Theory of moves: Overview and examples

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1993, Pages 1-39

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Mattli, Walter ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001951571     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/073889429301200201     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Aftink, Jan. 1989. “Far-Sighted Equilibria in 2 × 2 Non-Cooperative,Repeated Games”. Theory and Decision 27 (3) (November):175-92.
2. Binmore, Ken. 1992. Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. Lexington, MA: D. C.Heath.
3. Brams, Steven J. 1977. “Deception in 2 × 2 Games”. Journal of Peace Science 2 (Spring):171-203.
4. Brams, Steven J. 1982. “Omniscience and Omnipotence: How They May Help-orHurt-in a Game”. Inquiry 25 (2) (June):217-231.
5. Brams, Steven J. 1983. Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know?Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, andIncomprehensibility. New York: Springer-Verlag.
6. Brams, Steven J. 1990. Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining andArbitration. New York: Routledge.
7. Brams, Steven J. 1992. “Cycles of Conflict”. Department of Politics, New York University. Preprint.
8. Brams, Steven J. 1993. Theory of Moves. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.Forthcoming.
9. Brams, Steven J., and Marek P. Hessel. 1982. “Absorbing Outcomes in 2 × 2 Games”. Behavioral Science 27 (4)(October): 393-401.
10. Brams, Steven J. 1983. “Staying Power in 2 × 2 Games”. Theory and Decision 15 (3) (September):279-302.
11. Brams, Steven J. 1984. “Threat Power in Sequential Games”. International Studies Quarterly 28 (1) (March):15-36.
12. Brams, Steven J., and D. Marc Kilgour. 1988. Game Theory and National Security. New York: BasilBlackwell.
13. Brams, Steven J., and Ben D. Mor. 1993. “When Is It Rational to Be Magnanimous inVictory?” Rationality and Society. Forthcoming.
14. Brams, Steven J., and Donald Wittman. 1981. “Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2 × 2 Games”. Conflict Management and Peace Science 6 (1) (Fall):39-62.
15. Carter, Jimmy. 1982. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam.
16. Clines, Francis X. 1991. “Gorbachev Recounts Telling Plotters: To Hell withYou.'” New York Times, 31 August, A13.
17. De, Mitali, Keith W. Hipel, and D. Marc Kilgour. 1990. “Algorithms for Hierarchical Power”. Applied Mathematics and Computation 39: 21-36.
18. Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. 1991. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business,Politics, and Everyday Life. New York: W. W.Norton.
19. Fisher, Franklin M. 1989. “Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View”. RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1)(Spring): 113-24.
20. Friedman, James W. 1990. Game Theory with Applications to Economics, 2ded. New York: Oxford Univ.Press.
21. Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MITPress.
22. Gardner, Roy, and Elinor Ostrom. 1991. “Rules and Games”. Public Choice 70 (2) (May):121-149.
23. Greenberg, Joseph. The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.Press.
24. Güth, Werner. 1991. “Game Theory's Basic Question: Who Is aPlayer?” Journal of Theoretical Politics 3 (4) (October):403-435.
25. Hamilton, Jonathan H., and Steven M. Slutsky. 1993. “Endogenizing the Order of Moves in Matrix Games”. Theory and Decision 34 (1) (January):47-62.
26. Hirshleifer, Jack. 1985. “Protocol, Payoff, and Equilibrium: Game Theory andSocial Modeling”. Department of Economics,University of California, LosAngeles. Preprint.
27. Holsti, Ole R., Richard A. Brody, and Robert C. North. 1964. “Measuring Affect and Action in International Reaction Models:Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis”. Journal of Peace Research 1: 170-89
28. Kilgour, D. Marc. 1984. “Equilibria for Far-sighted Players”. Theory and Decision 16 (2) (March):135-57.
29. Kilgour, D. Marc. 1985. “Anticipation and Stability in Two-PersonNon-Cooperative Gaines”. In Dynamic Models ofInternational Conflict, edited by Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward, 26-51. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner.
30. Kilgour, D. Marc, Mitali De, and Keith W. Hipel. 1986. “ConflictAnalysis Using Staying Power”. Proceedings of tlie 1986 IEEEInternational Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. Atlanta, GA:Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
31. Kilgour, D. Marc, and Frank C. Zagare. 1987. “Holding Power in Sequential Games”. International Interactions 13 (2):91-114.
32. Kreps, David M. 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. New York: Oxford Univ.Press.
33. Langlois, John-Pierre P. 1992. “Decision Systems Analysis of CrisisBehavior”. Dept. of Mathematics, San Francisco State University. Preprint. “Last Word on October Surprise?”1993. New York Times, 24 January: E17.
34. Lewis, Neil A. (1992). “Panel Rejects Theory Bush Met Iranians in Paris in'80”. New York Times, 2 July: A16.
35. Lewis, Neil A. 1993. “House Inquiry Finds No Evidence of Deal on Hostages in1980”. New York Times, 13 January: A1, A14.
36. McMillan, John. 1992. Games, Strategies, and Managers. New York: Oxford Univ.Press.
37. Mailath, George J., Larry Samuelson, and Jeroen Swinkels. 1993. “Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games”. Econometrica 61 (2) (March):273-302.
38. Marschak, Thomas, and Reinhard Selten. 1978. “Rcstabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and OligopolisticEquilibria”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 42: 71-93.
39. Mortens, Jean-Francois. 1991. “Equilibrium and Rationality: Context andHistory-Dependence”. In Issues in ContemporaryEconomics: Markets and Welfare, vol. 1, edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, 198-211. NewYork: New York Univ.Press.
40. Myerson, Roger B. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.Press.
41. Nash, John. 1951. “Non-cooperative Games”. Annals of Mathematics 54: 286-95.
42. Rapoport, Anatol, and Melvin Guyer. 1966. “A Taxonomy of 2 × 2 Games”. General Systems: Yearbook of the Society for General SystemsResearch 11: 203-204.
43. Rasmusen, Eric. 1989. Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford, UK: BasilBlackwell.
44. Saunders, Harold. 1985. “Diplomacy and Pressure, November 1979- May1980”. In American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of aCrisis, edited by Warren Christopher, 72-144. NewHaven: Yale Univ. Press.
45. Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale Univ.Press.
46. Sick, Gary. 1985a. All Fall Down. New York: Penguin.
47. Sick, Gary. 1985b. “Military Options andConstraints”. In American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of aCrisis, edited by Christopher Warren, 144-72. NewHaven: Yale Univ. Press.
48. Sick, Gary. 1991. October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and theElection of Ronald Reagan. New York: RandomHouse.
49. Skyrms, Brian. 1990. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.Press.
50. Vance, Cyrus. 1983. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's ForeignPolicy. New York: Simon andSchuster.
51. von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1953. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3d ed. Princeton: Princeton Univ.Press.
52. Zagare, Frank C. 1984. “Limited-Move Equilibria in 2 × 2Games”. Theory and Decision 16 (1) (January):1-19.