Leadership and collective action: The case of revolution

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 107-132

  Van Belle, Douglas A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002002260     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2600933     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. DAVIES, J. (1962) Toward a Theory of Revolution. American Sociological Review 27:5-19.
2. DOWNS, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
3. ELSTKR, J. (1988) The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. FINKLE, S. E., AND J. B. RULE (1986) "Relative Deprivation and Related Psychological Theories of Civil Violence: A Critical Review." In Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, edited by L. Kriesberg, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
5. FROLICH, N., AND J. A. OPPENHEIMER (1970) I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends. World Politics 23:104-120.
6. GALLHOFER, I. N., AND W. F., SARIS (1979) Strategy Choices of Foreign Policy Decision Makers. Journal of Conflict Resolution 23:425-145.
7. GURR, T. (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
8. KURAN, T. (1989) Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution. Public Choice 61:41-74.
9. KURAN, T. (1991) Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. World Politics 44:7-18.
10. LICHBACH, M. I. (1994) What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action. World Politics 46:383-418.
11. MILBURN, T., AND R. BILLINGS (1976) Decision-Making Perspectives and Psychology. American Behavioral Scientist 20:111-126.
12. MOST, B. A., AND H. STARR (1989) Inquiry, Logic and International Politics. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
13. OLIVER, P. (1980) Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations. American Journal of Sociology 85:1356-1375.
14. OLSON, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
15. POPKIN, S. (1979) The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
16. SANDLKR, T. (1992) Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
17. SCHOFIELD, N. (1975) A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson's Game of Collective Action. Journal of Conflict Resolution 19:441-161.
18. SKOCPOL., T. (1979) States and Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. SNYDER, D., AND C. TILLY ( 1972) Hardship and Collective Violence in France. American Sociological Review 37:520-532.
20. TAYLOR, M. (1988) "Rationality and Revolutionary Action." In Rationality and Revolution, edited by A. Tayler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21. VAN BELLE, D. (1993a) Domestic Political Support and Variations in Leadership Risk Acceptance. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico.
22. VAN BELLE., D. (1993b) "Domestic Imperatives and Rational Models of Foreign Policy Decision Making." In The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, edited by D. Skidmore and V. Hudson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.