Congressional Party Leadership: Utilitarian versus Majoritarian Incentives

Legislative Studies Quarterly

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 219-243

  Bawn, Kathleen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003359596     PISSN: 03629805     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/440281     Document Type: Article

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