Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 56-90

  Gale, John ^a   Binmore, Kenneth G ^b   Samuelson, Larry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003042462     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80017-X     Document Type: Article

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