Insuring the Agents: The Role of Directors' and Officers' Insurance in Corporate Governance

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 64, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 545-556

  O'Sullivan, Noel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002511934     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/253764     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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