Modern absolutist or neopatriarchal state building? Customary law, extended families, and the Palestinian authority

International Journal of Middle East Studies

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 341-358

  Frisch, Hillel ^a,b  

^a Department of Political Science ^*  (Israel)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003278791     PISSN: 00207438     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743800064801     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. Al-Quds, 29 September 1995.
2. The Oslo B Agreements are the most recent of three accords that have led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority. The first, the Declaration of Principles signed by Chairman Yasir Arafat of the PLO, and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993, conceived the Palestinian Authority. The second was the Cairo Agreement, concluded on 4 May 1994, through which the PA secured both geographical and functional jurisdiction over most of Gaza and the small town of Jericho in the West Bank. Finally, the Oslo B accords, signed on 28 September 1995, extended PA rule over five West Bank towns and joint control over approximately 30 percent of West Bank territory.
3. In Israel, the cabinet meetings take place every Sunday.
4. The term "juridical state" was coined by Robert H. Jackson and Carl J. Rosberg in their article, "Why African States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35 (1982): 1-25. It refers to a state that is ineffective domestically but nevertheless recognized and often maintained artificially by the international community. The fact that states no longer have to fight for their survival in the face of external foes can make for bad leadership at home and often for disastrous government performance.
5. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70-76; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); idem, "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation," in The Formation of National States, 601-38; Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 142-50. According to Callaghy, leaders, either of national movements seeking to create and build the state or of newly founded states, engage in three-way conflict: "the battle between the state and society that it wishes to dominate; the context with external groups, organizations, and states; and the struggle within the state between the ruler and the staff." He describes state formation as a process of centralization, consolidation, expansion of power and control, monopolization of decision making and adjudication in a single legal system and extraction of resources. These features are true even of nonrevolutionary regimes whose state-formation elites pursue "a coverover strategy that tends to develop commitments to societal and external groups that restrict the regime's freedom of movement to some degree" (p. 97).
6. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70-76; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); idem, "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation," in The Formation of National States, 601-38; Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 142-50. According to Callaghy, leaders, either of national movements seeking to create and build the state or of newly founded states, engage in three-way conflict: "the battle between the state and society that it wishes to dominate; the context with external groups, organizations, and states; and the struggle within the state between the ruler and the staff." He describes state formation as a process of centralization, consolidation, expansion of power and control, monopolization of decision making and adjudication in a single legal system and extraction of resources. These features are true even of nonrevolutionary regimes whose state-formation elites pursue "a coverover strategy that tends to develop commitments to societal and external groups that restrict the regime's freedom of movement to some degree" (p. 97).
7. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70-76; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); idem, "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation," in The Formation of National States, 601-38; Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 142-50. According to Callaghy, leaders, either of national movements seeking to create and build the state or of newly founded states, engage in three-way conflict: "the battle between the state and society that it wishes to dominate; the context with external groups, organizations, and states; and the struggle within the state between the ruler and the staff." He describes state formation as a process of centralization, consolidation, expansion of power and control, monopolization of decision making and adjudication in a single legal system and extraction of resources. These features are true even of nonrevolutionary regimes whose state-formation elites pursue "a coverover strategy that tends to develop commitments to societal and external groups that restrict the regime's freedom of movement to some degree" (p. 97).
8. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 70-76; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); idem, "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation," in The Formation of National States, 601-38; Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 142-50. According to Callaghy, leaders, either of national movements seeking to create and build the state or of newly founded states, engage in three-way conflict: "the battle between the state and society that it wishes to dominate; the context with external groups, organizations, and states; and the struggle within the state between the ruler and the staff." He describes state formation as a process of centralization, consolidation, expansion of power and control, monopolization of decision making and adjudication in a single legal system and extraction of resources. These features are true even of nonrevolutionary regimes whose state-formation elites pursue "a coverover strategy that tends to develop commitments to societal and external groups that restrict the regime's freedom of movement to some degree" (p. 97).
9. Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 7.
10. Ibid.
11. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
12. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
13. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
14. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
15. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
16. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
17. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
18. This was especially evident in the first wave of scholarly writing on the Intifada. See, for example, Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada," Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger, 1990), 15-37; Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 155-70; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada," in Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, 107-9; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in ibid., 131; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in The Palestinians: New Directions, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 77-83. On the importance of tradition and "traditionalization," see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18; and John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful (London: Nicolson and Weidenfeld, 1970), 155-65.
19. ⊂Oved, 1988) (in Hebrew), 142-43. Sivan exhibits exactly how the line between presidential and monarchical regimes is tenuous, at best. His examples include the cult of personality surrounding the president, as well as the various national holidays that have become specifically associated with the president as opposed to the state.
20. ⊂Oved, 1988) (in Hebrew), 142-43. Sivan exhibits exactly how the line between presidential and monarchical regimes is tenuous, at best. His examples include the cult of personality surrounding the president, as well as the various national holidays that have become specifically associated with the president as opposed to the state.
21. Anderson, "Absolutism," 14.
22. Ibid., 11.
23. Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, 7.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., xi.
26. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 42, 62.
27. Ibid., 84.
28. I thank Dr. Ifrah Zilberman for sharing these findings based on an unpublished study of the role of extended families in the growth of the modern shoemaking industry in Hebron.
29. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978), 102.
30. ⊂arekhet Hevratit BeMerhav Yerushalayim" (Customary Law as a Social System in the Jerusalem Area), HaMizrach HeHadash 33 (1991), 70-93. For a general overview of customary law in the context of legal pluralism, see Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism," Law and Society Review 22 (1988): 869-96. For a more comprehensive look at legal pluralism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, see M. B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
31. ⊂arekhet Hevratit BeMerhav Yerushalayim" (Customary Law as a Social System in the Jerusalem Area), HaMizrach HeHadash 33 (1991), 70-93. For a general overview of customary law in the context of legal pluralism, see Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism," Law and Society Review 22 (1988): 869-96. For a more comprehensive look at legal pluralism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, see M. B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
32. ⊂arekhet Hevratit BeMerhav Yerushalayim" (Customary Law as a Social System in the Jerusalem Area), HaMizrach HeHadash 33 (1991), 70-93. For a general overview of customary law in the context of legal pluralism, see Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism," Law and Society Review 22 (1988): 869-96. For a more comprehensive look at legal pluralism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, see M. B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
33. Ibid., 82.
34. Ibid., 74-75.
35. This is a symptom of what Hourani calls "the politics of notables." See Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reforms and the Politics of Notables," in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). "Politics of notables" is not unique to the Middle East; Silliman, for example, recently demonstrated that neighborhood law in the Philippines has been administered by "neighborhood captains" who are in reality state officials; see Sidney G. Silliman, "A Political Analysis of the Philippines' Katarungang Pambarangay System of Informal Justice Through Mediation," Law and Society Review 15 (1985).
36. This is a symptom of what Hourani calls "the politics of notables." See Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reforms and the Politics of Notables," in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). "Politics of notables" is not unique to the Middle East; Silliman, for example, recently demonstrated that neighborhood law in the Philippines has been administered by "neighborhood captains" who are in reality state officials; see Sidney G. Silliman, "A Political Analysis of the Philippines' Katarungang Pambarangay System of Informal Justice Through Mediation," Law and Society Review 15 (1985).
37. Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective (Albany; State University of New York Press, 1994), 113-26.
38. Ibid., 113-14.
39. ⊂a in a Tribal Society in Process of Sedentarization," unpublished paper.
40. ⊂a in a Tribal Society in Process of Sedentarization," unpublished paper.
41. ⊂a in a Tribal Society in Process of Sedentarization," unpublished paper.
42. ⊂a in a Tribal Society in Process of Sedentarization," unpublished paper.
43. Zilberman, "Customary Law," 78-79. For an analysis of customary law in the Jordanian context, see Ahmad Oweidi, "Bedouin Justice in Jordan" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1982).
44. Zilberman, "Customary Law," 78-79. For an analysis of customary law in the Jordanian context, see Ahmad Oweidi, "Bedouin Justice in Jordan" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1982).
45. Zilberman, "Customary Law," 78-79.
46. Oweidi, "Bedouin Justice," 322.
47. Zilberman, "Customary Law," 80.
48. George Emile Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rule (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 125.
49. Adrien Katherine Wing, "Legitimacy and Coercion: Legal Traditions and Legal Rules During the Intifada," Middle East Policy 2 (1993): 90. See also Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers, 42.
50. Adrien Katherine Wing, "Legitimacy and Coercion: Legal Traditions and Legal Rules During the Intifada," Middle East Policy 2 (1993): 90. See also Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers, 42.
51. In September 1967, about 52 percent of the West Bank resided in rural areas. See Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Boulder, Colo., and London: Westview Press, 1985), 30. A more recent estimate placed the rural population of all the occupied territories at 70 percent; see Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Impact on the Social Structure of Palestinian Society," in Occupation: Israel over Palestine, ed. Naseer Aruri (London: Zed Books, 1984), 227, 232-35. The rural population-growth rate in the West Bank under Jordanian rule increased by 70 percent; see Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank: A Study in intercommunal Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), 34. On the other hand, the population of the Amman area alone increased by a factorial of 1.89 from 220,032 in 1956 to 417,390 in 1961; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, National Statistical Yearbook, 1956, vol. 7 (Amman: National Printing Press, 1956); and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1961, vol. 12 (Jerusalem: Industrial Islamic Orphanage Printing Press, 1961).
52. In September 1967, about 52 percent of the West Bank resided in rural areas. See Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Boulder, Colo., and London: Westview Press, 1985), 30. A more recent estimate placed the rural population of all the occupied territories at 70 percent; see Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Impact on the Social Structure of Palestinian Society," in Occupation: Israel over Palestine, ed. Naseer Aruri (London: Zed Books, 1984), 227, 232-35. The rural population-growth rate in the West Bank under Jordanian rule increased by 70 percent; see Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank: A Study in intercommunal Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), 34. On the other hand, the population of the Amman area alone increased by a factorial of 1.89 from 220,032 in 1956 to 417,390 in 1961; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, National Statistical Yearbook, 1956, vol. 7 (Amman: National Printing Press, 1956); and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1961, vol. 12 (Jerusalem: Industrial Islamic Orphanage Printing Press, 1961).
53. In September 1967, about 52 percent of the West Bank resided in rural areas. See Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Boulder, Colo., and London: Westview Press, 1985), 30. A more recent estimate placed the rural population of all the occupied territories at 70 percent; see Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Impact on the Social Structure of Palestinian Society," in Occupation: Israel over Palestine, ed. Naseer Aruri (London: Zed Books, 1984), 227, 232-35. The rural population-growth rate in the West Bank under Jordanian rule increased by 70 percent; see Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank: A Study in intercommunal Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), 34. On the other hand, the population of the Amman area alone increased by a factorial of 1.89 from 220,032 in 1956 to 417,390 in 1961; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, National Statistical Yearbook, 1956, vol. 7 (Amman: National Printing Press, 1956); and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1961, vol. 12 (Jerusalem: Industrial Islamic Orphanage Printing Press, 1961).
54. In September 1967, about 52 percent of the West Bank resided in rural areas. See Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Boulder, Colo., and London: Westview Press, 1985), 30. A more recent estimate placed the rural population of all the occupied territories at 70 percent; see Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Impact on the Social Structure of Palestinian Society," in Occupation: Israel over Palestine, ed. Naseer Aruri (London: Zed Books, 1984), 227, 232-35. The rural population-growth rate in the West Bank under Jordanian rule increased by 70 percent; see Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank: A Study in intercommunal Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), 34. On the other hand, the population of the Amman area alone increased by a factorial of 1.89 from 220,032 in 1956 to 417,390 in 1961; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, National Statistical Yearbook, 1956, vol. 7 (Amman: National Printing Press, 1956); and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1961, vol. 12 (Jerusalem: Industrial Islamic Orphanage Printing Press, 1961).
55. In September 1967, about 52 percent of the West Bank resided in rural areas. See Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Boulder, Colo., and London: Westview Press, 1985), 30. A more recent estimate placed the rural population of all the occupied territories at 70 percent; see Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Impact on the Social Structure of Palestinian Society," in Occupation: Israel over Palestine, ed. Naseer Aruri (London: Zed Books, 1984), 227, 232-35. The rural population-growth rate in the West Bank under Jordanian rule increased by 70 percent; see Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank: A Study in intercommunal Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), 34. On the other hand, the population of the Amman area alone increased by a factorial of 1.89 from 220,032 in 1956 to 417,390 in 1961; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, National Statistical Yearbook, 1956, vol. 7 (Amman: National Printing Press, 1956); and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1961, vol. 12 (Jerusalem: Industrial Islamic Orphanage Printing Press, 1961).
56. Muhammad Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," The Middle East Journal 47 (Spring 1993): 258-74.
57. See n. 8.
58. Zilberman, "Customary Law," 87.
59. Adrien Katherine Wing, "The Intifada: The Emergence of Embryonic Legal Mechanisms for Palestinian Self-Determination," Arab Studies Quarterly 15, 4 (1993): 69, 75.
60. Zilberman, "Customary Law," 88. He also points out the weakening, at least to some extent, of the family structure during the Intifada.
61. Ibid.
62. Wing, "The Intifada," 70-71.
63. The Shabiba Movement, founded in the late 1970s by released Fath prisoners on the model of the communist front organization, became the major vehicle of political mobilization in the West Bank and Gaza during the following decade. For a detailed analysis of its genesis and development, see Hillel Frisch, "Binuy Mosdot Falestinai baShtachim 1967-1985" (Palestinian Institution Building in the Territories 1967-1985) (Ph.D. diss., The Hebrew University. 1989), chap. 7.
64. ⊂Abd Abu Diab, Jerusalem, 19 October 1995.
65. Al-Quds, 23 January 1992.
66. Al-Quds, 1 January 1992.
67. Al-Quds, 26 January 1992.
68. Al-Quds, 14 February 1994.
69. The analysis is based on congratulatory announcements as they appeared in Al-Quds. 14-16 September 1993.
70. ⊂th of Khan Yunis. The killing of Nasr Ishaq Sawalha, a 22-year-old Hamas activist, in Gaza reflects this reality from a different perspective. Presumably, he was killed by family members of a man whom the Hamas suspected of collaboration and killed during the Intifada.
71. AI-Quds, 5 November 1995.
72. Al-Quds, 1 November 1995.
73. Al-Quds, 26 October 1995.
74. Interview with Khalid al-Qidra, attorney general of the PA, Gaza, 28 May 1995.
75. ⊂As and the second by Abu Hurayra. According to these two sources, the proper punishment for a "semi-intended" murder is a fine.
76. ⊃l-rabt) and the Fath-based arbitration committees (lijān al-islāh). The family pledged a contribution of U.S. $50,000 toward the opening of a cultural center for the people of the camp in the near future, all within broad goals "of assuring justice, equality, democracy and brotherhood on the long path of [Palestinian] struggle without respite." In this case, the extended family unit, which functions to amass wealth, has turned some of that wealth into a family trust for the cultivation of civil society.
77. Al-Quds, 24 October 1995.
78. Al-Quds, 2 November 1995.
79. Al-Quds, 17 October 1995.
80. Al-Quds, 29 October 1995.
81. See Hillel Frisch, "The Palestinian Movement in the Territories; The Middle Command," Middle Eastern Studies 29 (1993), 254-74.
82. Idem, "Palestinian Institution Building," chap. 7.
83. Majallat al-Dirāsāt al-Filastīniyya (Winter 1995), 66.
84. Ibid., 65.
85. Ibid., 78.
86. Al-Quds, 29 October 1995.
87. ⊂, financial committee; and Intisar al-Wazir, women's committee.
88. For one of the earliest and most powerful critiques of this division of labor, see Ibrahim Daqqaq, "A Study in the Palestinian Identity of the West Bank: Back to Square One," in Palestinians on Both Sides of the Green Line, ed. Alexander Schölch (London: Ithaca, 1983), 64-101.
89. The growing strength of family politics is best captured in an article in Al-Quds, 26 October 1995, entitled "The Heat of Elections Invades the Palestinian Street," by Muhammad Zahayka, who notes the growing importance of "the tribal factor in the absence of any activity of the political and factional forces in acknowledging the innovations that have occurred on the Arab and international planes in the last couple of years."
90. ⊃l-Nizām al-Siyāsī al-Filastīnī (The Elections and the Palestinian Political System) (Nablus: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, February 1995), 172-73.
91. Ibid., 199.
92. ⊂Abed, a Palestinian Jordanian, is currently assistant director of general finance at the International Monetary Fund. As of April 1995, this state bureaucracy consumed about half of the PA budget ($216 million out of a $444 million budget for a nine-month period, from April to December of 1995); Matrix of Donors' Assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, the World Bank Office in Jerusalem, draft paper.
93. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 12.
94. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 12-13.
95. Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18.