Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1988, Pages 3-40

  Bradley, Michael ^a   Desai, Anand ^b   Kim, E Han ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002479105     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90030-X     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. The gains to bidding firms from merger
2. The impact of merger bids on the participating firms' security holders
3. Interfirm tender offers and the market for corporate control
4. The advent and mechanics of the tender offer: An analysis of ownership structure and prisoner's dilemma
5. Defensive stock repurchases
6. Defensive stock repurchases and the appraisal remedy
7. The rationale behind interfirm tender offers: Information or synergy?
8. Two-tier and negotiated tender offers: The imprisonment of the free-riding shareholder
9. Tender offers and stockholder returns
10. Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth
11. Mergers and the market concentration doctrine Evidence from the capital market
12. Takeover bids the free rider problem and the theory of the corporation
13. The economic effects of federal and state regulations of each tender offers
14. When Unocal won over Mesa, shareholders and society lost
15. Corporate merger and the ‘co-insurance’ of corporate debt
16. Voluntary corporate liquidations
17. The legislative politics of hostile corporate takeovers
18. Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior Empirical tests
19. The Hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers
20. Repurchase offers, information adjusted premiums and shareholder response
21. Assessing competition in the market for corporate control
22. Large shareholders and corporate control
23. Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers