Self-respect: Moral, emotional, political

Ethics

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 226-249

  Dillon, Robin S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0002169159     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233719     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), p. 17.
2. To be sure, not all who lack self-respect feel miserable as a result; I focus on that sort of experience for reasons that will become clear. For other ways of lacking self-respect, see my "How to Lose Your Self-Respect," American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1992): 125-39.
3. The account set out in this section extends the account I have developed in earlier essays. See ibid., "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 105-32, "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69, and my "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, ed. Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 1-49.
4. The account set out in this section extends the account I have developed in earlier essays. See ibid., "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 105-32, "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69, and my "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, ed. Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 1-49.
5. The account set out in this section extends the account I have developed in earlier essays. See ibid., "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 105-32, "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69, and my "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, ed. Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 1-49.
6. The account set out in this section extends the account I have developed in earlier essays. See ibid., "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 105-32, "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69, and my "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect, ed. Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 1-49.
7. Elizabeth Telfer, "Self-Respect," Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1968): 114-21, reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
8. Elizabeth Telfer, "Self-Respect," Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1968): 114-21, reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
9. Note that not all that is encompassed by the notion of worth is included in the domain of self-respect, but only morally significant worth. This, I would argue, is one of the differences between self-respect and self-esteem. For the purposes of this paper, however, I leave aside the analysis of "morally significant worth." And for simplicity, I refer in the rest of the paper simply to 'worth'.
10. I use both prepositions, despite the awkwardness, to convey the idea that self-respect encompasses both a more objective perspective on or stance toward one's self and the more intimate experience of living with oneself. I use both objects to express the idea that respecting oneself is also a matter of how one understands one's place in the world and one's relation to other things, including other people, as well as how one lives with others.
11. The idea that there are different kinds of self-respect is common in the philosophical literature. See, e.g., Telfer; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Servility and Self-Respect," Monist 57 (1973): 87-104, and "Self-Respect Reconsidered," in Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. 31, ed. O. H. Green (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1985), pp. 128-37; Stephen J. Massey, "Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?" Ethics 93 (1983): 246-61. In what follows I develop the distinction drawn by Stephen Darwall in "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 34-49. All of these essays are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
12. The idea that there are different kinds of self-respect is common in the philosophical literature. See, e.g., Telfer; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Servility and Self-Respect," Monist 57 (1973): 87-104, and "Self-Respect Reconsidered," in Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. 31, ed. O. H. Green (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1985), pp. 128-37; Stephen J. Massey, "Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?" Ethics 93 (1983): 246-61. In what follows I develop the distinction drawn by Stephen Darwall in "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 34-49. All of these essays are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
13. The idea that there are different kinds of self-respect is common in the philosophical literature. See, e.g., Telfer; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Servility and Self-Respect," Monist 57 (1973): 87-104, and "Self-Respect Reconsidered," in Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. 31, ed. O. H. Green (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1985), pp. 128-37; Stephen J. Massey, "Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?" Ethics 93 (1983): 246-61. In what follows I develop the distinction drawn by Stephen Darwall in "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 34-49. All of these essays are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
14. The idea that there are different kinds of self-respect is common in the philosophical literature. See, e.g., Telfer; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Servility and Self-Respect," Monist 57 (1973): 87-104, and "Self-Respect Reconsidered," in Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. 31, ed. O. H. Green (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1985), pp. 128-37; Stephen J. Massey, "Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?" Ethics 93 (1983): 246-61. In what follows I develop the distinction drawn by Stephen Darwall in "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 34-49. All of these essays are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
15. Darwall. Note that respect grounded in status worth is but one of several species of recognition respect, not all of which have correlative forms of self-respect, and that the different sources of status worth yield different configurations of recognition self-respect; see my "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration." In what follows, I concentrate on recognition respect for oneself as a person. Note also that, inasmuch as the concepts of respect and self-respect rest on the essentially contested concepts of personhood and the morally significant worth of persons, different conceptions of persons and their worth yield different conceptions of respect and self-respect. In this paper, I focus on the conceptions that have dominated contemporary Western democratic society and hence contemporary Western philosophical discussions of self-respect. In "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," I explore the ramifications of transtheoretic variations in the conception of personhood. For an exploration of differences between Western and Indian ways of conceptualizing persons, worth, and self-respect, see Koyeli Gosh-Dastidar, "Respect for Persons and Self-Respect: Western and Indian," Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 5 (1987): 83-93.
16. Darwall. Note that respect grounded in status worth is but one of several species of recognition respect, not all of which have correlative forms of self-respect, and that the different sources of status worth yield different configurations of recognition self-respect; see my "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration." In what follows, I concentrate on recognition respect for oneself as a person. Note also that, inasmuch as the concepts of respect and self-respect rest on the essentially contested concepts of personhood and the morally significant worth of persons, different conceptions of persons and their worth yield different conceptions of respect and self-respect. In this paper, I focus on the conceptions that have dominated contemporary Western democratic society and hence contemporary Western philosophical discussions of self-respect. In "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," I explore the ramifications of transtheoretic variations in the conception of personhood. For an exploration of differences between Western and Indian ways of conceptualizing persons, worth, and self-respect, see Koyeli Gosh-Dastidar, "Respect for Persons and Self-Respect: Western and Indian," Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 5 (1987): 83-93.
17. I take this term from Stephen D. Hudson, "The Nature of Respect," Social Theory and Practice 6 (1980): 69-90. Darwall's term is 'appraisal self-respect'.
18. The locus classicus for this view is, of course, Kant: "man regarded as a person . . . is exalted above any price . . . he possesses . . . a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world: he can measure himself with every other being in the world and value himself on a footing of equality with them"; Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 99. See also Hill, "Servility and Self-Respect"; Laurence Thomas, "Self-Respect: Theory and Practice," in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harris (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), pp. 174-89; and Bernard R. Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest," Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976): 58-69. The latter three are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
19. The locus classicus for this view is, of course, Kant: "man regarded as a person . . . is exalted above any price . . . he possesses . . . a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world: he can measure himself with every other being in the world and value himself on a footing of equality with them"; Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 99. See also Hill, "Servility and Self-Respect"; Laurence Thomas, "Self-Respect: Theory and Practice," in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harris (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), pp. 174-89; and Bernard R. Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest," Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976): 58-69. The latter three are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
20. The locus classicus for this view is, of course, Kant: "man regarded as a person . . . is exalted above any price . . . he possesses . . . a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world: he can measure himself with every other being in the world and value himself on a footing of equality with them"; Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 99. See also Hill, "Servility and Self-Respect"; Laurence Thomas, "Self-Respect: Theory and Practice," in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harris (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), pp. 174-89; and Bernard R. Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest," Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976): 58-69. The latter three are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
21. The locus classicus for this view is, of course, Kant: "man regarded as a person . . . is exalted above any price . . . he possesses . . . a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world: he can measure himself with every other being in the world and value himself on a footing of equality with them"; Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 99. See also Hill, "Servility and Self-Respect"; Laurence Thomas, "Self-Respect: Theory and Practice," in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harris (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), pp. 174-89; and Bernard R. Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest," Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976): 58-69. The latter three are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
22. The locus classicus for this view is, of course, Kant: "man regarded as a person . . . is exalted above any price . . . he possesses . . . a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world: he can measure himself with every other being in the world and value himself on a footing of equality with them"; Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 99. See also Hill, "Servility and Self-Respect"; Laurence Thomas, "Self-Respect: Theory and Practice," in Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917, ed. Leonard Harris (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1983), pp. 174-89; and Bernard R. Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest," Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1976): 58-69. The latter three are reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
23. For discussions of resentment and self-respect, see, e.g., Michael Pritchard, On Becoming Responsible (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), chap. 5, which draws on Joseph Butler's Sermon 8, "Upon Resentment" (in Fifteen Sermons, ed. T. A. Roberts [1722; reprint, London: S.P.C.K., 1970] and on Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" (in Freedom, Resentment, and Other Essays [London: Methuen, 1974]); and Laurence Thomas, Living Morally (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), chap. 6.
24. For discussions of resentment and self-respect, see, e.g., Michael Pritchard, On Becoming Responsible (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), chap. 5, which draws on Joseph Butler's Sermon 8, "Upon Resentment" (in Fifteen Sermons, ed. T. A. Roberts [1722; reprint, London: S.P.C.K., 1970] and on Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" (in Freedom, Resentment, and Other Essays [London: Methuen, 1974]); and Laurence Thomas, Living Morally (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), chap. 6.
25. For discussions of resentment and self-respect, see, e.g., Michael Pritchard, On Becoming Responsible (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), chap. 5, which draws on Joseph Butler's Sermon 8, "Upon Resentment" (in Fifteen Sermons, ed. T. A. Roberts [1722; reprint, London: S.P.C.K., 1970] and on Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" (in Freedom, Resentment, and Other Essays [London: Methuen, 1974]); and Laurence Thomas, Living Morally (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), chap. 6.
26. For discussions of resentment and self-respect, see, e.g., Michael Pritchard, On Becoming Responsible (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), chap. 5, which draws on Joseph Butler's Sermon 8, "Upon Resentment" (in Fifteen Sermons, ed. T. A. Roberts [1722; reprint, London: S.P.C.K., 1970] and on Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" (in Freedom, Resentment, and Other Essays [London: Methuen, 1974]); and Laurence Thomas, Living Morally (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), chap. 6.
27. I discuss this more fully in "How to Lose Your Self-Respect." Note that it is possible for someone to have a mistaken view of her place in the moral world or care little about how others treat her and yet to have a keen sense of her other responsibilities and fulfill them out of respect for herself. That is, it is possible to respect oneself as an agent without respecting oneself as an equal. Massey describes such an individual in "Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?"
28. See Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. 3; and John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," Ethics 93 (1983): 225-45, reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
29. See Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. 3; and John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," Ethics 93 (1983): 225-45, reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
30. See Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. 3; and John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," Ethics 93 (1983): 225-45, reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
31. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 620.
32. See, e.g., ibid., bk. 2, pt. 1; Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949): 1-24; and Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt, chap. 2. Taylor in fact denies a connection between self-respect and emotional pride, arguing that the connection actually holds between self-esteem and pride. However, while Taylor is right that there is a conceptual difference between self-respect and self-esteem, it is also the case that there is no agreement about precisely what the difference is. I discuss some differences in "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
33. See, e.g., ibid., bk. 2, pt. 1; Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949): 1-24; and Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt, chap. 2. Taylor in fact denies a connection between self-respect and emotional pride, arguing that the connection actually holds between self-esteem and pride. However, while Taylor is right that there is a conceptual difference between self-respect and self-esteem, it is also the case that there is no agreement about precisely what the difference is. I discuss some differences in "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
34. See, e.g., ibid., bk. 2, pt. 1; Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949): 1-24; and Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt, chap. 2. Taylor in fact denies a connection between self-respect and emotional pride, arguing that the connection actually holds between self-esteem and pride. However, while Taylor is right that there is a conceptual difference between self-respect and self-esteem, it is also the case that there is no agreement about precisely what the difference is. I discuss some differences in "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
35. See, e.g., ibid., bk. 2, pt. 1; Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and Natural Shame," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949): 1-24; and Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt, chap. 2. Taylor in fact denies a connection between self-respect and emotional pride, arguing that the connection actually holds between self-esteem and pride. However, while Taylor is right that there is a conceptual difference between self-respect and self-esteem, it is also the case that there is no agreement about precisely what the difference is. I discuss some differences in "Introduction," in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
36. Note that pride does not always enact evaluative self-respect, for it can be unjustified, nor does it enact only evaluative self-respect, since its possible grounds are wider than quality of character and conduct. Note, too, that normative self-conceptions typically also include criteria of minimum acceptability and that to behave a certain way may not be an achievement but the least one expects of oneself. A positive self-evaluation here yields not pride but contentment or self-acceptance.
37. See Isenberg; Taylor; Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered"; John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," and "Guilt and Shame," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 426-28; Sandra Lee Bartky, "Shame and Gender," in her Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 83-98; John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988); Susan Miller, The Shame Experience (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46, which is reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
38. See Isenberg; Taylor; Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered"; John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," and "Guilt and Shame," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 426-28; Sandra Lee Bartky, "Shame and Gender," in her Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 83-98; John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988); Susan Miller, The Shame Experience (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46, which is reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
39. See Isenberg; Taylor; Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered"; John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," and "Guilt and Shame," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 426-28; Sandra Lee Bartky, "Shame and Gender," in her Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 83-98; John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988); Susan Miller, The Shame Experience (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46, which is reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
40. See Isenberg; Taylor; Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered"; John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," and "Guilt and Shame," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 426-28; Sandra Lee Bartky, "Shame and Gender," in her Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 83-98; John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988); Susan Miller, The Shame Experience (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46, which is reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
41. See Isenberg; Taylor; Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered"; John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," and "Guilt and Shame," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 426-28; Sandra Lee Bartky, "Shame and Gender," in her Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 83-98; John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988); Susan Miller, The Shame Experience (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46, which is reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
42. See Isenberg; Taylor; Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered"; John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," and "Guilt and Shame," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 426-28; Sandra Lee Bartky, "Shame and Gender," in her Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 83-98; John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988); Susan Miller, The Shame Experience (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46, which is reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
43. See Isenberg; Taylor; Hill, "Self-Respect Reconsidered"; John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," and "Guilt and Shame," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 426-28; Sandra Lee Bartky, "Shame and Gender," in her Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 83-98; John Kekes, "Shame and Moral Progress," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 13, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988); Susan Miller, The Shame Experience (Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1985); and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46, which is reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
44. Isenberg, p. 16. Rawls and Kekes are among those who share this view; Bartky is among those who challenge it.
45. I owe this case to Claudia Murphy.
46. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
47. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
48. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
49. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
50. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
51. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
52. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.:
53. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
54. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
55. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
56. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
57. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
58. To be more accurate, damaged self-respect is integrally connected with oppression. The claim that damaged self-respect is a gendered phenomenon requires, of course, more than anecdotal support. There are, however, some difficulties with empirical support. The first is that empirical research is carried on by psychologists, whose term of use is "self-esteem" rather than self-respect. I have argued elsewhere that the two are distinct; however, there is no agreement among psychologists or philosophers about whether there is a distinction and if so what it is. Still, many of the psychological studies I've looked at define "self-esteem" in ways that overlap with self-respect, so it is reasonable to look at that evidence. However, there is reason to worry about gender bias in psychological studies of self-esteem, since the standard definitions and measures (Coopersmith's and Rosenberg's, for example) omit gender considerations and are predicated on a model of the healthy self that is clearly male-biased (Kaschak). Further, empirical research relevant to damaged self-esteem is indirect, through work on shame and on psychopathologies such as depression and eating disorders, both of which are typically analyzed as involving damaged self-worth. There is, however, reason to suspect gender bias (and race bias) in diagnosis of psychopathology. Finally, much empirical work on gender and self-esteem is racially biased, omitting women of color. These methodological concerns are somewhat addressed by looking at studies which are explicitly sensitive to gender and race considerations, and there the evidence is clear. Women with traditionally feminine gender identification are more likely to have low self-esteem than men (Travis). Women are more likely to exceed men on reports of shame (Brody and Hall, Lewis). Women suffer depression at rates two to three times higher than men; the gender difference is consistently confirmed in epidemiological and clinical studies, is not an artifact of reporting, genetics, or hormones, and holds across racial and ethnic lines and cross-culturally (Jack, Russo and Green, Ritter, Matlin, Unger and Crawford, Travis). Ninety to ninety-five percent of those suffering from eating disorders are women. Two-thirds of teen self-mutilators are girls; the etiology is the same as for eating disorders (Orenstein). The most extensive national survey on gender and self-esteem in adolescence, done by the American Association of University Women (Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging America: A Call to Action [Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Women, 1991]), found that during adolescence the self-regard of girls drops further than boys' and never catches up; teen girls are much more likely than boys to say they are "not good enough" to achieve their dreams; although girls consistently report lower self-esteem than boys, Latina girls' self-esteem drops much lower than that of Caucasian girls, while the self-esteem of African American girls is higher than that of Caucasian girls though still lower than that of African American boys. All of these studies agree that the best explanation for the findings is that they are the effects on women of living in a sexist society. See Leslie Brody and Judith A. Hall, "Gender and Emotions," in Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland (New York: Guilford, 1993); Dana Jack, "Silencing the Self: The Power of Social Imperatives in Female Depression," in Women and Depression: A Lifespan Perspective, ed. Ruth Formanek and Anita Gurian (New York: Springer, 1987); Ellyn Kaschak, Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women's Experience (New York: Basic, 1992); Helen Block Lewis, "The Role of Shame in Depression in Women," in Formanek and Gurian, eds.; Margaret W. Matlin, The Psychology of Women, 2d ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987); Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women, Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap (New York: Anchor, 1994); Kathleen Y. Ritter, "Depression in Women," in Women, Relationships, and Power: Implications for Counseling, ed. Ellen Piel Cook (Alexandria, Va.: American Counseling Association, 1993); Nancy Felipe Russo and Beth L. Green, "Women and Mental Health," in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories, ed. Florence L. Denmark and Michele A. Paludi (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993); Karen W. Saakvitne and Laurie Anne Pearlman, "The Impact of Internalized Misogyny and Violence against Women on Feminine Identity," in Cook, ed.; Linda Tschirhart Sanford and Mary Ellen Donovan, Women and Self-Esteem (New York: Anchor, 1984); Cheryl Brown Travis, Women and Health Psychology: Mental Health Issues (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1988); and Rhoda Unger and Mary Crawford, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
59. They might also be explained in terms of bad emotional habits, weakness of will, or bad faith, i.e., insufficient commitment to the standards these women claim to embrace. (Amélie Rorty discusses "akrasia of the emotions" [also known as "irrational conservation of emotions"] in "Explaining Emotions," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980]; Bartky discusses the bad faith charge in "Feminism and the Politics of Personal Transformation," in her Femininity and Domination.) I won't pursue these suggestions, however, since they don't really explain the divergence of emotions and beliefs in these cases, or its persistence in the face of distress and sincere efforts to change, or the power of the emotions to so profoundly shape the lives of these women.
60. They might also be explained in terms of bad emotional habits, weakness of will, or bad faith, i.e., insufficient commitment to the standards these women claim to embrace. (Amélie Rorty discusses "akrasia of the emotions" [also known as "irrational conservation of emotions"] in "Explaining Emotions," in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980]; Bartky discusses the bad faith charge in "Feminism and the Politics of Personal Transformation," in her Femininity and Domination.) I won't pursue these suggestions, however, since they don't really explain the divergence of emotions and beliefs in these cases, or its persistence in the face of distress and sincere efforts to change, or the power of the emotions to so profoundly shape the lives of these women.
61. For an illuminating discussion of cognitivism and emotion, see John Deigh, "Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions," Ethics 104 (1994): 824-54. I draw on Deigh in what follows.
62. Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology," in Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, ed. Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 144-45.
63. For an illuminating discussion of the ways in which social institutions limit access to socially defined bases of self-respect, see Michele M. Moody-Adams, "Race, Class, and the Social Construction of Self-Respect," Philosophical Forum 24 (1992-93): 251-66, reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
64. For an illuminating discussion of the ways in which social institutions limit access to socially defined bases of self-respect, see Michele M. Moody-Adams, "Race, Class, and the Social Construction of Self-Respect," Philosophical Forum 24 (1992-93): 251-66, reprinted in Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect.
65. This is the crux of Deigh's objection to contemporary cognitivism about emotions; "Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions," p. 851.
66. Cheshire Calhoun distinguishes "believing intellectually" and "believing evidentially," the latter being a matter of feeling or experiencing things in a certain way, in "Cognitive Emotions?" in What Is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, ed. Cheshire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 335-36. Michael Pritchard draws a similar distinction between "intellectual understanding" and "participant understanding," where the latter mode involves the engagement of one's sentiments, in On Becoming Responsible, chap. 3. Michael Stocker differentiates beliefs from "emotional thoughts," which can conflict with beliefs and in which something is emotionally present and taken seriously or felt to be the case, in "Emotional Thoughts," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 59-69.
67. Cheshire Calhoun distinguishes "believing intellectually" and "believing evidentially," the latter being a matter of feeling or experiencing things in a certain way, in "Cognitive Emotions?" in What Is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, ed. Cheshire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 335-36. Michael Pritchard draws a similar distinction between "intellectual understanding" and "participant understanding," where the latter mode involves the engagement of one's sentiments, in On Becoming Responsible, chap. 3. Michael Stocker differentiates beliefs from "emotional thoughts," which can conflict with beliefs and in which something is emotionally present and taken seriously or felt to be the case, in "Emotional Thoughts," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 59-69.
68. Cheshire Calhoun distinguishes "believing intellectually" and "believing evidentially," the latter being a matter of feeling or experiencing things in a certain way, in "Cognitive Emotions?" in What Is an Emotion? Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, ed. Cheshire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 335-36. Michael Pritchard draws a similar distinction between "intellectual understanding" and "participant understanding," where the latter mode involves the engagement of one's sentiments, in On Becoming Responsible, chap. 3. Michael Stocker differentiates beliefs from "emotional thoughts," which can conflict with beliefs and in which something is emotionally present and taken seriously or felt to be the case, in "Emotional Thoughts," American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 59-69.
69. See Deigh, "Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions"; Calhoun; Susan E. Babbitt, Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), chap. 2; and Richmond Campbell's critical notice of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, by Allan Gibbard, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1993): 299-324.
70. See Deigh, "Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions"; Calhoun; Susan E. Babbitt, Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), chap. 2; and Richmond Campbell's critical notice of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, by Allan Gibbard, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1993): 299-324.
71. See Deigh, "Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions"; Calhoun; Susan E. Babbitt, Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), chap. 2; and Richmond Campbell's critical notice of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, by Allan Gibbard, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1993): 299-324.
72. See Deigh, "Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions"; Calhoun; Susan E. Babbitt, Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), chap. 2; and Richmond Campbell's critical notice of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, by Allan Gibbard, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1993): 299-324.
73. See Mark H. Bickhard and John Chambers Christopher, "The Influence of Early Experience on Personality Development," New Ideas in Psychology 12 (1994): 229-52; V. F. Guidano and G. Liotti, Cognitive Processes and Emotional Disorders (New York: Guilford, 1993); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966); and Calhoun.
74. See Mark H. Bickhard and John Chambers Christopher, "The Influence of Early Experience on Personality Development," New Ideas in Psychology 12 (1994): 229-52; V. F. Guidano and G. Liotti, Cognitive Processes and Emotional Disorders (New York: Guilford, 1993); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966); and Calhoun.
75. See Mark H. Bickhard and John Chambers Christopher, "The Influence of Early Experience on Personality Development," New Ideas in Psychology 12 (1994): 229-52; V. F. Guidano and G. Liotti, Cognitive Processes and Emotional Disorders (New York: Guilford, 1993); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966); and Calhoun.
76. See Mark H. Bickhard and John Chambers Christopher, "The Influence of Early Experience on Personality Development," New Ideas in Psychology 12 (1994): 229-52; V. F. Guidano and G. Liotti, Cognitive Processes and Emotional Disorders (New York: Guilford, 1993); Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1966); and Calhoun.
77. Since developing this account, I have found it to be congruent with a number of analyses in psychology, most notably Guidano and Liotti; and Seymour Epstein, "Emotion and Self-Theory," in Lewis and Haviland, eds. What Thomas calls "basic psychological security" also points in the direction of basal self-respect (Living Morally, pp. 61, 242).
78. Joan Didion, "On Self-Respect," in Slouching toward Bethlehem (New York: Washington Square, 1968), pp. 124-25.
79. One might object here, as an Ethics editor did, "the fact that a source of self-respect is political will not settle the extent of the agent's responsibility, if any, for failed self-respect. In some cases where the excusing cause is political, still, all things considered, one may judge that the individual should have done more to preserve self-respect and is to a degree blameworthy." However, while this objection does hold for evaluative and recognition self-respect, it misses the point regarding basal self-respect. For the point is not that the excusing cause of damaged basal self-respect is a political one (and, suppressed premise, a political cause obviates responsibility), but rather that what is damaged (by political causes) is basal self-respect, which, as the fundamental interpretive medium, is what makes it possible or impossible for one to do anything to build, preserve, receive support for, etc., the other two kinds of self-respect. I return to this point in the last section.
80. I draw here on the large body of work in philosophy and psychology on the social construction of emotion and personality, especially in connection with gender. In psychology, see, e.g., Kaschak; Travis; Brody and Hall; Unger and Crawford; Keith Oatley, "Social Construction in Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, eds.; Doris Howard, ed., The Dynamics of Feminist Therapy (New York: Haworth, 1986); M. Butler, "Guidelines for Feminist Therapy," in Handbook of Feminist Therapy, ed. L. B. Rosewater and L. Walker (New York: Springer, 1985); Hannah Lerman, "The Limits of Phenomenology: A Feminist Critique of the Humanistic Personality Theories," in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Appraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou (New York: Guilford, 1992); Rom Harre, ed., The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In philosophy, see, e.g., Bartky, "Shame and Gender"; Jaggar; Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger," in her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing, 1983); Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: Reidel, 1983).
81. I draw here on the large body of work in philosophy and psychology on the social construction of emotion and personality, especially in connection with gender. In psychology, see, e.g., Kaschak; Travis; Brody and Hall; Unger and Crawford; Keith Oatley, "Social Construction in Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, eds.; Doris Howard, ed., The Dynamics of Feminist Therapy (New York: Haworth, 1986); M. Butler, "Guidelines for Feminist Therapy," in Handbook of Feminist Therapy, ed. L. B. Rosewater and L. Walker (New York: Springer, 1985); Hannah Lerman, "The Limits of Phenomenology: A Feminist Critique of the Humanistic Personality Theories," in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Appraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou (New York: Guilford, 1992); Rom Harre, ed., The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In philosophy, see, e.g., Bartky, "Shame and Gender"; Jaggar; Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger," in her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing, 1983); Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: Reidel, 1983).
82. I draw here on the large body of work in philosophy and psychology on the social construction of emotion and personality, especially in connection with gender. In psychology, see, e.g., Kaschak; Travis; Brody and Hall; Unger and Crawford; Keith Oatley, "Social Construction in Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, eds.; Doris Howard, ed., The Dynamics of Feminist Therapy (New York: Haworth, 1986); M. Butler, "Guidelines for Feminist Therapy," in Handbook of Feminist Therapy, ed. L. B. Rosewater and L. Walker (New York: Springer, 1985); Hannah Lerman, "The Limits of Phenomenology: A Feminist Critique of the Humanistic Personality Theories," in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Appraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou (New York: Guilford, 1992); Rom Harre, ed., The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In philosophy, see, e.g., Bartky, "Shame and Gender"; Jaggar; Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger," in her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing, 1983); Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: Reidel, 1983).
83. I draw here on the large body of work in philosophy and psychology on the social construction of emotion and personality, especially in connection with gender. In psychology, see, e.g., Kaschak; Travis; Brody and Hall; Unger and Crawford; Keith Oatley, "Social Construction in Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, eds.; Doris Howard, ed., The Dynamics of Feminist Therapy (New York: Haworth, 1986); M. Butler, "Guidelines for Feminist Therapy," in Handbook of Feminist Therapy, ed. L. B. Rosewater and L. Walker (New York: Springer, 1985); Hannah Lerman, "The Limits of Phenomenology: A Feminist Critique of the Humanistic Personality Theories," in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Appraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou (New York: Guilford, 1992); Rom Harre, ed., The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In philosophy, see, e.g., Bartky, "Shame and Gender"; Jaggar; Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger," in her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing, 1983); Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: Reidel, 1983).
84. I draw here on the large body of work in philosophy and psychology on the social construction of emotion and personality, especially in connection with gender. In psychology, see, e.g., Kaschak; Travis; Brody and Hall; Unger and Crawford; Keith Oatley, "Social Construction in Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, eds.; Doris Howard, ed., The Dynamics of Feminist Therapy (New York: Haworth, 1986); M. Butler, "Guidelines for Feminist Therapy," in Handbook of Feminist Therapy, ed. L. B. Rosewater and L. Walker (New York: Springer, 1985); Hannah Lerman, "The Limits of Phenomenology: A Feminist Critique of the Humanistic Personality Theories," in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Appraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou (New York: Guilford, 1992); Rom Harre, ed., The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In philosophy, see, e.g., Bartky, "Shame and Gender"; Jaggar; Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger," in her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing, 1983); Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: Reidel, 1983).
85. I draw here on the large body of work in philosophy and psychology on the social construction of emotion and personality, especially in connection with gender. In psychology, see, e.g., Kaschak; Travis; Brody and Hall; Unger and Crawford; Keith Oatley, "Social Construction in Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, eds.; Doris Howard, ed., The Dynamics of Feminist Therapy (New York: Haworth, 1986); M. Butler, "Guidelines for Feminist Therapy," in Handbook of Feminist Therapy, ed. L. B. Rosewater and L. Walker (New York: Springer, 1985); Hannah Lerman, "The Limits of Phenomenology: A Feminist Critique of the Humanistic Personality Theories," in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Appraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou (New York: Guilford, 1992); Rom Harre, ed., The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In philosophy, see, e.g., Bartky, "Shame and Gender"; Jaggar; Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger," in her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing, 1983); Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: Reidel, 1983).
86. I draw here on the large body of work in philosophy and psychology on the social construction of emotion and personality, especially in connection with gender. In psychology, see, e.g., Kaschak; Travis; Brody and Hall; Unger and Crawford; Keith Oatley, "Social Construction in Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, eds.; Doris Howard, ed., The Dynamics of Feminist Therapy (New York: Haworth, 1986); M. Butler, "Guidelines for Feminist Therapy," in Handbook of Feminist Therapy, ed. L. B. Rosewater and L. Walker (New York: Springer, 1985); Hannah Lerman, "The Limits of Phenomenology: A Feminist Critique of the Humanistic Personality Theories," in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Appraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou (New York: Guilford, 1992); Rom Harre, ed., The Social Construction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). In philosophy, see, e.g., Bartky, "Shame and Gender"; Jaggar; Marilyn Frye, "A Note on Anger," in her The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing, 1983); Naomi Scheman, "Individualism and the Objects of Psychology," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Boston: Reidel, 1983).
87. I am indebted to Richmond Campbell for this point. The primordial human experience of being a valued and valuable person among valued and valuable persons is not only the experiential source for an individual's basal, recognition, and evaluation self-respect but is also the ground of the very concepts of recognition and evaluative self-respect, which are socially constructed out of that collective experience, in light of other socially constructed (hence historically, culturally, and ideologically variable) concepts, such as personhood, personal identity, agency, the good life, and so on.
88. The term is Audre Lorde's, in "Eye to Eye: Black Women, Hatred, and Anger," in her Sister Outsider (Trumansburg, N.Y.: Crossing, 1984).
89. See Thomas, Living Morally, chaps. 2 and 3.
90. I owe this way of putting the point to Laurence Thomas.
91. See Kaschak; Russo and Green; and Saakvitne and Pearlman.
92. Bartky, "Psychological Oppression," p. 23.
93. Bartky, "Shame and Gender," p. 85. The phrase in single quotes she attributes to Husseen Abdilahi Bulhan, Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression (New York: Plenum, 1985), p. 122.
94. Bartky, "Shame and Gender," p. 85. The phrase in single quotes she attributes to Husseen Abdilahi Bulhan, Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression (New York: Plenum, 1985), p. 122.
95. Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 225, 227.
96. It is important to note (as one reviewer did) that when gender works together with other factors - for example, race or ethnicity - being female might in fact make one less liable to damaged self-respect. With regard to race and ethnicity, however, I've found no evidence to support this hypothesis and much that suggests the opposite. See, e.g., the essays in Lillian Comas-Diaz and Beverly Greene, eds., Women of Color: Integrating Ethnic and Gender Identities in Psychotherapy (New York: Guilford, 1994).
97. For two claims that one can and must love oneself into self-respect, see Lorde, pp. 172-75; and Collins, pp. 107-13.
98. For two claims that one can and must love oneself into self-respect, see Lorde, pp. 172-75; and Collins, pp. 107-13.
99. See Susan Babbitt, "Feminism and Objective Interests: The Role of Transformation Experiences in Rational Deliberation," in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993).