When Equal Chances = Good Chances: Verbal Probabilities and the Equiprobability Effect

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 77-108

  Teigen, Karl Halvor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ   (Norway)

Author keywords

Subjective probabilities; verbal probabilities; equiprobability effect.

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002709751     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.2000.2933     Document Type: Article

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