Issues in Corruption Control in Post-Mao China

Issues and Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 9, 1998, Pages 1-21

  Manion, Melanie ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Anti corruption campaigns; China; Corruption; Corruption control; Criminal law

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003070210     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
2. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
3. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
4. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
5. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
6. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
7. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
8. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
9. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
10. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
11. See, for example, discussions in Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Grey and Black: The Hidden Economy of Rural China," Pacific Affairs 55, no. 3 (1982): 452-71; Keith Forster, "The 1982 Campaign Against Economic Crime in China," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 14 (1985): 1-19; Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Helena Kolenda, "One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It," Journal of Chinese Law 4, no. 2 (1990): 187-232; Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Bureaucratic Corruption During the Deng Xiaoping Era," Corruption and Reform 5, no. 5 (1990): 29-47; Alan P.L. Liu, "The Politics of Corruption in the People's Republic of China," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 602-23; Carlos Wing-hung Lo, China's Legal Awakening: Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng's Era (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, "Explaining China's Recent Political Corruption," Corruption and Reform 1, no. 1 (1986): 209-33; Jean-Louis Rocca, "Corruption and Its Shadow: An Anthropological View of Corruption in China," The China Quarterly, no. 130 (1992): 402-16; James D. Seymour, "Cadre Accountability to the Law," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21 (1989): 1-27; Deborah E. Townsend, "The Concept of Law in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Economic Crime," Stanford Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (1987): 227-58.
12. This is not to imply that such a definition is always unproblematic, only that it provides a good point of departure for making the key points in this study. On definitional issues, see especially John A. Gardiner, "Defining Corruption," Corruption and Reform 7, no. 2 (1992): 111-24.
13. See, for example, Sun Qian, Jiancha lilun yanjiu zongshu 1979-1989 (A summary of theoretical studies on procuratorial work 1979-1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1990), 27-28; Wei Pingxiong and Wang Ranji, eds., Tanwu huilu zui de rending yu duice (Determining and countering the crimes of corruption and bribery) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1992), 184-91; Wen Shengtang, "The Anti-Corruption Effort in China in 1995," in 1995-1996 nian Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Chinese society in 1995-96: Analysis of the situation and predictions), ed. Jiang Liu, Lu Xueyi, and Shan Tianlun (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996), 97-111.
14. See, for example, Sun Qian, Jiancha lilun yanjiu zongshu 1979-1989 (A summary of theoretical studies on procuratorial work 1979-1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1990), 27-28; Wei Pingxiong and Wang Ranji, eds., Tanwu huilu zui de rending yu duice (Determining and countering the crimes of corruption and bribery) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1992), 184-91; Wen Shengtang, "The Anti-Corruption Effort in China in 1995," in 1995-1996 nian Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Chinese society in 1995-96: Analysis of the situation and predictions), ed. Jiang Liu, Lu Xueyi, and Shan Tianlun (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996), 97-111.
15. See, for example, Sun Qian, Jiancha lilun yanjiu zongshu 1979-1989 (A summary of theoretical studies on procuratorial work 1979-1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1990), 27-28; Wei Pingxiong and Wang Ranji, eds., Tanwu huilu zui de rending yu duice (Determining and countering the crimes of corruption and bribery) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1992), 184-91; Wen Shengtang, "The Anti-Corruption Effort in China in 1995," in 1995-1996 nian Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Chinese society in 1995-96: Analysis of the situation and predictions), ed. Jiang Liu, Lu Xueyi, and Shan Tianlun (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996), 97-111.
16. See Arts. 151 and 155 of "The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China" (Fifth National People's Congress, Second Session, July 1, 1979), in The Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 65-109. I note that the principle is nowhere presented explicitly or generally as such in the 1979 Criminal Law, although Art. 119 on smuggling and profiteering states that officials who exploit public office to commit these crimes are to be punished more harshly.
17. Criminal detention constitutes a deprivation of freedom, as it takes place in a center administered by the local public security agency. An individual sentenced to control continues to work as usual (although under the "supervision" of the public security agency and "the masses") and reports periodically to the local public security agency.
18. CCP Central Committee General Office, "Supplementary Provisions on Punishment for the Crimes of Corruption and Accepting Bribes (Draft) (Excerpts)" (August 13, 1982), in Lianzheng shouce (Handbook on clean government) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin gongan daxue chubanshe, 1989), 531-32.
19. Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, Twenty-fourth Session, "Supplementary Provisions on Punishment for the Crimes of Corruption and Bribery" (January 21, 1988), in Chachu "guandao" anjian shiyongfagui shouce (Handbook of regulations and laws on investigation and punishment in cases of "official profiteering") (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1989), 34-37.
20. Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate, "Explanation of Certain Issues in Application of the Law in Handling Cases of Theft" (December 11, 1992), in Chachu jingji weifa fanzui zhengce fagui shouce (Handbook of policies, regulations, and laws on investigation and punishment in cases of economic crimes), comp. Supreme People's Procuratorate General Office (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1996), 164-71.
21. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa (Criminal law of the People's Republic of China), Eighth National People's Congress, Fifth Session, March 14, 1997 (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1997).
22. See Arts. 264, 382, and 383. Other crimes for which the 1997 Criminal Law states monetary values are: bribery, smuggling, tax evasion, resistance of tax payment, manufacture or sale of fake or shoddy goods, and certain crimes involving illegal drugs.
23. Considering the specification of minimum, maximum, and supplementary punishments for the two crimes, the 1997 Criminal Law certainly does not view corruption as essentially more serious than ordinary theft.
24. CCP Central Committee General Office, "Supplementary Provisions on Punishment for the Crimes of Corruption and Accepting Bribes (Draft) (Excerpts)," 533.
25. Wen, "The Anti-Corruption Effort in China in 1995," 109.
26. Wei and Wang, Tanwu huilu zui de rendingyu duice, 187. There is also an organizational incentive that may have led procuratorates to prosecute as corruption or bribery crimes of ordinary theft or swindling. Under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, cases of corruption and bribery are investigated exclusively by procuratorates, but cases of ordinary theft and swindling are normally investigated by public security agencies. The Criminal Procedure Law permits investigation by procuratorates of any cases "considered necessary"; the procuratorate can take any case involving an official rather than an ordinary citizen. Nonetheless, the distinction in the law itself, which assigns some sorts of cases more routinely to one agency than another, may have contributed to the purposeful categorization of cases of ordinary theft or swindling as cases of corruption or bribery. See Art. 13 of "The Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China" (Fifth National People's Congress, Second Session, July 1, 1979), in The Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, 111- 214. This basic division of labor was not altered in the revised Criminal Procedure Law, although procuratorates now require approval by a procuratorate at or above the provincial level to investigate cases outside the categories specified in the law. See Art. 18 of Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa (Criminal procedure law of the People's Republic of China), Eighth National People's Congress, Fourth Session, March 17, 1996 (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1996).
27. Wei and Wang, Tanwu huilu zui de rendingyu duice, 187. There is also an organizational incentive that may have led procuratorates to prosecute as corruption or bribery crimes of ordinary theft or swindling. Under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, cases of corruption and bribery are investigated exclusively by procuratorates, but cases of ordinary theft and swindling are normally investigated by public security agencies. The Criminal Procedure Law permits investigation by procuratorates of any cases "considered necessary"; the procuratorate can take any case involving an official rather than an ordinary citizen. Nonetheless, the distinction in the law itself, which assigns some sorts of cases more routinely to one agency than another, may have contributed to the purposeful categorization of cases of ordinary theft or swindling as cases of corruption or bribery. See Art. 13 of "The Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China" (Fifth National People's Congress, Second Session, July 1, 1979), in The Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, 111-214. This basic division of labor was not altered in the revised Criminal Procedure Law, although procuratorates now require approval by a procuratorate at or above the provincial level to investigate cases outside the categories specified in the law. See Art. 18 of Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa (Criminal procedure law of the People's Republic of China), Eighth National People's Congress, Fourth Session, March 17, 1996 (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1996).
28. Wei and Wang, Tanwu huilu zui de rendingyu duice, 187. There is also an organizational incentive that may have led procuratorates to prosecute as corruption or bribery crimes of ordinary theft or swindling. Under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, cases of corruption and bribery are investigated exclusively by procuratorates, but cases of ordinary theft and swindling are normally investigated by public security agencies. The Criminal Procedure Law permits investigation by procuratorates of any cases "considered necessary"; the procuratorate can take any case involving an official rather than an ordinary citizen. Nonetheless, the distinction in the law itself, which assigns some sorts of cases more routinely to one agency than another, may have contributed to the purposeful categorization of cases of ordinary theft or swindling as cases of corruption or bribery. See Art. 13 of "The Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China" (Fifth National People's Congress, Second Session, July 1, 1979), in The Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, 111- 214. This basic division of labor was not altered in the revised Criminal Procedure Law, although procuratorates now require approval by a procuratorate at or above the provincial level to investigate cases outside the categories specified in the law. See Art. 18 of Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa (Criminal procedure law of the People's Republic of China), Eighth National People's Congress, Fourth Session, March 17, 1996 (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1996).
29. Exemption from criminal prosecution is different from exemption from criminal punishment. The latter is a decision taken by the court, which occurs after the procuratorial decision to prosecute.
30. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa, July 1, 1979 and March 17, 1996, Arts. 11 and 15, respectively.
31. See especially the discussion in "Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign" (Note), Harvard Law Review 98, no. 8 (1985): 1890-1908.
32. Exceptions are cases of political dissidents, who are often subjected to reeducation through labor, an administrative sanction distinguished from reform through labor (a criminal punishment) almost solely by the principle that individuals undergoing reeducation are to be paid for their labor. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Justice with Chinese Characteristics: China's Criminal Process and Violations of Human Rights (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1993), 66-76.
33. The proportion of cases dropped can be roughly estimated by comparing the figures presented in column five of table 1 with figures on all cases of corruption filed and investigated in the same years. Obviously, imprecision is introduced as the differences between the two sets of figures include cases filed, investigated, and ultimately dropped in the same year and cases carried over from the previous year (i.e., filed and investigated in one year, but prosecuted or exempted from prosecution in a later year). The latter sort of situation is probably not uncommon, but if we sum up the differences over the nine-year period, the year-to-year variation probably averages out. By this calculation, an estimated 9 percent of cases of corruption are dropped, with 91 percent prosecuted or exempted from prosecution.
34. Procuratorates may conduct their own investigation of cases in the former category if they consider it necessary. Public security agencies conduct initial investigations and transfer these cases to procuratorates with recommendations to prosecute or exempt from prosecution. After reviewing the investigations, procuratorates may decide to transfer the case back to public security agencies for further investigation or conduct their own further investigation. Typically, however, cases are not investigated further but are prosecuted or exempted from prosecution. Occasionally, procuratorates decide to drop cases transferred to them by public security agencies.
35. Exemption from prosecution in cases of bribery (which, by legal definition, involves public officials) is similarly high and exhibits similar volatility. As a proportion of cases investigated (i.e., by procuratorates, which have exclusive investigatory jurisdiction over this crime) in 1987-95, exemptions averaged 50 percent, ranging from a low of 15 percent in 1994 to a high of 67 percent in 1989.
36. Even before passage of the 1997 Criminal Law, exemption from prosecution could also be granted in cases of corruption involving more than two thousand yuan, even in non-campaign periods. The Supreme People's Procuratorate introduced measures permitting exemption from prosecution in cases of corruption or bribery involving amounts of up to five thousand yuan if officials guilty of the violation turned themselves in, offered assistance to the authorities or otherwise demonstrated remorse, and took the initiative to return the illegally obtained property. Normally, however, cases involving more than two thousand yuan were to be prosecuted. Supreme People's Procuratorate, "Some Opinions on the Correct Application of Exemption from Prosecution for Cases of Corruption, Bribery, and Other Economic Crimes (Revised Draft)" (December 25, 1982), in Lianzheng shouce, 487-89, and "Provisions on Exemption from Prosecution in Cases of Corruption and Accepting a Bribe" (December 26, 1991), in Fan fubai zhengce fagui shouce (Handbook of policies, regulations, and laws to counter corruption), comp. CCP Central Discipline Inspection Commission, Office of Regulation and Law and Office for Coordination of Supervisory Work (Beijing: Zhongguo fangzheng chubanshe, 1994), 185-91.
37. Even before passage of the 1997 Criminal Law, exemption from prosecution could also be granted in cases of corruption involving more than two thousand yuan, even in non- campaign periods. The Supreme People's Procuratorate introduced measures permitting exemption from prosecution in cases of corruption or bribery involving amounts of up to five thousand yuan if officials guilty of the violation turned themselves in, offered assistance to the authorities or otherwise demonstrated remorse, and took the initiative to return the illegally obtained property. Normally, however, cases involving more than two thousand yuan were to be prosecuted. Supreme People's Procuratorate, "Some Opinions on the Correct Application of Exemption from Prosecution for Cases of Corruption, Bribery, and Other Economic Crimes (Revised Draft)" (December 25, 1982), in Lianzheng shouce, 487-89, and "Provisions on Exemption from Prosecution in Cases of Corruption and Accepting a Bribe" (December 26, 1991), in Fan fubai zhengce fagui shouce (Handbook of policies, regulations, and laws to counter corruption), comp. CCP Central Discipline Inspection Commission, Office of Regulation and Law and Office for Coordination of Supervisory Work (Beijing: Zhongguo fangzheng chubanshe, 1994), 185-91.
38. Periods of intensive enforcement, which this author calls "anti-corruption campaigns," can result in additional exemptions not only because of clemency periods that precede them (as in 1982 and 1989), but also because exemptions are a way to "complete" cases in a shorter period of time than is involved in going through the court system. To the extent that procuratorates are under pressure to complete cases in anti-corruption campaigns (i.e., as a measure of performance), it is possible that exemptions may be artificially boosted.
39. The term "campaign" is used here to refer to intensive bursts of enforcement that the Chinese usually term "battles." In the Chinese political historical context the term "campaign" involves the mobilization of the masses, clearly lacking in these recent anti-corruption campaigns.
40. For example, by summing up the figures for 1987-95 in columns two and five of table 1 above, it is evident that in these years more than 90 percent of crimes of property violation (which includes theft, swindling, extortion, forcible seizure, and corruption) were ordinary crimes investigated by public security agencies. Procuratorates investigated fewer than 10 percent of such cases, which presumably includes all cases of corruption as well as crimes of theft, swindling, extortion, and forcible seizure committed by public officials.
41. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa (July 1, 1979), Art. 13. See also Sun, Jiancha lilun yanjiu zongshu.
42. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa (July 1, 1979), Art. 13. See also Sun, Jiancha lilun yanjiu zongshu.
43. The revised Criminal Procedure Law reduced the scope of procuratorial authority somewhat by removing procuratorial responsibility for investigating tax evasion and resistance of tax payment. More significantly, it replaced procuratorial authority to investigate additional crimes "as necessary" with a requirement for approval of a procuratorate at or above the provincial level for expansion (i.e., beyond the categories of crimes specified in the law) of procuratorial investigatory authority in specific cases. Authority to investigate crimes of corruption, bribery, and misappropriation of public funds remains unaffected by these changes, however. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa (March 17, 1996), Art. 18.
44. Sun, Jiancha lilun yanjiu zongshu, 212-13; Dong Chunjiang and Ding Muying, "The Work of Directly Accepting and Investigating Cases Must Not Be Eliminated," Renmin jiancha (People's Procuratorate), no. 7 (1993): 57-58.
45. Sun, Jiancha lilun yanjiu zongshu, 212-13; Dong Chunjiang and Ding Muying, "The Work of Directly Accepting and Investigating Cases Must Not Be Eliminated," Renmin jiancha (People's Procuratorate), no. 7 (1993): 57-58.
46. When a procuratorate receives information about a crime, it conducts a preliminary review to verify basic facts and the likelihood that the matter is indeed in the nature of a crime. A case is filed and investigated only if the review process indicates that the facts of a crime are reasonably clear and that the matter concerns a violation of law. Thus the decision to file and investigate a case signifies that a report or accusation has sufficient merit to pursue a more specialized investigation of a crime, normally leading to prosecution or exemption from prosecution. As discussed above, it appears that many cases investigated by procuratorates are exempted from prosecution (see table 1), but this is due mainly to the tolerance of official misconduct reflected in the definition of acts legally punishable as crimes. Thus figures on cases filed and investigated include official misconduct investigated as crimes by procuratorates, although not necessarily punished as such. This inclusiveness is useful, especially considering the bias against routine transfer of cases to the criminal justice system by party discipline inspection committees. Finally, a focus on cases filed and investigated is more useful than cases accepted or cases concluded. This is because the figures on cases accepted include those that are ultimately not pursued (including cases that lack foundation) and the figures on cases concluded contain a greater time lag than do figures on those filed and investigated.
47. The next largest category is tax evasion and resistance of tax payment, accounting for an average of 12 percent of economic crime investigated by procuratorates in 1987-96. The author found no breakdown for these categories for 1980-86.
48. Figures presented in a summary of procuratorial work in 1983-87 permit a calculation that 95 percent of big and important cases of economic crime in those years were big cases; figures in procuratorial yearbooks and the 1997 report on procuratorial work, which separate big and important cases in 1990-96, permit a calculation that, on average, 94 percent of big and important cases filed and investigated in those years were big cases. See Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Yang Yichen, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (April 1, 1988), in Zhongguo jiancha nianjian 1989 (Procuratorial yearbook of China 1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1991), 21-27; Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Zhang Siqing, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (March 11, 1997), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin jianchayuan gongbao (Gazette of the PRC Supreme People's Procuratorate), 1997, no. 2:52-59; Zhongguo jiancha nianjian (Procuratorial yearbook of China), 1991-96 issues (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1992-97).
49. Figures presented in a summary of procuratorial work in 1983-87 permit a calculation that 95 percent of big and important cases of economic crime in those years were big cases; figures in procuratorial yearbooks and the 1997 report on procuratorial work, which separate big and important cases in 1990-96, permit a calculation that, on average, 94 percent of big and important cases filed and investigated in those years were big cases. See Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Yang Yichen, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (April 1, 1988), in Zhongguo jiancha nianjian 1989 (Procuratorial yearbook of China 1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1991), 21-27; Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Zhang Siqing, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (March 11, 1997), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin jianchayuan gongbao (Gazette of the PRC Supreme People's Procuratorate), 1997, no. 2:52-59; Zhongguo jiancha nianjian (Procuratorial yearbook of China), 1991-96 issues (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1992-97).
50. Figures presented in a summary of procuratorial work in 1983-87 permit a calculation that 95 percent of big and important cases of economic crime in those years were big cases; figures in procuratorial yearbooks and the 1997 report on procuratorial work, which separate big and important cases in 1990-96, permit a calculation that, on average, 94 percent of big and important cases filed and investigated in those years were big cases. See Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Yang Yichen, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (April 1, 1988), in Zhongguo jiancha nianjian 1989 (Procuratorial yearbook of China 1989) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1991), 21-27; Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Zhang Siqing, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (March 11, 1997), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin jianchayuan gongbao (Gazette of the PRC Supreme People's Procuratorate), 1997, no. 2:52-59; Zhongguo jiancha nianjian (Procuratorial yearbook of China), 1991-96 issues (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1992-97).
51. This preponderance of corruption is well reflected in a change of name: in 1989 the Procuratorial Bureau Against Economic Crime became the Procuratorial Bureau Against Corruption and Bribery.
52. he average annual percentage increases reported here are based on percentage changes from 1981 through 1996. I take 1980 as the baseline year (thereby excluding the huge increases from 1979 to 1980) because the responsibilities of procuratorates were not well established until passage of the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law in mid-1979. Even in 1980, the main focus of procuratorial work was on reviewing cases from the Cultural Revolution period of the 1960s and 1970s, not on current cases of economic crime.
53. Big cases certainly swamp important cases. While a separate plotting of the two categories would be useful, there are too few observations for the exercise to be meaningful.
54. In 1993-94 the senior officials targeted were above the county level, while in 1995-96 the campaign extended enforcement targeting down to leaders at the county and township levels. See Chang Yanyan, "Results in This Stage Strengthens Our Confidence in the Struggle Against Corruption," Neibu wengao (Internal Manuscripts), no. 21 (1995): 1-3. The difference in campaign focus may partly explain the results in figure 2, which suggests a lack of intensive enforcement in 1993 compared to 1994, 1995, and 1996. Not only was the pool of leaders targeted in the first campaign smaller, but obstacles to enforcement have been typically greater when officials are more senior. Obviously, cases involving senior officials are only a small proportion of big and important cases. Nonetheless, to the extent that cases of corruption involving leaders below the county level (which are not recorded as "important" cases) also involved big amounts, enforcement in 1995-96 could hit two sorts of campaign targets at the same time with comparative ease. A Chief Procurator report from the early 1990s suggests that nearly half of all corruption and bribery investigated by procuratorates occurs in collective enterprises and other basic-level workplaces. See Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Liu Fuzhi, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (March 28, 1992), in Zhongguo jiancha nianjian 1993 (Procuratorial yearbook of China 1993) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1994), 6- 11. In the current Chinese political economy, this implies cases involving officials below the county level.
55. In 1993-94 the senior officials targeted were above the county level, while in 1995-96 the campaign extended enforcement targeting down to leaders at the county and township levels. See Chang Yanyan, "Results in This Stage Strengthens Our Confidence in the Struggle Against Corruption," Neibu wengao (Internal Manuscripts), no. 21 (1995): 1-3. The difference in campaign focus may partly explain the results in figure 2, which suggests a lack of intensive enforcement in 1993 compared to 1994, 1995, and 1996. Not only was the pool of leaders targeted in the first campaign smaller, but obstacles to enforcement have been typically greater when officials are more senior. Obviously, cases involving senior officials are only a small proportion of big and important cases. Nonetheless, to the extent that cases of corruption involving leaders below the county level (which are not recorded as "important" cases) also involved big amounts, enforcement in 1995-96 could hit two sorts of campaign targets at the same time with comparative ease. A Chief Procurator report from the early 1990s suggests that nearly half of all corruption and bribery investigated by procuratorates occurs in collective enterprises and other basic-level workplaces. See Supreme People's Procuratorate, Chief Procurator Liu Fuzhi, "Report on the Work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate" (March 28, 1992), in Zhongguo jiancha nianjian 1993 (Procuratorial yearbook of China 1993) (Beijing: Zhongguo jiancha chubanshe, 1994), 6-11. In the current Chinese political economy, this implies cases involving officials below the county level.