Information Asymmetries and the Provision of Finance to Small Firms

International Small Business Journal

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1992, Pages 35-46

  Binks, M R ^a   Ennew, C T ^a   Reed, G V ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002594536     PISSN: 02662426     EISSN: 17412870     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/026624269201100103     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Bester, H. (1987), ‘The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information’, European Economic Review, Vol. 31 (4), pp 887-899.
2. Bester, H., and Hellwig, M. (1989), ‘Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues’, in Bamber, G., and Spremann, K. (eds.), Agency Theory, Information and Incentives, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
3. Binks, M. R., Ennew, C. T., and Reed, G. V. (1988), ‘The Survey by the Forum of Private Business on Banks and Small Firms’, in Bannock, G., and Morgan, E. V. (eds.), Banks and Small Businesses: A Two Nation Perspective, Forum of Private Business/National Federation of Small Business.
4. de Meza, D., and Webb, D. C. (1987), ‘Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, pp 281-292.
5. Harrison, R. T., and Mason, C. M. (1990), ‘The Role of the Business Expansion Scheme in the UK’, Omega, Vol. 17 (2), pp 147-157.
6. Reed, G. V., Binks, M. R., and Ennew, C. T. (1990), ‘On a Set of Measures of the Success of Firms in Matching the Characteristics of a Service to the Wants of their Customers’, Managerial and Decision Economics, (forthcoming).
7. Stiglitz, J., and Weiss, A. (1981), ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’, American Economic Review, Vol. 71, pp 393-410.