Norms, third-party sanctions, and cooperation

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 1990, Pages 33-63

  Bendor, Jonathan ^a   Mookherjee, Dilip ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003182499     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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