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Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 377-383

Extending Nash's Axioms to Nonconvex Problems

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EID: 0002254887     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0590     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (22)

References (10)
  • 1
    • 0030099254 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems
    • Conley J. P., Wilkie S. An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems. Games Econ. Behav. 13:1996;26-38.
    • (1996) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.13 , pp. 26-38
    • Conley, J.P.1    Wilkie, S.2
  • 3
    • 0001673751 scopus 로고
    • Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
    • Kalai E., Smorodinsky M. Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem. Econometrica. 43:1975;513-518.
    • (1975) Econometrica , vol.43 , pp. 513-518
    • Kalai, E.1    Smorodinsky, M.2
  • 4
    • 0001974736 scopus 로고
    • An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Problem and the Nash Social Welfare Function
    • Kaneko M. An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Problem and the Nash Social Welfare Function. Theory and Decision. 12:1980;135-148.
    • (1980) Theory and Decision , vol.12 , pp. 135-148
    • Kaneko, M.1
  • 5
    • 38149146431 scopus 로고
    • The Nash Solution and Independence of Revealed Irrelevant Alternatives
    • Mariotti M. The Nash Solution and Independence of Revealed Irrelevant Alternatives. Econ. Lett. 45:1994;175-179.
    • (1994) Econ. Lett. , vol.45 , pp. 175-179
    • Mariotti, M.1
  • 6
    • 0000700338 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Nash Bargaining Theory when the Number of Alternatives Can Be Finite
    • Mariotti M. Nash Bargaining Theory when the Number of Alternatives Can Be Finite. Social Choice and Welfare. 1997a.
    • (1997) Social Choice and Welfare
    • Mariotti, M.1
  • 8
    • 0000291018 scopus 로고
    • The Bargaining Problem
    • Nash J. F. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica. 18:1950;155-162.
    • (1950) Econometrica , vol.18 , pp. 155-162
    • Nash, J.F.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.