Is franchising a capital structure issue?

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 2, Issue 1-2, 1995, Pages 75-101

  Norton, Seth W ^a  

^a ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital structure; Franchising; Incentives; Signalling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002593390     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0929-1199(95)00005-S     Document Type: Article

References (77)

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8. Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information
9. The choice of organizational form: the case of franchising
10. An Agency Perspective on Franchising
11. The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws
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17. Capital structure and dividend irrelevance with asymmetric information
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19. An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints
20. Agency problems and residual claims
21. Separation of Ownership and Control
22. Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
23. Dual distribution and royalty fees in franchising
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28. The Theory of Capital Structure
29. The trend toward company-operated units in franchise chains
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34. Transactions cost determinants of ‘unfair’ contractual arrangements
35. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
36. The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts
37. Understanding stock price behaviour around the time of equity issues
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52. Why firms franchise: a search cost theory
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54. Debt Versus Equity under Asymmetric Information
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