriers of space and time, and retlexivity, see Giddens, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 17-21. Hannah Arendt defines 'action' in a similar fashion to the way in which Giddens defines 'reflexivity'. In contrast to Giddens, Arendt argues that even though the end of action cannot be known beforehand, it has a purpose derived from the desires and capacities of the individuals involved. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), Chapter 5. Both authors emphasise the role of fragmentation as one of the reasons why the ends of action or retlexivity cannot be pre-determined regardless of the intentions of the actors.
125. See, for example, Grant T. Hammond and Bryant P Shaw, 'Conflict, the Rise of Nations, and the Decay of States: The Transformation of the International System?', Journal of Conflict Studies (Vol. 15, No. 1, 1995), pp. 5-29.