Mathematical models of group choice and negotiations

Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science

Volumn 5, Issue C, 1993, Pages 83-142

  Corfman, Kim P ^a   Gupta, Sunil ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002157238     PISSN: 09270507     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0927-0507(05)80026-X     Document Type: Review

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