The political economy of intergenerational redistribution

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1994, Pages 61-84

  Breyer, Friedrich ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Intergenerational transfers; Social security

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002427489     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0176-2680(94)90062-0     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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