Biases of probability assessment: A comparison of frequency and single-case judgments

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 109-122

  Jones, Steven K ^a   Taylor Jones, Kristine ^b   Frisch, Deborah ^b  

^a OHIO UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002995340     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1995.1009     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Ajzen, I. (1977). Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on predictions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 303-314.
2. Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica, 44, 211-233.
3. Bar-Hillel, M. (1982). Studies of representativeness. In D. Kahne-man, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
4. Baron, J. (1988). Thinking and deciding. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
5. Bazerman, M. H., & Neale, M. A. (1983). Heuristics in negotiation. In H. R. Arkes & K. R. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 311-321). London: Cambridge Univ. Press.
6. Cohen, L. J. (1979). On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy? Cognition, 7, 385—407.
7. Cohen, L. J. (1981). Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 317-331.
8. Dawes, R. M. (1988). Rational choice in an uncertain world. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
9. Edwards, W. (1968). Conservatism in human information processing. In B. Kleinmuntz (Ed.), Formal representation of human judgment (pp. 17-52). New York: Wiley.
10. Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50, 123-129.
11. Frisch, D. (1988). Violations of probability theory: What do they mean? Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior, 18, 137-148.
12. Frisch, D. (1993). The relevance of probability theory to frequency and confidence judgments. Manuscript submitted for publication.
13. Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond “heuristics and biases.” European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 83-115.
14. Gigerenzer, G., Hell, W., & Blank, H. (1988). Presentation and content: The use of base rates as a continuous variable. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14, 513-525.
15. Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbolting, H. (1991). Probabilistic mental models: A Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review, 98, 506-528.
16. Hogarth, R. M. (1981). Beyond discrete biases: Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics. Psychological Bulletin, 90, 191-217.
17. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
18. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430—454.
19. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237-251.
20. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). On the study of statistical intuitions. Cognition, 11, 123-141.
21. Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Layman, M., & Combs, B. (1978). Judged frequency of lethal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4, 551-578.
22. Lopes, L. L., & Oden, G. C. (1991). The rationality of intelligence. In E. Eells & T. Maruszewski (Eds.), Rationality and reasoning: Essays in honor of L. J. Cohen. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
23. Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Cultural variation in self-concept. In J. Strauss & G. R. Goethals (Eds.), The Self: Interdisciplinary Approaches, (pp. 18—48) New York: Springer-Verlag.
24. Myers, D. (1987). Social psychology (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
25. Nisbett, R. E., Krantz, D. H., Jepson, C., & Kunda, Z. (1983). The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning. Psychological Review, 90, 339-363.
26. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In R. B. Braithwaite (Ed.), The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
27. Reeves, T., & Lockhart, R. S. (1993). Distributional versus singular approaches to probability and errors in probabilistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology; General, 122, 207-226.
28. Saks, M. J., & Kidd, R. F. (1980). Human information processing and adjudication: Trial by heuristics. Law and Society Review, 15, 123-160.
29. Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundation of statistics. New York: Wiley.
30. Sniezek, J. A., & Buckley, T. (1991). Confidence depends on level of aggregation. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 4, 263-272.
31. Statistical abstract of the United States. (1990). Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
32. Thaler, R. H. (1983). Illusions and mirages in public policy. The Public Interest, 73, 60-74.
33. Tversky, A. (1977). Features of similarity. Psychological Review, 84, 327-351.
34. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232.
35. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124—1131.
36. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
37. Wolford, G., Taylor, H. A., & Beck, J. R. (1990). The conjunction fallacy? Memory and Cognition, 18, 47-54.
38. Yates, J. F., & Carlson, B. W. (1986). Conjunction errors: Evidence for multiple judgment procedures, including “Signed summation.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 230-253.