Postmerger performance, managerial superiority and the market for corporate control

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 45-55

  Philippatos, George C ^a   Baird, Philip L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^b DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001873636     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199601)17:1<45::AID-MDE733>3.0.CO;2-K     Document Type: Article

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