Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-37

  Anderlini, Luca ^a  

^a ST JOHN S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Common interest games; computability; preplay communication

Indexed keywords

EID: 0004827169     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0652     Document Type: Article

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