Incentives and incomplete information

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1979, Pages 25-45

  d'Aspremont, Claude ^a,b   Gérard Varet, Louis André ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002444388     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(79)90043-4     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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2. Multipart pricing of public goods
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4. A tâtonnement process for public goods
5. Incentives in teams
6. Incentives compatible control of decentralized organization
7. Incentives and public inputs
8. Optimal allocation of public goods a solution to the free-rider problem
9. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods
10. Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem
11. Management Science
12. Games with incomplete information played by ‘Bayesian’ players II
13. Games with incomplete information played by ‘Bayesian’ III
14. Centralization and decentralization in economic processes
15. On informationally decentralized systems
16. On systems of linear inequalities
17. Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung
18. Pure theory of public expenditure and taxation
19. Le principe de la compensation réciproque. Un instrument économique pour la solution de certains problm̀es de pollution transfrontière
20. Counterspeculation auctions and competitive sealed tenders
21. Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen und das steuerwesen Schweden's