Insights from asean’s foreign policy co-operation: The “asean way”, a real spirit or a phantom?

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 89-112

  Nischalke, Tobias Ingo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003010821     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS22-1D     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. For critical comments on ASEAN in the Post-Cold War period, see Jeannie Henderson, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper 328 (London: IISS, 1999). Other criticism has focused on the limitations of ASEAN’s model of co-operation for the wider region; see Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ASEAN Way”, Asian Survey 37, no. 10 (1997): 961-78; and Juergen Haacke, “The ASEANization of Regional Order in East Asia: A Failed Endeavour?”, Asian Perspective 22, no. 3 (1998): 7-47. For an excellent and up-to-date review of the broader theoretical debate, see Amitav Acharya, “Realism, Institutionalism, and the Asian Economic Crisis”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 1 (1999): 1-29.
2. Nikolas Busse, “Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security”, Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999): 39-60; Kusuma Snitwongse, “ASEAN’s Security Cooperation: Searching for a Regional Order”, Pacific Review 8 (1995): 520; Jörn Dosch, Die ASEAN: Bilanz eines Erfolges (Hamburg:Abera Verlag, 1997); Foong Khong Yuen, “ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex”, in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, edited by David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University Park, Pen.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 318-39. For a very nuanced view, see Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia”, in Security Communities, edited by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 198-227.
3. Ron Jepperson et al., “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security”, in The Culture of National Security, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 54, quoted in Busse, op. cit.., p. 45.
4. One recent study has argued for the existence of an ASEAN community based on norm compliance with the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) – which are standard in international law – but ignored the ASEAN-idiosyncratic norms of mufakat and musyawarah. See Busse, op.cit..
5. For recent examples, look at the Opening Statement by Surin Pitsuwan, Foreign Minister of Thailand at the 32nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 23 July 1999. See also Keynote address by Prime Minister Goh of Singapore, who referred to consensus decision-making as one successful core principle, 23 July 1999., http/: www.aseansec.org. For the scholarly side, see Hussin Mutalib, “At Thirty, ASEAN Looks to Challenges in the New Millenium”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 1 (1997): 78-79; and Busse, op.cit.
6. Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to ‘Asia Pacific Way’?”, Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 328-29. For a more elaborate distinction between behavioural and procedural norms in the ASEAN context, see Busse, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
7. For a more elaborate account, see Amitav Acharya, “Culture, Security, Multilateralism: The ‘ASEAN Way’ and Regional Order”, in Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building, edited by Keith R. Krause (London: Frank Cass, 1999): 56-67.
8. For a detailed account, see Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), pp. 10-13.
9. See Michael B. Yahuda, The International Politics of Asia-Pacific: 1945-95 (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 87-90; Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (New York: East Gate, 1990), pp. 108-14; and Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security”, Pacific Affairs 71, no. 2 (1998): 198.
10. K.K. Nair, ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 30 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1984), p. 15; and Antolik, op. cit., pp. 108-9.
11. Propelled partly by the need for domestic reconciliation between the Malays and Chinese, see Antolik, op. cit., pp. 112-13; and Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), pp. 12-13.
12. On the development surrounding the Declaration, see Antolik, op.cit.; and Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake”, Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999): 33.
13. See Leszek Buszynski, “Southeast Asia in the Post Cold War Era”, Asian Survey, 32, no. 9 (1992): 831.
14. Antolik, op.cit., p.142.
15. Nair, op. cit., pp. 62-64.
16. Yahuda, op. cit:., p. 89.
17. Richard Nations, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 May 1980, pp. 12-13.
18. Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on Escalation of the Armed Conflict Between Vietnam and Kampuchea, 9 January 1979; and Joint Statement, the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asia Region, 12 January 1979.
19. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy – The War after the War (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 348-49.
20. See Joint Communiqué of the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 June 1980.
21. John Funston, “Thailand’s Diplomacy on Cambodia: Success of Realpolitik”, Asian Journal of Political Science 6, no. 1 (1998): 62.
22. For an excellent perspective, see John Funston, “Thailand’s Diplomacy on Cambodia: Success of Realpolitik”, Asian Journal of Political Science 6, no. 1 (1998): pp. 60-69.
23. Leszek Buszynski, “New Aspirations and Old Constraints in Thailand’s Foreign Policy”, Asian Survey 29, no. 11 (1989): 1057-72.
24. Interview with a witness to Soeharto’s reaction, August 1999.
25. Parliamentary Statement on U.S. Site Survey Team, Brigadier General George Yeo, 4 August 1989.
26. J.N. Mak and B. A. Hamzah, “The External Maritime Dimension of ASEAN Security”, in The Transformation of Security in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 142.
27. Khaw Guat Hoon, “The International Politics of Southeast Asia: Issues in 1989”, in Southeast Asian Affars 1990 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 15-16. See also Philip Methven, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States – Incompatible Models for Security in Southeast Asia? Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 92. (Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), pp. 75-81.
28. Methven, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
29. Asian Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1992, quoted in Leszek Buszynski, Asian Survey 32, no. 9 (1992): 846; Derek da Cunha, “Southeast Asia’s Security Dynamics: A Multiplicity of Approaches Amidst Changing Geopolitical Circumstances”, ISEAS Working Paper 4 (1999), p. 19.
30. Michael Antolik, “ASEAN’s Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 2 (1992): 146.
31. However, the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, South Korea) meetings established in 1997 bear some resemblance to the original proposal. I owe this point to John Funston.
32. A striking contrast was the painstaking effort at consultation by Thailand before submitting its AFTA proposal to the 1992 Singapore Summit; see Leszek Buszynski, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy-Management of a Regional Vision”, Asia Survey 34, no. 8 (1994): 726-32.
33. James V. Jesudason, “Malaysia – A Year Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying… Something?”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1995 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), p. 216.
34. Manila Declaration, Philippines, 15 December 1987, section 5.
35. M. C. Abad, Jr, “Re-engineering ASEAN”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 18, no. 3 (1996): 239.
36. Inaugurated in July 1993, it has expanded to 22 members since the first working session in Bangkok in July 1994. For accounts of the ARF’s development, see Simon J. Hay, “The 1995 ASEAN Summit: Scaling a Higher Peak”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 18, no. 3 (1996): 256-57; and Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996). On the importance of the Track Two process, see Sheldon W. Simon, “Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 207-9.
37. Joint Communiqué of the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, section 12-14, Kuala Lumpur, 19-20 July 1991.
38. See Leszek Buszynski, “Southeast Asia in the Post Cold War Era”, Asian Survey 32, no. 9 (1992): 847; and Jakarta Post, 24 January 1992.
39. Interviews with Foreign Ministry officials, Jakarta, September 1999.
40. Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum.
41. This point is borrowed from the perceptive discussion in Leszek Buszynski, “Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era”, Asian Survey 32, no. 9 (1992): 846.
42. Dosch, op. cit:., p. 171.
43. Micool Brooke, “Thailand’s New Policy for ASEAN?”, Asian Defence Journal (February 1996), pp. 98-107.
44. Micool Brooke, “Thailand’s New Policy for ASEAN?”, Asian Defence Journal (February 1996), pp. 98-100.
45. For details, see Bob Catley and Mamur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Adershot, England: Ashgate, 1997); and Craig A. Snyder, “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea”, Asian Perspective 21, no. 1 (1997): 21-24.
46. For an up-to-date overview of the process, see Lee Lai To, “The South China Sea – China and Multilateral Dialogues”, Security Dialogue 30, no. 2 (1999): 165-78.
47. Catley and Keliat, op.cit.., p. 155
48. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992.
49. Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 18.
50. Interview with academic participant in the Spratly Initiatives, August 1999.
51. Interview with ASEAN official, September 1999.
52. Asiawek, 14 April 1995, p. 32.
53. On the Chinese reaction, see Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 38. See also Allen E. Whiting, “ASEAN Eyes China”, Asian Survey 37, no. 4 (1997): 319-20.
54. Bangkok Post, 5 April 1995, p. 14; and Asiaweek, 14 April 1995, p. 32.
55. Craig A. Snyder, “Building Multilateral Security Cooperation in the South China Sea”, Asian Perspective 21, no. 1 (1997): 27.
56. Lee Lai To, op. cit., p. 174. At the same time, Chinese officials made clear that this concession was not tantamount to a repudiation of Chinese claims to sovereignty over the area.
57. Interviews with ASEAN, Indonesian, and Philippine officials, September 1999. On threat perceptions, see Whiting, op. cit., pp. 299-322.
58. Some members have criticized the Philippine leadership for overreacting if not provoking China and using the incident for domestic purposes. See Whiting, op. cit.., p. 300. The Mischief Reef incident coincided with heated discussions in the Philippines over an increased military budget.
59. Interviews with scholars and officials, Jakarta and Singapore, August/September 1999.
60. Asiaweek, 18 April 1997, p. 14; and Asian Defence Journal (May 1997), p. 1
61. See interview with Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir, hardly an outspoken Sinophobic, in Asiaweek, 9 May 1997, p. 34. Officials were also quoted as saying “Automatically ASEAN will support Vietnam. It’s all for one and one for all”, Asian Defence Journal (May 1997), p. 1.
62. Defence Minister Chi Hao Tien, quoted in Asian Defence Journal, May 1997, p. 1.
63. Asiaweek, 18 April 1997, pp. 14-15. See also statements by Philippine Foreign Minister Roberto Romulo in 1995, Asian Defence Journal (February 1995), p. 87.
64. A more detailed discussion can be found in Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the Security Agreement with Australia”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997): 231-42.
65. SWB, FE/2487 B/2, 15 December 1995.
66. During a July 1995 visit Foreign Minister Alatas had failed to gain assurances from his counterpart Qian Qichen as to the status of the resource rich waters. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 December 1995, and 4 January 1996, pp. 18-19. See also Leonard C. Sebastian, “Enhancing the Security of Southeast Asia through the Deepening Web of Bilateral Relations”, Indonesia Quarterly 24 (1996): p. 15; and Robyn Lim, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, no. 2 (1998): 125.
67. Interviews with scholars and officials, August/September 1999.
68. Weekend Australian, 16-17 December 1995, quoted in Alan Dupont, “The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement”, Indonesia Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1996): 204.
69. On the new partnership between Indonesia and Singapore, see SWB, 18 January 1996, FE/2512 B/4; on the interest of the Philippines, see Mohan Malik, “Securing Australia: From Alliances to Agreements”, Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 10, no. 1 (1999): 182-83.
70. Burma’s strictly isolationist policies under Ne Win kept it out of the ASEAN– Indochina antagonism, but also ruled out ASEAN membership.
71. Reservations revolved around economic discrepancies as well as strategic issues. For details, see Frank Frost, Vietnam’s Foreign Relations – Dynamics of Change, Pacific Strategic Paper 6 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993), pp. 65-66; and Matin Gainsborough, “Vietnam and ASEAN: The Road to Membership?”, Pacific Review 6, no. 4 (1993): 385-86. See also Hoang Anh Tuan, “Why Hasn’t Vietnam Gained ASEAN Member-ship?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 15, no. 3 (1993): 286-88; and Asian Defence Journal (December 1991), p. 122.
72. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 August 1994, p. 15.
73. Barbara Dreis-Lampen, “ASEAN und die Europaeische Union”, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde 287 (Hamburg: Deutsches Uebersee Institut, 1998), p. 173.
74. See comments by Philippine Senator Ernesto Herrera, quoted in Bangkok Post, 22 May 1995, p. 11, and by a non-ASEAN diplomat, quoted in Asian Defence Journal (April 1995), p. 82.
75. Leszek Buszynski, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy-Management of a Regional Vision”, Asian Survey 34, no. 8 (1994): 728.
76. Malaysia blocked the extension of observer status to Myanmar for the 1992 and 1993 Foreign Ministers Meeting. See Buszynski, op. cit., pp. 728-29; and Gunter Siemers, “Thailand Foreign Policy”, “Myanmar 1992: Heading for ‘Guided Democracy’?”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1993 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 263.
77. R. H. Taylor, “Myanmar: New, but Different?”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1995 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 247.
78. The fervency of the two leaders might be explained by the aspiration to complete ASEAN under their helm; see Robert Cribb, “Burma’s Entry into ASEAN: Back-ground and Implications”, Asian Perspective 22, no. 3 (1998): 53-54; and Asian Defence Journal (June 1997), p. 1.
79. Referring to the consensus principle, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah said that “events of the past few months have tested the very principles ASEAN has lived with”, in Asian Defence Journal (August 1997), p. 1.
80. Quoted in Chandra Muzaffar, Asian Defence Journal (June 1997), p. 1. Personal interviews with Indonesian officials confirmed this interpretation, September 1999.
81. Thai Foreign Minister Prachuab, quoted in Jakarta Post, 11 July 1997.
82. On that debate, see John Funston, “Challenges Facing ASEAN in a More Complex Age”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (1999): 216; and Anthony Smith, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (1999): 252. On the importance of international pressure on Cambodia, see Henderson, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
83. While difficult to gauge, the same probably applied to Malaysia’s secret 1984 agreement.
84. Interview with ASEAN official, September 1999.
85. Straits Times (Singapore), 22 July 1999, p. 27. Thai Prime Minister Anand’s consultations on AFTA also demonstrated a learning effect. They were an effort to overcome mistrust created by Chatichai, but policy objectives had not necessarily changed. See Buszynski, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy”, pp. 726-32.
86. See Henderson, op. cit., pp. 48-55.
87. Thailand and Malaysia, whose leadership otherwise disagree on the issue of non-interference, joined ranks in criticizing Howard’s interference; see Straits Times, 25 September 1999, p. 35.