What is it like to be me?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 48-60

  Kornblith, Hilary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002206048     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048409812348181     Document Type: Review

References (4)

1. This conceptual claim can come in degrees. Descartes'version is maximally strong, but one might claim that the conceptual connection between mental states and beliefs about them is weaker. Thus, Sydney Shoemaker argues for a weaker, but still conceptual, connection between mental states and beliefs about them. See 'On Knowing One's Own Mind,' Philosophical Perspectives, 2(1988), pp.183-209. I do not directly address Shoemaker's position in the text, but the view I present supposes no conceptual connection whatsoever between mental states and beliefs about them. See also note 8 below on Shoemaker
2. Philosophical Review 83(1974), pp. 435-450
3. See, e.g., Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Engelwood (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980, ch. 9
4. Among Caucasian males, for example, the group in which colour blindness is most prevalent, more than eight percent of the population is afflicted. See Leo Hurvich, Color Vision, (Sunderland, Ma.: Sinauer Associates, 1981) pp. 267