Trustworthiness

Ethics

Volumn 107, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 26-42

  Hardin, Russell ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0003042661     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233695     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Richard Wagner, The Ring of the Nibelung, trans. Andrew Porter (New York: Norton, 1977), p. 16. Many of Wagner's characters, some of them among the most loathsome and treacherous in all of opera, are obsessed with trust. Like Lohengrin, they demand it without evidence that they merit it; like Wotan, they are unworthy of it.
2. Ibid., pp. 106-7, in The Valkyrie.
3. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 6, p. 162.
4. Bernard Williams, "Formal Structures and Social Reality," in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 3-13.
5. Roland N. McKean, "Economics of Trust, Altruism, and Corporate Responsibility," in Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory, ed. Edmund S. Phelps (New York: Russell Sage, 1975), pp. 29-44.
6. Niklas Luhmann, Trust: A Mechanism for the Reduction of Social Complexity, in his Trust and Power (New York: Wiley, 1980), pp. 4-103, p. 8.
7. Luhmann also says that trust is a kind of capital (ibid., p. 64). While trustworthiness might be seen as a form of capital, as reputation is, it is hard even to imagine what it means for trust to be a form of capital. That we all trust might seem to yield good results, so that we might think generalized trusting is a form of capital. But, again, good results depend on trustworthiness, without which generalized trusting cannot and should not arise.
8. Niklas Luhmann, "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives," in Gambetta, pp. 94-107, p. 95.
9. Kazuo Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day (New York: Vintage, 1990), p. 201.
10. Ibid., p. 243.
11. Russell Hardin, "Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions," in The Strategy of Choice, ed. Richard J. Zeckhauser (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 185-209, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust," Analyse und Kritik 14 (1992): 152-76, reprinted in Politics and Society 21 (1993): 505-29.
12. Russell Hardin, "Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions," in The Strategy of Choice, ed. Richard J. Zeckhauser (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 185-209, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust," Analyse und Kritik 14 (1992): 152-76, reprinted in Politics and Society 21 (1993): 505-29.
13. Russell Hardin, "Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions," in The Strategy of Choice, ed. Richard J. Zeckhauser (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 185-209, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust," Analyse und Kritik 14 (1992): 152-76, reprinted in Politics and Society 21 (1993): 505-29.
14. See also Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983), p. 170; James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 114.
15. See also Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983), p. 170; James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 114.
16. Coleman, p. 92.
17. See the discussion of end-game motivations in contract-by-convention resolutions of iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas in Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, for Resources for the Future, 1982), pp. 200-205.
18. Barry Schwartz, The Battle for Human Nature; Science, Morality and Modern Life (New York: Norton, 1986), pp. 247-48.
19. "Prenuptial Pacts Rise, Prenuptial Trust Fails," New York Times (November 19, 1986). This is a less revolutionary change than one might think. In many times and places, national and familial interests have dominated some marriages, and powerful institutions have stood behind those interests. The principal change in contemporary conditions may be that far larger fractions of marriages put substantial economic interests at stake. Schwartz argues that, once satisfaction of personal interests "becomes the goal of friendship and marriage, it destroys these activities as distinct, organized, and coherent" (Schwartz, p. 269). Unless he means the only goal, or these terms are defined in odd ways, this is utterly implausible. Marriages must often have strong, even predominant elements of satisfaction of personal (and other) interests. Are they then destroyed as a "distinct, organized, and coherent" activity?
20. Murasaki Shikibu, The Tale of Genji, trans. Edward G. Seidensticker (New York: Knopf, 1976), p. 1083.
21. Schwartz, p. 288.
22. Giuseppe Verdi, La Traviata, libretto by Francesco Maria Piave (1853; New York: Schirmer, 1946), p. 9; my translation.
23. Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude (1875-77; London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 347.
24. Murasaki Shikibu: Her Diary and Poetic Memoirs, trans. Richard Bowring (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 226.
25. See also Partha Dasgupta, "Trust As a Commodity," in Gambetta, pp. 49-72, p. 54.
26. Bowring, pp. 9-10, 213.
27. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 36-111; Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 57-112.
28. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 36-111; Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 57-112.
29. Bowring, p. 234.