The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas: Experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1994, Pages 99-126

  Hackett, Steven ^a   Schlager, Edella ^b   Walker, James ^c  

^a HUMBOLDT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002286390     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1994.1029     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. W. Ault, “Open-Field Farming in Medieval England: A Study of Village Bylaws, ” Harper & Row, New York (1972).
2. A. Bacdayan, Mountain irrigators in the Philippines, in “Irrigation and Agricultural Development in Asia” (W. Coward, Ed.), Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, NY (1980).
3. M. Bagnoli and M. McKee, Voluntary contribution games: Efficient private provision of public goods, Econom. Inquiry 29, 351-366 (1991).
4. F. Berkes, Local-level management and the commons problem: A comparative study of Turkish coastal fisheries, Marine Policy 10, 215-29 (1986).
5. F. Berkes and D. Pocock, Quota management and ‘people problems’: A case study of Canadian Lake Erie fisheries, Transact. Amer. Fish. Soc. 116, 494-502 (1987).
6. W. Blomquist, “Dividing the Waters: Governing Groundwater in Southern California, ” ICS Press, San Francisco (1992).
7. G. Bornstein and A. Rapoport, Intergroup competition for the provision of step-level public goods: Effects of preplay communication, European J. Social Psychol. 18, 125-142 (1988).
8. G. Bornstein, A. Rapoport, L. Kerpel, and T. Katz, Within and between-group communication in intergroup competition for public goods, J. Exp. Social Psychol. 25, 422-436 (1989).
9. A. Bottrall, The management and operation of irrigation schemes in less developed countries, Water Supply Management 2, 309-332 (1978).
10. A. Bottrall, “Comparative Study of the Management and Organization of Irrigation Projects, ” World Bank Working Paper 458, World Bank, Washington, DC (1981).
11. K. Brechner, An experimental analysis of social traps, J. Exper. Social Psychol. 13, 552-564 (1977).
12. C. Clark, Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: A game-theoretic analysis, in “Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics” (P-T. Liu, Ed.), Plenum, New York (1980).
13. J. Cordell and M. McKean, Sea tenure in Bahia, Brazil, in “Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, ” National Academy Press, Washington, DC (1986).
14. R. Comes and T. Sandler, “The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, ” Cambridge Univ. Press, New York (1986).
15. E. Coward, Principles of social organization in an indigenous irrigation system, Human Organiz. 5, 128-141 (1979).
16. A Davis, Property rights and access management in the small boat fishery: A case study from southwest Nova Scotia, in “Atlantic Fisheries and Coastal Communities: Fisheries Decision-Making Case Studies” (C. Lamson and A. J. Hanson, Eds.), Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, Halifax, PNS (1984).
17. R. Dawes, Social dilemmas, Annual Rev. Psychol. 31, 169-193 (1980).
18. R. Dawes, J. Orbell, R. Simmons, and A. van de Kragt, Organizing groups for collective action, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 80, 1171-1185 (1986).
19. R. De los Reyes, “47 Communal Gravity Systems: Organization Profiles, ” Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines (1980).
20. K. Enge and S. Whiteford, “The Keepers of the Water and the Earth: Mexican Rural Social Organization and Irrigation, ” University of Texas Press, Austin, TX (1989).
21. R. Gardner, E. Ostrom, and J. Walker, The nature of common-pool resource problems, Rationality Soc. 2, 335-358 (1990).
22. R. Gardner, M. Moore, and J. Walker, “Groundwater Property Rights: Laboratory Evidence on the Performance of Entry Restrictions and Stock Quotas, ” Indiana University Working Paper 93-008, Bloomington, IN (1993).
23. T. Glick, “Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia, ” Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (1970).
24. R. Gray, “The Sonjo of Tanganika, ” Oxford Univ. Press, London/New York (1963).
25. W. Guth, On the behavioral approach to distributive justice—A theoretical and experimental investigation, in “Applied Behavioral Economics” (S. Maital, Ed.), Vol. 2, New York Univ. Press, New York (1988).
26. W. Guth, “Distributive Justice: A Behavioral Theory and Empirical Evidence, ” Ekonomiska Forsk- ningsinstitutet Research Paper 6461, Stockholm (1992).
27. W. Guth and R. Teitz, Strategic power versus distributive justice: An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining games, in “Economic Psychology” (H. Brandstatter and E. Kirchler, Eds.), Rudolph Trauner Verlag, Linz, Germany (1985).
28. S. Hackett, Heterogeneity and the provision of governance for common-pool resources, J. Theoret. Politics 4, 325-42 (1992).
29. G. Hardin, The tragedy of the commons, Science 162, 1243-1248 (1968).
30. G. Hardin, “The Limits of Altruism: An Ecologist’s View of Survival, ” Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington, IN (1978).
31. R. Hardin, “Collective Action, ” The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, MD (1982).
32. G. Harrison and J. Hirshleifer, An experimental evaluation of weakest link/best shot models of public goods, J. Polit. Economy 97, 201-225 (1989).
33. E. Hoffman and M. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some experimental tests, J. Law Econom. 25, 73-98 (1982).
34. E. Hoffman and M. Spitzer, Entitlements, rights, and fairness: An experimental examination of subjects’ concepts of distributive justice, J. Legal Stud. 14, 259-297 (1985).
35. M. Isaac and C. Plott, The opportunity for conspiracy in restraint of trade, J. Econom. Behav. Organiz. 2, 1-30 (1981).
36. M. Isaac, V. Ramey, and A. Williams, The effects of market organization on conspiracies in restraint of trade, J. Econom. Behav. Organiz. 5, 191-222 (1984).
37. M. Isaac and J. Walker, Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions, J. Econom. Behav. Organiz. 6, 139-159 (1985).
38. M. Isaac and J. Walker, Communication and free-riding behavior: The voluntary contribution mechanism, Econom. Inquiry 24, 585-608 (1988).
39. M. Isaac, D. Schmidtz, and J. Walker, The assurance problem in a laboratory market, Public Choice 62, 217-236 (1989).
40. R. Johnson and G. Libecap, Contracting problems and regulation: The case of the fishery, Amer. Econom. Rev. 72, 1005-1022 (1982).
41. R. Kanbur, “Heterogeneity, Distribution and Cooperation in Common Property Resource Management, ” Background Paper for the World Development Report (1991).
42. E. Leach, “Pul Eliya, ” Cambridge Univ. Press, New York (1961).
43. G. Libecap and S. Wiggins, Contractual responses to the common pool: Prorationing of crude oil production, Amer. Econom. Rev. 74, 87-98 (1984).
44. W. Liebrand, The effect of social motives, Communication and group size on behavior in an n-person multi-stage mixed-motive game, European J. Social Psychol. 14, 239-264 (1984).
45. A. Maas and R. Anderson, “And the Desert Shall Rejoice: Conflict, Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments, ” MIT Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA (1986).
46. P. Marchak, N. Guppy, and J. McMullan, “Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish-Processing Industries in British Columbia, ” Methuen, Toronto (1987).
47. F. Martin, “Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography, ” Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN (1989).
48. S. McDonald, “Petroleum Conservation in the United States: An Economic Analysis, ” Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore, MD (1971).
49. M. McKean, Success on the commons: A comparative examination of institutions for common property resource management, J. Theorel. Politics 4, 247-282 (1992).
50. R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey, An experimental study of the centipede game, Econometrica 60, 803-836 (1992).
51. D. Negri, The common property aquifer as a differential game, Water Resour. Res. 25, 9-15 (1989).
52. R. Netting, “Balancing on an Alp: Ecological Change and Continuity in a Swiss Mountain Community, ” Cambridge Univ. Press, New York (1981).
53. M. Olson, “The Logic of Collective Action, ” Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1965).
54. J. Orbell, A. van de Kragt, and R. Dawes, Explaining discussion-induced cooperation, J. Personality Social Psychol. 54, 811-819 (1988).
55. E. Ostrom, “Governing the Commons, ” Cambridge Univ. Press, New York (1990).
56. E. Ostrom, J. Walker, and R. Gardner, Covenants with and without a sword: Self governance is possible, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86, 128-145 (1992).
57. E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. Walker, “Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, ” University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, (1994).
58. K. Palanisami and K. Easter, Irrigation tanks of South India: Strategies and investment alternatives, Indian J. Agr. Econom. 39, 214-223 (1984).
59. T. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal, Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information, Games Econom. Behav. 3, 183-220 (1991).
60. K. Ruddle and T. Akimichi (Eds.), “Maritime Institutions in the Western Pacific, ” National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan (1984).
61. E. Schlager, “Model Specification and Policy Analysis: The Governance of Coastal Fisheries, ” Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN (1990).
62. E. Schlager, W. Blomquist, and S. Tang, “All CPRs Are Not Created Equal: The Affect of Two Important Physical Characteristics on the Resolution of Commons Dilemmas, ” Working Paper, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ (1993).
63. D. Seckler and D. Joshi, Sukhomajri: Water management in India, Bull. Atomic Scientists 25, 26-30 (1982).
64. R. Selten, A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many, Internal. J. Game Theory 2, 141-201 (1971).
65. G. Slater, “The English Peasantry and the Enclosure of Common Fields, ” Archibald Constable, London (1907).
66. B. Spooner, Continuity and change in rural Iran: The eastern deserts, in “Iran: Continuity and Variety” (P. Chelkowski, Ed.), New York University, Center for Near Eastern Studies and the Center for International Studies, New York (1971).
67. B. Spooner, The Iranian deserts, in “Population Growth: Anthropological Implications” (B. Spooner, Ed.), MIT Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA (1972).
68. B. Spooner, Irrigation and society: The Iranian plateau, in “Irrigation’s Impact on Society” (T. Downing and M. Gibson, Eds.), University of Arizona Press, Tucson, AZ (1974).
69. N. Sturgess, N. Dow, and P. Belin, Management of the Victorian scallop fisheries: Retrospect and prospect, in “Policy and Practice in Fisheries Management” (N. Sturgess and T. Meany, Eds.), Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (1982).
70. R. Wade, “Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India, ” Cambridge Univ. Press, New York (1988).
71. J. Walker, R. Gardner, and E. Ostrom, Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence, J. Environ. Econom. Management 19, 203-211 (1990).
72. J. Walker and R. Gardner, Rent dissipation and probabilistic destruction of common-pool resource environments: Experimental evidence, Econom. J. 102, 1149-1161 (1992).
73. S. Wiggins and G. Libecap, Oil field unitization: Contractual failure in the presence of imperfect information, Amer. Econom. Rev. 75, 368-384 (1985).
74. S. Wiggins and G. Libecap, Firm heterogeneities and cartelization efforts in domestic crude oil, J. Law Econom. Organiz. 3, 1-25 (1987).
75. S. Wiggins, S. Hackett, and R. Battalio, Imperfect Information, Multilateral Bargaining, and Unitization: An Experimental Analysis, Photocopy, Indiana University (1991).