Regret and Responsibility in the Evaluation of Decision Outcomes

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 73-85

  Connolly, Terry ^a   Ordóñez, Lisa D ^a   Coughlan, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002287736     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1997.2695     Document Type: Article

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