Love as a moral emotion

Ethics

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 338-374

  Velleman, J David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0001798458     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233898     Document Type: Article

References (199)

1. I will not be concerned in this article with the possibility of practical conflict between love and duty; my sole concern will be the supposed psychological conflict - what I have called the conflict in spirit. For the claim that love and duty conflict in practice, see Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 86. Slote's example is discussed by Marcia Baron in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, pp. 558ff. An alternative version of Slote's example appears in Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 243-59, p. 253.
2. I will not be concerned in this article with the possibility of practical conflict between love and duty; my sole concern will be the supposed psychological conflict - what I have called the conflict in spirit. For the claim that love and duty conflict in practice, see Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 86. Slote's example is discussed by Marcia Baron in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, pp. 558ff. An alternative version of Slote's example appears in Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 243-59, p. 253.
3. I will not be concerned in this article with the possibility of practical conflict between love and duty; my sole concern will be the supposed psychological conflict - what I have called the conflict in spirit. For the claim that love and duty conflict in practice, see Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 86. Slote's example is discussed by Marcia Baron in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, pp. 558ff. An alternative version of Slote's example appears in Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 243-59, p. 253.
4. I explain my reasons for using 'he' to denote the arbitrary person in my Practical Reflection (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 4, n. 1.
5. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
6. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
7. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
8. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
9. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
10. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
11. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
12. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
13. Some philosophers see love as conflicting with morality only as the latter is conceived by a particular moral theory. See, e.g., Julia Annas, "Personal Love and Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest," in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 155-73; and Neera Badhwar Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship," Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504. Annas and Badhwar think that love is compatible with morality, properly conceived; and so they reject Kantianism and consequentialism, respectively, for implying otherwise. Other philosophers see the conflict between love and morality as cutting across at least some differences among moral theories. These authors include: Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150, "Morality and the Emotions," in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 207-29, "Persons, Character and Morality," in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, and "Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations," in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 219-33; Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," and "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39; John Deigh, "Morality and Personal Relations," in his The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-17.
14. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 432ff.; Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, and "The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 275-86; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-72. See also Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism" Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283-302; and Frank Jackson, "Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection," Ethics 101 (1991): 461-82.
15. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 432ff.; Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, and "The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 275-86; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-72. See also Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism" Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283-302; and Frank Jackson, "Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection," Ethics 101 (1991): 461-82.
16. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 432ff.; Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, and "The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 275-86; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-72. See also Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism" Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283-302; and Frank Jackson, "Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection," Ethics 101 (1991): 461-82.
17. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 432ff.; Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, and "The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 275-86; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-72. See also Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism" Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283-302; and Frank Jackson, "Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection," Ethics 101 (1991): 461-82.
18. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 432ff.; Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, and "The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 275-86; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-72. See also Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism" Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283-302; and Frank Jackson, "Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection," Ethics 101 (1991): 461-82.
19. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 432ff.; Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, and "The Objectivity of Morals and the Subjectivity of Agents," American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985): 275-86; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-72. See also Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism" Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283-302; and Frank Jackson, "Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection," Ethics 101 (1991): 461-82.
20. Here I am glossing over many exegetical issues in order to state a version of the Categorical Imperative that seems both intuitively plausible and faithful to Kant. I defend this version of the Categorical Imperative in my "The Voice of Conscience," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 57-76.
21. Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 44.
22. A similar reply can be made to the following remark by Robert C. Solomon: "On the Kantian model, the particularity of love would seem to be a form of irrationality -comparable to our tendency to make 'exceptions' of ourselves, in this case, making exceptions of persons close to us" ("The Virtue of (Erotic) Love," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 [1988]: 12-31, p. 18). The Kantian model forbids only those exceptions by which we act for reasons that we couldn't make generally accessible. It does not forbid differential treatment of different people. (This point is also made, e.g., by Marcia Baron in "Impartiality and Friendship," Ethics 101 [1991]: 836-57, p. 851.)
23. A similar reply can be made to the following remark by Robert C. Solomon: "On the Kantian model, the particularity of love would seem to be a form of irrationality - comparable to our tendency to make 'exceptions' of ourselves, in this case, making exceptions of persons close to us" ("The Virtue of (Erotic) Love," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 [1988]: 12-31, p. 18). The Kantian model forbids only those exceptions by which we act for reasons that we couldn't make generally accessible. It does not forbid differential treatment of different people. (This point is also made, e.g., by Marcia Baron in "Impartiality and Friendship," Ethics 101 [1991]: 836-57, p. 851.)
24. Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," p. 18.
25. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
26. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
27. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
28. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
29. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
30. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
31. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
32. See Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 191-98; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 9; Marcia Baron, "On Admirable Immorality," and Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1995), chaps. 4-6. See also H.J. Paton, "Kanton Friendship," Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956): 45-66; N.J. H Dent, "Duty and Inclination," Mind 83 (1974): 552-70; Mary Midgley, "The Objection to Systematic Humbug," Philosophy 53 (1978): 147-69; Adrian M. S. Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 102-18; and Cynthia A. Stark, "Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness, and Impartiality," Noûs 31 (1997): 478-95.
33. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
34. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
35. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
36. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
37. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
38. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
39. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
40. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
41. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
42. Lawrence Blum, "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," Philosophical Studies 50 (1986): 343-67, p. 344. Blum draws this view from Iris Murdoch's The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). Others who subscribe to this view include John Kekes, "Morality and Impartiality," American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303; Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyatiies," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99; Annette Baier, "The Moral Perils of Intimacy," in Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis, ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 93-101; Christina Hoff Sommers, "Filial Morality," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 439-56; Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), pp. 154-77; Lynne McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (1987): 5-20. See also various contributions to a symposium published in Ethics 101, no. 4 (1991).
43. Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," p. 16.
44. For a related attempt to rethink the partiality of love, see Jennifer Whiting, "Impersonal Friends," Monist 74 (1991): 3-29.
45. Murdoch, Sovereignty of Good, p. 65.
46. "Prayer is properly not petition, but simply an attention to God which is a form of love"; "the capacity to love, that is to see"; "attention to reality inspired by, consisting of, love" (ibid.,pp. 55, 66, 67).
47. Ibid., p. 91.
48. Iris Murdoch herself draws this connection in "The Sublime and the Good," in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature, ed. Peter Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1997), pp. 205-20. In this essay, after asserting that "love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real" (p. 215), Murdoch says that this "exercise of overcoming oneself . . . is very like Achtung," adding: "Kant was marvelously near the mark" (p. 216). To be sure, Murdoch's primary concern in this essay is to criticize Kant for being "afraid of the particular" (p. 214). But I think that Murdoch underestimates the extent to which the object of Kantian Achtung can be a universal law embodied in a particular person, or the object of love can be a particular person as embodying something universal. In short, I think that Murdoch underestimates how near Kant was to the mark.
49. On the concept of respect for persons in moral theory, see Stephen L. Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 36-19; William K. Frankena, "The Ethics of Respect for Persons," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 149-67. As these discussions make clear, Kantian respect is not the same as esteem. It is rather a kind of practical consideration paid to another person. See also Robin Dillon, "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration," Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 22 (1992): 105-32.
50. On the concept of respect for persons in moral theory, see Stephen L. Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 36-19; William K. Frankena, "The Ethics of Respect for Persons," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 149-67. As these discussions make clear, Kantian respect is not the same as esteem. It is rather a kind of practical consideration paid to another person. See also Robin Dillon, "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration," Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 22 (1992): 105-32.
51. On the concept of respect for persons in moral theory, see Stephen L. Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 36-19; William K. Frankena, "The Ethics of Respect for Persons," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 149-67. As these discussions make clear, Kantian respect is not the same as esteem. It is rather a kind of practical consideration paid to another person. See also Robin Dillon, "Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration," Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 22 (1992): 105-32.
52. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
53. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
54. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
55. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature
56. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
57. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
58. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
59. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
60. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
61. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
62. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
63. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
64. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:402. All references to Kant's works are given by the volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition of his gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-). The Latin vereor is cognate with the Greek óρα'ω, "to see," as well as the English 'beware'. On the connection between respect and attention, see Dillon, "Respect and Care," pp. 108, 119-20, 124-27. The connection between love and attention was attributed by Murdoch to Simone Weil (see Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in The Simone Weil Reader, ed. George A. Panichas [New York: David McKay, 1977], pp. 313-39, p. 333). Similar connections are drawn by George Nakhnikian, "Love in Human Reason," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978): 286-317; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 99-100; Martha Craven Nussbaum, "'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination," in Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), pp. 111-34; and Nathaniel Branden, "Love and Psychological Visibility," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 64-72. David Hills has pointed out to me that Stanley Cavell's essay on King Lear is primarily about our motives for avoiding the visibility that comes with being loved (Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in his Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], pp. 267-353). The psychoanalytic literature offers an especially vivid instance of love as a form of attention. It is D. W. Winnicott's image of the mother's face as a mirror ("Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development," in his Playing and Reality [New York: Routledge, 1989], pp. 111-18). Winnicott imagines that the good-enough mother (as he calls her) expresses in her face the feelings that she sees expressed in the baby's face, thus presenting the baby with an expression that mirrors both its face and its state of mind. The mother looks at the baby in a way that enacts her unclouded perception of what it feels: hers is a look that visibly sees. This image of "really looking" is also, unmistakably, an image of motherly love. (On the application of Murdoch's views specifically to maternal love, see also Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," in Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall [Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1986], pp. 340-51, pp. 347ff.) Winnicott's image may explain why Freud imagined the psychoanalyst as offering his patient "a cure through love" while doing no more than holding up a mirror to him. (For the former notion, see Freud's letter to Jung, December 6, 1906, in The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G, Jung [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974], pp. 12-13; for the latter, see Freud "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey [London: Hogarth Press, 1958] [hereafter cited as S.E.], vol. 12, pp. 111-20, p. 118. This connection was suggested to me by Nina Coltart's essay "Attention," in her Slouching towards Bethlehem [New York: Guildford, 1992], pp. 176-93.)
65. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 4:420, 426, 437.
66. Ibid., 4:421-22. See also 4:402.
67. Ibid., 4:421-22. See also 4:402.
68. Ibid., 4:400-401.
69. Ibid., 4:402.
70. Ibid., 4:403. See also 4: 436.
71. Ibid., 4:403. See also 4: 436.
72. Ibid., 4:403.
73. Ibid., 4:440, 447.
74. Ibid., 4:446.
75. Ibid., 4:455. Also relevant here is this passage from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 5: 32. "One need only analyze the sentence which men pass upon the lawfulness of their actions to see in every case that their reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, in every action holds up the maxim of the will to the pure will, i.e., to itself regarded as a priori practical." Here the process of submitting a maxim to the test of the Categorical Imperative is equated with holding it up to a conception of the will itself, as a faculty of a priori practical reason.
76. Kant, Groundwork, 4:440. See 4:435: actions performed from duty "exhibit the will which performs them as an object of immediate reverence"; ibid., 4:436: "The law-making [Gesetzgebung] which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity - that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth - for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression"; Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73: "Since this law, however, is in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect." In this last passage, the moral law is an object of respect insofar as it is "the form of an intellectual causality" - i.e., a conception of the free will. See also Kant, Groundwork, 4: 410-11, where Kant explains how "the pure thought of duty, and in general of the moral law, has . . . an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all the further impulsions capable of being called up from the field of experience." The explanation of this influence is that "in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is able gradually to become their master." Here the influence exerted by "the pure thought of the moral law" is equated with an influence exerted by reason's "consciousness of its own dignity." The motive by which we are influenced in contemplating the moral law is thus a response to an ideal conception of ourselves.
77. Kant, Groundwork, 4:440. See 4:435: actions performed from duty "exhibit the will which performs them as an object of immediate reverence"; ibid., 4:436: "The law-making [Gesetzgebung] which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity - that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth - for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression"; Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73: "Since this law, however, is in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect." In this last passage, the moral law is an object of respect insofar as it is "the form of an intellectual causality" - i.e., a conception of the free will. See also Kant, Groundwork, 4: 410-11, where Kant explains how "the pure thought of duty, and in general of the moral law, has . . . an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all the further impulsions capable of being called up from the field of experience." The explanation of this influence is that "in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is able gradually to become their master." Here the influence exerted by "the pure thought of the moral law" is equated with an influence exerted by reason's "consciousness of its own dignity." The motive by which we are influenced in contemplating the moral law is thus a response to an ideal conception of ourselves.
78. Kant, Groundwork, 4:440. See 4:435: actions performed from duty "exhibit the will which performs them as an object of immediate reverence"; ibid., 4:436: "The law-making [Gesetzgebung] which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity - that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth - for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression"; Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73: "Since this law, however, is in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect." In this last passage, the moral law is an object of respect insofar as it is "the form of an intellectual causality" - i.e., a conception of the free will. See also Kant, Groundwork, 4: 410-11, where Kant explains how "the pure thought of duty, and in general of the moral law, has . . . an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all the further impulsions capable of being called up from the field of experience." The explanation of this influence is that "in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is able gradually to become their master." Here the influence exerted by "the pure thought of the moral law" is equated with an influence exerted by reason's "consciousness of its own dignity." The motive by which we are influenced in contemplating the moral law is thus a response to an ideal conception of ourselves.
79. Kant, Groundwork, 4:440. See 4:435: actions performed from duty "exhibit the will which performs them as an object of immediate reverence"; ibid., 4:436: "The law-making [Gesetzgebung] which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity - that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth - for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression"; Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73: "Since this law, however, is in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect." In this last passage, the moral law is an object of respect insofar as it is "the form of an intellectual causality" - i.e., a conception of the free will. See also Kant, Groundwork, 4: 410-11, where Kant explains how "the pure thought of duty, and in general of the moral law, has . . . an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all the further impulsions capable of being called up from the field of experience." The explanation of this influence is that "in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is able gradually to become their master." Here the influence exerted by "the pure thought of the moral law" is equated with an influence exerted by reason's "consciousness of its own dignity." The motive by which we are influenced in contemplating the moral law is thus a response to an ideal conception of ourselves.
80. Kant, Groundwork, 4:440. See 4:435: actions performed from duty "exhibit the will which performs them as an object of immediate reverence"; ibid., 4:436: "The law-making [Gesetzgebung] which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity - that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth - for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression"; Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73: "Since this law, however, is in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect." In this last passage, the moral law is an object of respect insofar as it is "the form of an intellectual causality" - i.e., a conception of the free will. See also Kant, Groundwork, 4: 410-11, where Kant explains how "the pure thought of duty, and in general of the moral law, has . . . an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all the further impulsions capable of being called up from the field of experience." The explanation of this influence is that "in the consciousness of its own dignity reason despises these impulsions and is able gradually to become their master." Here the influence exerted by "the pure thought of the moral law" is equated with an influence exerted by reason's "consciousness of its own dignity." The motive by which we are influenced in contemplating the moral law is thus a response to an ideal conception of ourselves.
81. As should already be clear from my survey of how Kant uses the term das Gesetz, I do not mean to deny that individual rules or the abstract form of rules plays a role in Kantian moral theory. In particular, the abstract form of rules plays a crucial role in the procedures followed by the will in living up to its self-ideal of being an autonomous legal authority. My interest, however, is focused exclusively on the law as the proper object of Achtung. And I find strong textual evidence for the conclusion that the proper object of Achtung is not the abstract form of law but rather the idea of a will that constrains its dictates to be compatible with that form.
82. This reading seems not to fit a statement in the footnote attached to Kant's initial discussion of reverence: "All reverence for a person is properly only reverence for the law (of honesty and so on) of which that person gives us an example" (Groundwork, 4:400). My interpretation says, on the contrary, that all reverence for the law is properly only reverence for the person. The context of this statement is important to its interpretation. In the present footnote, Kant is forestalling an objection to the effect that reverence is "an obscure feeling" rather than "a concept of reason." Kant's answer to this objection is that "although reverence is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside influence, but one self-produced by a rational concept." He is therefore at pains to emphasize that reverence is a response to something in the rational order rather than to anything in the empirical world. Kant's statement about the object of reverence must be read in this light. It is meant, I think, to rule out persons as proper objects of reverence insofar as they are inhabitants of the empirical world. Their serving as objects of reverence in their purely intelligible aspect, as instances of rational nature, is compatible with the point that Kant is trying to make. It is precisely in this aspect that persons embody the law that is the object of reverence, according to my interpretation. Thus, "the law . . . of which that person gives us an example" is one and the same with the rational nature of which he gives us an example. (See also the material at 5:76ff. of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, which appears to support this interpretation.)
83. Kant, Ground-work, 4:458.
84. Ibid., 4:457-58. See also 4:461.
85. Ibid., 4:457-58. See also 4:461.
86. My approach bears similarities to that of Gregory Vlastos, "Justice and Equality," in Social Justice, ed. Richard B. Brandt (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 31-72. Vlastos draws a connection between love and the principles of social justice, as being jointly grounded in the "individual worth" of a person. My approach also resembles that of Dillon in "Respect and Care," although I differ from Dillon in trying to retain a Kantian conception of respect.
87. My approach bears similarities to that of Gregory Vlastos, "Justice and Equality," in Social Justice, ed. Richard B. Brandt (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 31-72. Vlastos draws a connection between love and the principles of social justice, as being jointly grounded in the "individual worth" of a person. My approach also resembles that of Dillon in "Respect and Care," although I differ from Dillon in trying to retain a Kantian conception of respect.
88. Finally, I also find similarities to Weil's "Human Personality," in which the disparagement of "the person" and "rights" strikes me as aimed at un-Kantian versions of these concepts, and hence as Kantian in spirit.
89. Richard Rorty, "Freud, Morality, and Hermeneutics," New Literary History 12 (1980): 177-85, p. 180. This passage is quoted by Baier, p. 93.
90. Murdoch says that Freud "presents us with a realistic and detailed picture of the fallen man" (Sovereignty of Good, p. 51). My discussion of Freud is an attempt to make clear and explicit what is implicit in Murdoch's brief allusions to him (pp. 46-51).
91. Richard Rorty, "Freud, Morality, and Hermeneutics," p. 178.
92. Freud, "The Libido Theory," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 255-59, p. 258. See also Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, in S.E., vol. 21, pp. 59-145, pp. 102-3, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 67-143, pp. 90-91, and 137-40, "The Dynamics of Transference," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 97-108, p. 105, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," in S.E., vol. 7, pp. 125-243, p. 200.
93. Freud, "The Libido Theory," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 255-59, p. 258. See also Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, in S.E., vol. 21, pp. 59-145, pp. 102-3, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 67-143, pp. 90-91, and 137-40, "The Dynamics of Transference," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 97-108, p. 105, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," in S.E., vol. 7, pp. 125-243, p. 200.
94. Freud, "The Libido Theory," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 255-59, p. 258. See also Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, in S.E., vol. 21, pp. 59-145, pp. 102-3, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 67-143, pp. 90-91, and 137-40, "The Dynamics of Transference," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 97-108, p. 105, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," in S.E., vol. 7, pp. 125-243, p. 200.
95. Freud, "The Libido Theory," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 255-59, p. 258. See also Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, in S.E., vol. 21, pp. 59-145, pp. 102-3, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 67-143, pp. 90-91, and 137-40, "The Dynamics of Transference," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 97-108, p. 105, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," in S.E., vol. 7, pp. 125-243, p. 200.
96. Freud, "The Libido Theory," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 255-59, p. 258. See also Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, in S.E., vol. 21, pp. 59-145, pp. 102-3, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," in S.E., vol. 18, pp. 67-143, pp. 90-91, and 137-40, "The Dynamics of Transference," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 97-108, p. 105, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," in S.E., vol. 7, pp. 125-243, p. 200.
97. 'Drive' is the literal translation of the word (Trieb) that is translated in the S.E. as 'instinct'. For a critique of the latter translation, see Bruno Bettelheim, Freud and Man's Soul (New York: Vintage, 1984), pp. 103-12.
98. Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," in S.E., vol. 14, pp. 111-40, pp. 118-23. See also Freud, New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis, in S.E., vol. 22, pp. 3-182, p. 97. In what follows I substitute the word 'drive for 'instinct' in the S.E. translation. Freud later modified the notion that drives aim at the removal of a "tension due to stimulus," but only by introducing the possibility of their aiming at a particular qualitative character in the stimulus ("The Economic Problem of Masochism," in S.E., vol. 19, pp. 156-70, pp. 159-61). This modification makes no difference for my purposes.
99. Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," in S.E., vol. 14, pp. 111-40, pp. 118-23. See also Freud, New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis, in S.E., vol. 22, pp. 3-182, p. 97. In what follows I substitute the word 'drive for 'instinct' in the S.E. translation. Freud later modified the notion that drives aim at the removal of a "tension due to stimulus," but only by introducing the possibility of their aiming at a particular qualitative character in the stimulus ("The Economic Problem of Masochism," in S.E., vol. 19, pp. 156-70, pp. 159-61). This modification makes no difference for my purposes.
100. Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," in S.E., vol. 14, pp. 111-40, pp. 118-23. See also Freud, New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis, in S.E., vol. 22, pp. 3-182, p. 97. In what follows I substitute the word 'drive for 'instinct' in the S.E. translation. Freud later modified the notion that drives aim at the removal of a "tension due to stimulus," but only by introducing the possibility of their aiming at a particular qualitative character in the stimulus ("The Economic Problem of Masochism," in S.E., vol. 19, pp. 156-70, pp. 159-61). This modification makes no difference for my purposes.
101. Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," p. 122.
102. Freud himself offers the word 'need' for the motivating stimulus of a drive (ibid., pp. 118-19).
103. See Freud, "Three Essays," p. 168.
104. Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," pp. 122-23: "[The object] may be changed any number of times in the course of the vicissitudes which the [drive] undergoes during its existence; and highly important parts are played by this displacement of [drive]."
105. Freud, "Group Psychology," pp. 112-13. See also Freud, "Three Essays," pp. 150-51, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," in S.E., vol. 14, pp. 67-102, pp. 88ff.
106. Freud, "Group Psychology," pp. 112-13. See also Freud, "Three Essays," pp. 150-51, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," in S.E., vol. 14, pp. 67-102, pp. 88ff.
107. Freud, "Group Psychology," pp. 112-13. See also Freud, "Three Essays," pp. 150-51, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," in S.E., vol. 14, pp. 67-102, pp. 88ff.
108. Janet Malcolm, Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession (New York: Vintage, 1980), p. 6.
109. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in S.E., vol. 16, p. 442.
110. Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 157-71, p. 168. Indeed, Freud says that transference governs "the whole of each person's relations to his human environment" (An Autobiographical Study, in S.E., vol. 20, pp. 3-74, p. 42). See also Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in S.E., vol. 11, pp. 3-55, p. 51: "Transference arises spontaneously in all human relationships."
111. Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 157-71, p. 168. Indeed, Freud says that transference governs "the whole of each person's relations to his human environment" (An Autobiographical Study, in S.E., vol. 20, pp. 3-74, p. 42). See also Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in S.E., vol. 11, pp. 3-55, p. 51: "Transference arises spontaneously in all human relationships."
112. Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love," in S.E., vol. 12, pp. 157-71, p. 168. Indeed, Freud says that transference governs "the whole of each person's relations to his human environment" (An Autobiographical Study, in S.E., vol. 20, pp. 3-74, p. 42). See also Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in S.E., vol. 11, pp. 3-55, p. 51: "Transference arises spontaneously in all human relationships."
113. Sidgwick, p. 244.
114. Laurence Thomas, "Reasons for Loving," in The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991), pp. 467-76, p. 470.
115. Frankfurt, "Some Thoughts about Caring," Ethical Perspectives 5 (1998): 3-14, p. 7.
116. Gabriele Taylor, "Love," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1976): 147-64, p. 157.
117. William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 64.
118. Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 55.
119. Robert Nozick, The Examined Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 68.
120. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 190. See also p. 487.
121. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 190. See also p. 487.
122. Alan Soble, "Union, Autonomy, and Concern," in Love Analyzed, ed. Roger E. Lamb (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 65-92, p. 65.
123. Nozick diverges somewhat from this trend, but not very far from it. Nozick thinks that love yokes together the welfare interests of lover and beloved, but these interests are also formidable in terms of motives - if not the notives that the parties actually have then the ones that they rationally would or ought to. Nozick goes on to speak about these motives in much the same terms as the other authors.
124. Why might philosophers be committed to a conative analysis of love? My suspicion is that this commitment reflects the extent to which the practical syllogism has come to monopolize moral psychology. Philosophers who are unduly impressed with the power of belief-desire explanation, and the associated instrumental reasoning, would like every psychological state or attitude to be analyzable as either a belief or a desire, or perhaps as some combination of the two. An especially clear case of this philosophical bias (as I would call it) can be found in O. H. Green, The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory (Boston: Kluwer, 1992), and "Is Love an Emotion?" in Lamb, ed., pp. 209-24.
125. Why might philosophers be committed to a conative analysis of love? My suspicion is that this commitment reflects the extent to which the practical syllogism has come to monopolize moral psychology. Philosophers who are unduly impressed with the power of belief-desire explanation, and the associated instrumental reasoning, would like every psychological state or attitude to be analyzable as either a belief or a desire, or perhaps as some combination of the two. An especially clear case of this philosophical bias (as I would call it) can be found in O. H. Green, The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory (Boston: Kluwer, 1992), and "Is Love an Emotion?" in Lamb, ed., pp. 209-24.
126. Indeed, Freud names "such features as longing for proximity, and self-sacrifice" as characteristic of aim-inhibited libido ("Group Psychology," pp. 90-91).
127. Compare Scruton, pp. 101-2. Scruton considers and rejects the claim that love approaches its object with no aim. My argument for this claim will draw on Michael Stocker's "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65. Stocker's version of the claim reads as follows: "There are no ends, properly so-called, the seeking of which is, as such, to act out of friendship" (p. 756). Note that in denying that there is any particular aim attached to the motive of friendship, Stocker uses the term 'end' instead of 'aim'. I prefer to distinguish between ends and aims, however, because I want to say that acting from friendship does involve an end - namely, one's friend, who serves as one's end in the sense that one acts for his sake. Of course, the idea of a person's serving as an end comes straight out of Kantian moral psychology, as I shall explain below. In this application of Kantian theory, I am drawing on Elizabeth Anderson's Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), chap. 2. The departure from classical moral psychology in which I thus join Stocker and Anderson bears some resemblance to the departure from Freudian drive theory that was taken by objects-relations theorists, who asserted the priority of libidinal objects over libidinal aims. See especially the essays in part 1 of W. R. D. Fairbairn's Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (London: Routledge, 1990).
128. Compare Scruton, pp. 101-2. Scruton considers and rejects the claim that love approaches its object with no aim. My argument for this claim will draw on Michael Stocker's "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65. Stocker's version of the claim reads as follows: "There are no ends, properly so-called, the seeking of which is, as such, to act out of friendship" (p. 756). Note that in denying that there is any particular aim attached to the motive of friendship, Stocker uses the term 'end' instead of 'aim'. I prefer to distinguish between ends and aims, however, because I want to say that acting from friendship does involve an end - namely, one's friend, who serves as one's end in the sense that one acts for his sake. Of course, the idea of a person's
129. Compare Scruton, pp. 101-2. Scruton considers and rejects the claim that love approaches its object with no aim. My argument for this claim will draw on Michael Stocker's "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65. Stocker's version of the claim reads as follows: "There are no ends, properly so-called, the seeking of which is, as such, to act out of friendship" (p. 756). Note that in denying that there is any particular aim attached to the motive of friendship, Stocker uses the term 'end' instead of 'aim'. I prefer to distinguish between ends and aims, however, because I want to say that acting from friendship does involve an end - namely, one's friend, who serves as one's end in the sense that one acts for his sake. Of course, the idea of a person's serving as an end comes straight out of Kantian moral psychology, as I shall explain below. In this application of Kantian theory, I am drawing on Elizabeth Anderson's Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), chap. 2. The departure from classical moral psychology in which I thus join Stocker and Anderson bears some resemblance to the departure from Freudian drive theory that was taken by objects-relations theorists, who asserted the priority of libidinal objects over libidinal aims. See especially the essays in part 1 of W. R. D. Fairbairn's Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (London: Routledge, 1990).
130. Kant, Groundwork, 4:427ff. As I mentioned in the preceding note, this application of Kantian moral psychology is indebted to Anderson, chap. 2. Also relevant here are R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect for Persons (New York: Shocken, 1970), chap. I; and Stephen Darwall, "Self-Interest and Self-Concern," Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 158-78, and "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 261-82.
131. Kant, Groundwork, 4:427ff. As I mentioned in the preceding note, this application of Kantian moral psychology is indebted to Anderson, chap. 2. Also relevant here are R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect for Persons (New York: Shocken, 1970), chap. I; and Stephen Darwall, "Self-Interest and Self-Concern," Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 158-78, and "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 261-82.
132. Kant, Groundwork, 4:427ff. As I mentioned in the preceding note, this application of Kantian moral psychology is indebted to Anderson, chap. 2. Also relevant here are R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect for Persons (New York: Shocken, 1970), chap. I; and Stephen Darwall, "Self-Interest and Self-Concern," Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 158-78, and "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 261-82.
133. Kant, Groundwork, 4:427ff. As I mentioned in the preceding note, this application of Kantian moral psychology is indebted to Anderson, chap. 2. Also relevant here are R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect for Persons (New York: Shocken, 1970), chap. I; and Stephen Darwall, "Self-Interest and Self-Concern," Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 158-78, and "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 261-82.
134. David Phillips has directed me to this quotation from Sidgwick (p. 390n): "The conception of 'humanity as an end in itself is perplexing: because by an End we commonly mean something to be realised, whereas 'humanity' is, as Kant says, 'a self-subsistentend'."
135. Richardson, p. 50.
136. Of course, he might have had a further end - e.g., if he deferred to the elderly out of respect for his own mother, who taught him to do so. In that case, he might have given up his seat for the sake of his mother, not yours.
137. One of these proposed definitions is not quite right. An end is that for the sake of which one acts, but it is not exactly that with a view to which one is moved to act; it is that with a view to whose (positive) value one is moved. Because I have not yet discussed the value of a person, I temporarily gloss over this particular wrinkle in the concept of an end. This wrinkle becomes important in cases of motivation by negative attitudes - at least, under some conceptions of those attitudes. I myself am inclined to think that hate, e.g., is not the mirror image of love because hate, unlike love, really is a drive: hating someone is not a response to his (negative) value but rather a matter of adopting him as the object of one's aggression. On this view, to act out of hate is to be motivated, in the first instance, with a view to an aggressive aim, not with a view to the person hated. But one might think, alternatively, that hate is the mirror image of love, in that it is a response to the disvalue of its object. On this view, actions motivated by hate are motivated with a view to the hated person. Yet they still aren't done for the sake of that person, nor with the person as their end, because they aren't motivated with a view to the positive value of anything. So conceived, hateful actions would be utterly pointless.
138. Kant, Groundwork, 4:400, 428, 437.
139. Ibid., 4:400-401.
140. Ibid., 4:437. Paul Guyer notes that the word translated by Paton as 'self-existent' is selbständig, which can be translated idiomatically as 'self-sufficient' or 'independent' (Paul Guyer, "The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative," Philosophical Review 104 [1995]: 353-85, pp. 373-74, n. 17). According to Guyer, rational nature is selbständig only in the sense that it is "independent of particular, contingent ends." I don't think that my interpretation of Kant rests on the translation of this term. What supports my interpretation is that it respects the sharp distinction that Kant draws between ends in themselves and ends that are the potential results of our actions. Guyer's interpretation tends to collapse this distinction, by treating ends in themselves as things that we are obliged to "promote" and "preserve." Although my interpretation of Kant doesn't rest on the translation of this term, I still find Paton's translation preferable to Guyer's. Selbständig can perhaps be translated as 'self-sufficient' or 'independent', but it is not strictly equivalent to either of these expressions. The literal German equivalent of 'independent' is unabhängig; the literal equivalent of 'self-sufficient' is selbstgenügsam. The root word ständig means 'fixed, constant, standing' - as in 'a standing committee'. Selbständig therefore suggests that an end so described is already in place, "standing" on its own two feet, not needing to be brought into existence. That's why selbständig is contrasted in this sentence with "to be produced." The translation 'self-existent' conveys this contrast while also echoing Kant's earlier statement that rational nature existiert als Zweck an sich selbst (Groundwork, 4:429).
141. Ibid., 4:437. Paul Guyer notes that the word translated by Paton as 'self-existent' is selbständig, which can be translated idiomatically as 'self-sufficient' or 'independent' (Paul Guyer, "The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative," Philosophical Review 104 [1995]: 353-85, pp. 373-74, n. 17). According to Guyer, rational nature is selbständig only in the sense that it is "independent of particular, contingent ends." I don't think that my interpretation of Kant rests on the translation of this term. What supports my interpretation is that it respects the sharp distinction that Kant draws between ends in themselves and ends that are the potential results of our actions. Guyer's interpretation tends to collapse this distinction, by treating ends in themselves as things that we are obliged to "promote" and "preserve." Although my interpretation of Kant doesn't rest on the translation of this term, I still find Paton's translation preferable to Guyer's. Selbständig can perhaps be translated as 'self-sufficient' or 'independent', but it is not strictly equivalent to either of these expressions. The literal German equivalent of 'independent' is unabhängig; the literal equivalent of 'self-sufficient' is selbstgenügsam. The root word ständig means 'fixed, constant, standing' - as in 'a standing committee'. Selbständig therefore suggests that an end so described is already in place, "standing" on its own two feet, not needing to be brought into existence. That's why selbständig is contrasted in this sentence with "to be produced." The translation 'self-existent' conveys this contrast while also echoing Kant's earlier statement that rational nature existiert als Zweck an sich selbst (Groundwork, 4:429).
142. Ibid., 4:437. Paul Guyer notes that the word translated by Paton as 'self-existent' is selbständig, which can be translated idiomatically as 'self-sufficient' or 'independent' (Paul Guyer, "The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative," Philosophical Review 104 [1995]: 353-85, pp. 373-74, n. 17). According to Guyer, rational nature is selbständig only in the sense that it is "independent of particular, contingent ends." I don't think that my interpretation of Kant rests on the translation of this term. What supports my interpretation is that it respects the sharp distinction that Kant draws between ends in themselves and ends that are the potential results of our actions. Guyer's interpretation tends to collapse this distinction, by treating ends in themselves as things that we are obliged to "promote" and "preserve." Although my interpretation of Kant doesn't rest on the translation of this term, I still find Paton's translation preferable to Guyer's. Selbständig can perhaps be translated as 'self-sufficient' or 'independent', but it is not strictly equivalent to either of these expressions. The literal German equivalent of 'independent' is unabhängig; the literal equivalent of 'self-sufficient' is selbstgenügsam. The root word ständig means 'fixed, constant, standing' - as in 'a standing committee'. Selbständig therefore suggests that an end so described is already in place, "standing" on its own two feet, not needing to be brought into existence. That's why selbständig is contrasted in this sentence with "to be produced." The translation 'self-existent' conveys this contrast while also echoing Kant's earlier statement that rational nature existiert als Zweck an sich selbst (Groundwork, 4:429).
143. Ibid., 4:429.
144. Kant draws this connection in ibid., 4:428.
145. I thus disagree with interpretations that treat respect for rational nature as requiring "the preservation and promotion of freedom," or efforts to "help others set their own ends and rationally pursue them." (The first quotation is from Guyer, p. 372; the second is from Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992], pp. 38-57, p. 54.) Insofar as we regard rational nature as something for us to promote, preserve, or facilitate, we regard it no differently from happiness, and our motive toward it is no different from desire. Hence these interpretations assimilate ends-in-themselves to ends that are projected results of our actions, collapsing a distinction on which Kant repeatedly insists. grant that these interpretations seem to gain some support from the passage in which Kant applies the Formula of Humanity to his standard examples (Groundwork, 4: 430) . Here he says: "It is not enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of nature's purpose for humanity in our person. To neglect these can admittedly be compatible with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion of this end." Yet I do not think that we can draw conclusions from this passage until we have attempted to reconcile it with the numerous passages in which Kant denies that humanity is a result to be produced. Consider, e.g., how Kant expands upon this denial only a few pages later: "The end must here be conceived, not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end. It must therefore be conceived only negatively - that is, as an end against which we should never act" (4:437). How can these two passages be rendered consistent? In the earlier passage, the first sentence says that our humanity, regarded as an end, requires us not only to avoid acts that would "conflict" with it but also to undertake acts that "harmonize" with it. I regard this statement as consistent with the later statement that humanity must be conceived negatively, as an end against which we mustn't act. The reason why we are required to undertake positive steps in cultivating our talents is that the alternative would be to neglect them, which would be to act against our humanity. The duty of self-cultivation, like all imperfect duties, is the positive requirement that results when some omission is forbidden - in this case, the omission that would constitute self-neglect. Thus, the fundamental requirement is the negative requirement not to act against our humanity by neglecting our talents. The question is whether self-cultivation also entails promoting our own humanity, as the final sentence of the first passage seems to say. A problem in reading this sentence is that Kant applies the Formula of Humanity, like the Formula of Universal Law, via the notion of a system of nature, which is "analogous" to the system of morality (Groundwork, 4: 437). In the present case, nature is said to have a "purpose (Zweck) for humanity in our person," a purpose that is at most analogous to the end (Zweck) consisting of our humanity itself. I think that Kant then glosses over the distinction between these two Zwecke. The sentence consequently abbreviates Kant's view, which is that promoting nature's purpose for humanity is an analog, or image, for the positive steps that we must take in order to avoid acting against our humanity as an end. What is to be promoted, then, is nature's purpose for humanity, not the self-existent end of humanity itself. (Paton gives a similar reading of this passage in his "Analysis of the Argument," [in Kant, Groundwork, p. 31], though he elsewhere suggests that Kant simply "forgets" the passage when saying that the end of humanity is to be conceived only negatively [p. 140, n. 1, which refers to p. 82 of the translation].) My reading of these passages is suoported, I believe, by Kant's treatment of the topic in The Metaphysics of Morals. There he says a person has a duty to cultivate his faculties "so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him" (6:387). Humanity is "the capacity to set oneself an end," and the associated duty is "to make ourselves worthy of humanity by culture in general, by procuring or promoting the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends" (6:392). What we are required to cultivate, then, is not our humanity, which already "dwells within" us, but rather the capacities that would make us worthy of our humanity, and whose neglect would be an affront to it.
146. I thus disagree with interpretations that treat respect for rational nature as requiring "the preservation and promotion of freedom," or efforts to "help others set their own ends and rationally pursue them." (The first quotation is from Guyer, p. 372; the second is from Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992], pp. 38-57, p. 54.) Insofar as we regard rational nature as something for us to promote, preserve, or facilitate, we regard it no differently from happiness, and our motive toward it is no different from desire. Hence these interpretations assimilate ends-in-themselves to ends that are projected results of our actions, collapsing a distinction on which Kant repeatedly insists. I grant that these interpretations seem to gain some support from the passage in which Kant applies the Formula of Humanity to his standard examples (Groundwork, 4: 430) . Here he says: "It is not enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of nature's purpose for humanity in our person. To neglect these can admittedly be compatible with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion of this end." Yet I do not think that we can draw conclusions from this passage until we have attempted to reconcile it with the numerous passages in which Kant denies that humanity is a result to be produced. Consider, e.g., how Kant expands upon this denial only a few pages later: "The end must here be conceived, not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end. It must therefore be conceived only negatively - that is, as an end against which we should never act" (4:437). How can these two passages be rendered consistent? In the earlier passage, the first sentence says that our humanity, regarded as an end, requires us not only to avoid acts that would "conflict" with it but also to undertake acts that "harmonize" with it. I regard this statement as consistent with the later statement that humanity must be conceived negatively, as an end against which we mustn't act. The reason why we are required to undertake positive steps in cultivating our talents is that the alternative would be to neglect them, which would be to act against our humanity. The duty of self-cultivation, like all imperfect duties, is the positive requirement that results when some omission is forbidden - in this case, the omission that would constitute self-neglect. Thus, the fundamental requirement is the negative requirement not to act against our humanity by neglecting our talents. The question is whether self-cultivation also entails promoting our own humanity, as the final sentence of the first passage seems to say. A problem in reading this sentence is that Kant applies the Formula of Humanity, like the Formula of Universal Law, via the notion of a system of nature, which is "analogous" to the system of morality (Groundwork, 4: 437). In the present case, nature is said to have a "purpose (Zweck) for humanity in our person," a purpose that is at most analogous to the end (Zweck) consisting of our humanity itself. I think that Kant then glosses over the distinction between these two Zwecke. The sentence consequently abbreviates Kant's view, which is that promoting nature's purpose for humanity is an analog, or image, for the positive steps that we must take in order to avoid acting against our humanity as an end. What is to be promoted, then, is nature's purpose for humanity, not the self-existent end of humanity itself. (Paton gives a similar reading of this passage in his "Analysis of the Argument," [in Kant, Groundwork, p. 31], though he elsewhere suggests that Kant simply "forgets" the passage when saying that the end of humanity is to be conceived only negatively [p. 140, n. 1, which refers to p. 82 of the translation].) My reading of these passages is suoported, I believe, by Kant's treatment of the topic in The Metaphysics of Morals. There he says a person has a duty to cultivate his faculties "so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him" (6:387). Humanity is "the capacity to set oneself an end," and the associated duty is "to make ourselves worthy of humanity by culture in general, by procuring or promoting the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends" (6:392). What we are required to cultivate, then, is not our humanity, which already "dwells within" us, but rather the capacities that would make us worthy of our humanity, and whose neglect would be an affront to it.
147. I thus disagree with interpretations that treat respect for rational nature as requiring "the preservation and promotion of freedom," or efforts to "help others set their own ends and rationally pursue them." (The first quotation is from Guyer, p. 372; the second is from Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992], pp. 38-57, p. 54.) Insofar as we regard rational nature as something for us to promote, preserve, or facilitate, we regard it no differently from happiness, and our motive toward it is no different from desire. Hence these interpretations assimilate ends-in-themselves to ends that are projected results of our actions, collapsing a distinction on which Kant repeatedly insists. grant that these interpretations seem to gain some support from the passage in which Kant applies the Formula of Humanity to his standard examples (Groundwork, 4: 430) . Here he says: "It is not enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of nature's purpose for humanity in our person. To neglect these can admittedly be compatible with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion of this end." Yet I do not think that we can draw conclusions from this passage until we have attempted to reconcile it with the numerous passages in which Kant denies that humanity is a result to be produced. Consider, e.g., how Kant expands upon this denial only a few pages later: "The end must here be conceived, not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end. It must therefore be conceived only negatively - that is, as an end against which we should never act" (4:437). How can these two passages be rendered consistent? In the earlier passage, the first sentence says that our humanity, regarded as an end, requires us not only to avoid acts that would "conflict" with it but also to undertake acts that "harmonize" with it. I regard this statement as consistent with the later statement that humanity must be conceived negatively, as an end against which we mustn't act. The reason why we are required to undertake positive steps in cultivating our talents is that the alternative would be to neglect them, which would be to act against our humanity. The duty of self-cultivation, like all imperfect duties, is the positive requirement that results when some omission is forbidden - in this case, the omission that would constitute self-neglect. Thus, the fundamental requirement is the negative requirement not to act against our humanity by neglecting our talents. The question is whether self-cultivation also entails promoting our own humanity, as the final sentence of the first passage seems to say. A problem in reading this sentence is that Kant applies the Formula of Humanity, like the Formula of Universal Law, via the notion of a system of nature, which is "analogous" to the system of morality (Groundwork, 4: 437). In the present case, nature is said to have a "purpose (Zweck) for humanity in our person," a purpose that is at most analogous to the end (Zweck) consisting of our humanity itself. I think that Kant then glosses over the distinction between these two Zwecke. The sentence consequently abbreviates Kant's view, which is that promoting nature's purpose for humanity is an analog, or image, for the positive steps that we must take in order to avoid acting against our humanity as an end. What is to be promoted, then, is nature's purpose for humanity, not the self-existent end of humanity itself. (Paton gives a similar reading of this passage in his "Analysis of the Argument," [in Kant, Groundwork, p. 31], though he elsewhere suggests that Kant simply "forgets" the passage when saying that the end of humanity is to be conceived only negatively [p. 140, n. 1, which refers to p. 82 of the translation].) My reading of these passages is suoported, I believe, by Kant's treatment of the topic in The Metaphysics of Morals. There he says a person has a duty to cultivate his faculties "so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him" (6:387). Humanity is "the capacity to set oneself an end," and the associated duty is "to make ourselves worthy of humanity by culture in general, by procuring or promoting the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends" (6:392). What we are required to cultivate, then, is not our humanity, which already "dwells within" us, but rather the capacities that would make us worthy of our humanity, and whose neglect would be an affront to it.
148. I thus disagree with interpretations that treat respect for rational nature as requiring "the preservation and promotion of freedom," or efforts to "help others set their own ends and rationally pursue them." (The first quotation is from Guyer, p. 372; the second is from Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992], pp. 38-57, p. 54.) Insofar as we regard rational nature as something for us to promote, preserve, or facilitate, we regard it no differently from happiness, and our motive toward it is no different from desire. Hence these interpretations assimilate ends-in-themselves to ends that are projected results of our actions, collapsing a distinction on which Kant repeatedly insists. grant that these interpretations seem to gain some support from the passage in which Kant applies the Formula of Humanity to his standard examples (Groundwork, 4: 430) . Here he says: "It is not enough that an action should refrain from conflicting with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end. Now there are in humanity capacities for greater perfection which form part of nature's purpose for humanity in our person. To neglect these can admittedly be compatible with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the promotion of this end." Yet I do not think that we can draw conclusions from this passage until we have attempted to reconcile it with the numerous passages in which Kant denies that humanity is a result to be produced. Consider, e.g., how Kant expands upon this denial only a few pages later: "The end must here be conceived, not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end. It must therefore be conceived only negatively - that is, as an end against which we should never act" (4:437). How can these two passages be rendered consistent? In the earlier passage, the first sentence says that our humanity, regarded as an end, requires us not only to avoid acts that would "conflict" with it but also to undertake acts that "harmonize" with it. I regard this statement as consistent with the later statement that humanity must be conceived negatively, as an end against which we mustn't act. The reason why we are required to undertake positive steps in cultivating our talents is that the alternative would be to neglect them, which would be to act against our humanity. The duty of self-cultivation, like all imperfect duties, is the positive requirement that results when some omission is forbidden - in this case, the omission that would constitute self-neglect. Thus, the fundamental requirement is the negative requirement not to act against our humanity by neglecting our talents. The question is whether self-cultivation also entails promoting our own humanity, as the final sentence of the first passage seems to say. A problem in reading this sentence is that Kant applies the Formula of Humanity, like the Formula of Universal Law, via the notion of a system of nature, which is "analogous" to the system of morality (Groundwork, 4: 437). In the present case, nature is said to have a "purpose (Zweck) for humanity in our person," a purpose that is at most analogous to the end (Zweck) consisting of our humanity itself. I think that Kant then glosses over the distinction between these two Zwecke. The sentence consequently abbreviates Kant's view, which is that promoting nature's purpose for humanity is an analog, or image, for the positive steps that we must take in order to avoid acting against our humanity as an end. What is to be promoted, then, is nature's purpose for humanity, not the self-existent end of humanity itself. (Paton gives a similar reading of this passage in his "Analysis of the Argument," [in Kant, Groundwork, p. 31], though he elsewhere suggests that Kant simply "forgets" the passage when saying that the end of humanity is to be conceived only negatively [p. 140, n. 1, which refers to p. 82 of the translation].) My reading of these passages is suoported, I believe, by Kant's treatment of the topic in The Metaphysics of Morals. There he says a person has a duty to cultivate his faculties "so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him" (6:387). Humanity is "the capacity to set oneself an end," and the associated duty is "to make ourselves worthy of humanity by culture in general, by procuring or promoting the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends" (6:392). What we are required to cultivate, then, is not our humanity, which already "dwells within" us, but rather the capacities that would make us worthy of our humanity, and whose neglect would be an affront to it.
149. For this point, see Michael Smith, "The Possibility of Philosophy of Action" (unpublished manuscript, Australian National University, n.d.).
150. We can say that wanting to produce an outcome for her sake consists in the fact that a reference to her in the description of the outcome is motivationally relevant: you want to produce the outcome, say, as something thai mattered to her, in particular. But what explains the motivational relevance of this reference to her in the description of the desired outcome? What explains it, I claim, is that you have some attitude toward her, out of which you desire the outcome.
151. Kant, Groundwork, 4:437. See also 4:428 "Their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves - that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means - and consequently imposes a limit on all treatment of them (and is an object of reverence)." This aspect of respect is discussed by Darwall in "Two Kinds of Respect."
152. Kant, Groundwork, 4:437. See also 4:428 "Their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves - that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means -and consequently imposes a limit on all treatment of them (and is an object of reverence)." This aspect of respect is discussed by Darwall in "Two Kinds of Respect."
153. Kant, Groundwork, 4:400. I have substituted the verb 'checks' for 'demolishes' in Paton's translation. The verb used by Kant is Abbruch tut, and Abbruch means 'a breaking up' or 'breaking off' - a rupture. Causing an Abbruch to self-love would fall short of demolishing it. Compare Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73: "Pure practical reason merely checks selfishness . . . . But it strikes down self-conceit." The expression that Beck here translates as 'checks' is once again Abbruch tut, which is expressly contrasted with the more decisive 'striking down' in the next sentence.
154. Kant, Groundwork, 4:400. I have substituted the verb 'checks' for 'demolishes' in Paton's translation. The verb used by Kant is Abbruch tut, and Abbruch means 'a breaking up' or 'breaking off' - a rupture. Causing an Abbruch to self-love would fall short of demolishing it. Compare Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:73: "Pure practical reason merely checks selfishness . . . . But it strikes down self-conceit." The expression that Beck here translates as 'checks' is once again Abbruch tut, which is expressly contrasted with the more decisive 'striking down' in the next sentence.
155. See Kant, Groundwork, 4:406. See also Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:22.
156. See Kant, Groundwork, 4:406. See also Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:22.
157. Some might argue that even this motive must be a desire, such as a desire not to use another person merely as a means. But I would reply, as before, that one can want not to use others, and consequently be moved not to use them, without so wanting or being so moved for their sake, since one can want and pursue such restraint for one's own sake, or for the sake of restraint itself - a project that is hardly moral. The moral project is to abstain from the use of others for their sake, which requires that one take them as an end, by virtue of having a motive, such as respect, that takes them as its object.
158. See D. W. Winnicott, "Hate in the Countertransference," Through Paediatrics to Psycho-analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1975), pp. 194-203, p. 199. See also Jerome Neu, "Odi et Amo: On Hating the Ones We Love," in Freud and the Passions, ed. John O'Neill (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 53-72.
159. See D. W. Winnicott, "Hate in the Countertransference," Through Paediatrics to Psycho-analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1975), pp. 194-203, p. 199. See also Jerome Neu, "Odi et Amo: On Hating the Ones We Love," in Freud and the Passions, ed. John O'Neill (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 53-72.
160. Quoted at n. 39.
161. I discuss other differences between love and respect below.
162. See also Stocker's example of the hospital visit in "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," p. 462.
163. The reference is to Yeats's poem "For Anne Gregory," in The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 240. Note that by Anne's reckoning, the husband in Williams's example entertained, not one thought too many, but two. Since Anne wants to be loved for herself alone, she would have no use for either one of the premises adduced by a husband who reasoned "that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife." She would no more want to be loved for being someone's wife than for her yellow hair. Yet Williams is surely right that the husband's first premise - that it was his wife - was appropriate in the circumstances, and that only the second was potentially problematic. Perhaps, then, the motivating thoughts that are appropriate in such cases aren't thoughts of love at all. I shall return to this possibility at the end of the article. For some recent discussions of the passage from Yeats, see Neil Delaney, "Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal," American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 339-56, pp. 345-46; and Roger E. Lamb, "Love and Rationality," in Lamb, ed., pp. 23-47.
164. The reference is to Yeats's poem "For Anne Gregory," in The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 240. Note that by Anne's reckoning, the husband in Williams's example entertained, not one thought too many, but two. Since Anne wants to be loved for herself alone, she would have no use for either one of the premises adduced by a husband who reasoned "that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife." She would no more want to be loved for being someone's wife than for her yellow hair. Yet Williams is surely right that the husband's first premise - that it was his wife - was appropriate in the circumstances, and that only the second was potentially problematic. Perhaps, then, the motivating thoughts that are appropriate in such cases aren't thoughts of love at all. I shall return to this possibility at the end of the article. For some recent discussions of the passage from Yeats, see Neil Delaney, "Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal," American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 339-56, pp. 345-46; and Roger E. Lamb, "Love and Rationality," in Lamb, ed., pp. 23-47.
165. The reference is to Yeats's poem "For Anne Gregory," in The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 240. Note that by Anne's reckoning, the husband in Williams's example entertained, not one thought too many, but two. Since Anne wants to be loved for herself alone, she would have no use for either one of the premises adduced by a husband who reasoned "that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one's wife." She would no more want to be loved for being someone's wife than for her yellow hair. Yet Williams is surely right that the husband's first premise - that it was his wife - was appropriate in the circumstances, and that only the second was potentially problematic. Perhaps, then, the motivating thoughts that are appropriate in such cases aren't thoughts of love at all. I shall return to this possibility at the end of the article. For some recent discussions of the passage from Yeats, see Neil Delaney, "Romantic Love and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal," American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 339-56, pp. 345-46; and Roger E. Lamb, "Love and Rationality," in Lamb, ed., pp. 23-47.
166. Here again I have benefited from Anderson's Value in Ethics and Economics. See also Scruton, pp. 104-5. Scruton considers the idea, which I shall defend, that to be loved for oneself is to be treated as an end in oneself. Scruton rejects this idea, but only because he doesn't adequately explore the Kantian notion of an end in itself (pp. 104, 111, 123).
167. Here again I have benefited from Anderson's Value in Ethics and Economics. See also Scruton, pp. 104-5. Scruton considers the idea, which I shall defend, that to be loved for oneself is to be treated as an end in oneself. Scruton rejects this idea, but only because he doesn't adequately explore the Kantian notion of an end in itself (pp. 104, 111, 123).
168. See Anderson's "pragmatic theory of comparative value judgments" (pp. 47ff.).
169. Kant draws the connection between products and prices by speaking, in both cases, about the relativity of the values involved. That is, an end that consists in a possible product of action has a value relative to the strength of our desire for that product (Groundwork, 4:427); and relative value of this kind necessarily has the form of a price (4:434-35). This way of connecting products and prices is compatible with the way that I connect them. Strength of desire is the common currency to which we resort when forced to compare the values of alternative products.
170. Ibid., 4:436.
171. Kant himself says that "morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has a dignity" (ibid., 4:435). He thus seems to rule out the possibility of responding to objects other than persons as self-existent ends. I am inclined to differ from Kant on this point. See also Anderson, pp. 8-11.
172. Here I am smuggling Kantian universalisation into my account, by speaking in the abstract of a capacity for valuation, and then speaking about the attitude of this abstract capacity toward particular instances of itself. I would need to offer a fair amount of argumentation in order to earn the right to this manner of speaking.
173. Note that this formulation of Kant's view treats the value of persons as one that rational nature doesn't find in but must project onto instances of itself. See Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 122-25.
174. Thanks to Richard Heck for suggesting the first sentence of this paragraph, and to Christine Korsgaard for suggesting the last.
175. This way of understanding the distinction is due to Anderson: "Things that differ in the kind of worth they have merit different kinds of appreciation" (chap. 1, p. 9).
176. Ibid., p. 2. I am using the verb 'to appreciate' where Anderson uses 'to value'.
177. Dillon, "Respect and Care," p. 121. This passage is discussed by Baron in Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, p. 10, n. 9. See also Robin S. Dillon, "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69.
178. Dillon, "Respect and Care," p. 121. This passage is discussed by Baron in Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, p. 10, n. 9. See also Robin S. Dillon, "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69.
179. Dillon, "Respect and Care," p. 121. This passage is discussed by Baron in Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, p. 10, n. 9. See also Robin S. Dillon, "Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect," Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69.
180. For a similar point about love, see Neera Kapur Badhwar's "Friends as Ends in Themselves,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1987): 1-25, p. 5: "If I love you unconditionally, I love you regardless of your individual qualities - your appearance, your temperament, your style, even your moral character. So you are no different from anyone else as the object of my love, and my love for you is no different from my love for anyone else. But then in what sense are you the object of my love?" See also Neu, p. 58.
181. A similar point is made by Cynthia Stark, pp. 483-84.
182. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
183. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
184. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
185. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
186. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
187. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
188. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
189. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be
190. Versions of this thought can be found in many of the works quoted at nn. 49-57, including those of Taylor, Lyons, and Greenspan. Nozick is a complicated case. In Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 168, he said: "An adult may come to love another person because of the other's characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics." But when Nozick seeks to understand the nontransferability of love in The Examined Life, he falls back on "the particularity of the qualities that you come to love." Nozick now explains that love isn't transferable because "no other person could have precisely those traits" (p. 81). Here Nozick expresses the view currently under discussion, that someone is valued as irreplaceable only if he is valued under a description that fits him uniquely. See also Kapur, "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best," p. 483. In the text I criticize this view as involving a confusion between value judgment and appreciation. Other confusions are common in the literature on this subject. One confusion is between "the basis and the object of love," as Alan Soble puts it (The Structure of Love [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990], pp. 225ff.). In this case, loving someone for his qualities is equated with loving the qualities themselves. Another confusion is between the basis of love and the way in which love picks out its object. In this case, the qualities by which love picks out an object are assumed to be the same as those for which it values that object - as if it couldn't pick out an object by one set of qualities while valuing him for another. Love is therefore said to have as its object all of the people who share the qualities on which it is based. (See, e.g., the quotation from Badhwar in n. 95.) See also Robert Kraut, "Love De Re," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 413-30; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 399-412; Scruton, pp. 103-7; Delaney, p. 346; Lamb, "Love and Rationality"; Deborah Brown, "The Right Method of Boy-Loving," in Lamb, ed., pp. 49-63.
191. Happy Birthday to You! (New York: Randori House, 1959).
192. Lest you feel tempted to celebrate being yourself instead of some other person, Dr. Seuss makes clear that being yourself is rather to be contrasted with being "a clam or a ham or a dusty old jar of sour gooseberry jam" - or, worse yet, being a "Wasn't." Being yourself is thus to be contrasted, not with being someone else, but with failing to exist as a person at all.
193. Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (New York: Random House, 1954). The refrain of this book is: "A person's a person, no matter how small."
194. See Whiting's complaint against "the fetish concern with uniqueness characteristic of modern discussions of friendship" (p. 8). Those moved by this concern sometimes go so far as to suggest that love for someone should be based not only on his merits but also on his flaws, because his flaws help to individuate him. (See, e.g., Gregory Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," in his Platonic Studies [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973], pp. 3-42; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Beatrice's 'Dante': Loving the Individual?" in Virtue, Love, and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos, ed. Terence Irwin and Martha C. Nussbaum [Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1993], pp. 161-78.) While I agree that we want to be loved warts and all, as the saying goes, I don't think that we want to be loved for our warts. Who wants to be the object of someone's wart-love? What we want is to be loved by someone who sees and isn't put off by our warts, but who appreciates our true value well enough to recognize that they don't contribute to it.
195. See Whiting's complaint against "the fetish concern with uniqueness characteristic of modern discussions of friendship" (p. 8). Those moved by this concern sometimes go so far as to suggest that love for someone should be based not only on his merits but also on his flaws, because his flaws help to individuate him. (See, e.g., Gregory Vlastos, "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato," in his Platonic Studies [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973], pp. 3-42; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Beatrice's 'Dante': Loving the Individual?" in Virtue, Love, and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos, ed. Terence Irwin and Martha C. Nussbaum [Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1993], pp. 161-78.) While I agree that we want to be loved warts and all, as the saying goes, I don't think that we want to be loved for our warts. Who wants to be the object of someone's wart-love? What we want is to be loved by someone who sees and isn't put off by our warts, but who appreciates our true value well enough to recognize that they don't contribute to it.
196. See the footnote in Kant, Groundwork, 4:401 and my discussion of this passage in n. 30. See also 4:439.
197. See the footnote in Kant, Groundwork, 4:401 and my discussion of this passage in n. 30. See also 4:439.
198. A similar point is made about selectivity in friendship by Dianejeske in "Friendship, Virtue, and Impartiality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): 51-72, pp. 69ff.
199. This way of putting the point was offered to me by Peter Railton, in a very helpful conversation about an earlier draft of this article.