Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 1985, Pages 13-31

  Eichenseher, John W ^a   Shields, David ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002858446     PISSN: 02784254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0278-4254(85)90010-9     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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2. Auditor size and audit quality
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4. The analysis of industry-specific auditor concentration: Towards an explanatory model
5. Optimal contracts with costly conditional auditing
6. Accounting for stewardship
7. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
8. Do audit committees favor the large CPA firms?
9. Auditor changes by audit committees and outside directors
10. The impact of regulation on controls: Firms' response the the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
11. Corporate audit committees-quo vadis?
12. Are the Big 8 increasing their share of the NYSE, AMEX, and OTC Audit Markets?
13. Auditor changes and related disagreements
14. An information economics analysis of financial reporting and external auditing
15. Supply and demand for auditing services and the nature of regulation in auditing
16. Auditing: Incentives and Truthful Reporting
17. A history of the seventies
18. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards
19. The demand for and supply of accounting theories: The market for excuses