Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1990, Pages 29-46

  Hamilton, Jonathan H ^a   Slutsky, Steven M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001771974     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90012-J     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Being a Leader or a Follower: Reflections on the Distribution of Roles in Duopoly
2. Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria A Geometric Approach
3. von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly Choosing Roles
4. First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
5. Endogenizing the Order of Moves in Matrix Games
6. On the Status of the Nash Type of Noncooperative Equilibrium in Economic Theory
7. Strategic Role Choice: An Economic Theory of the Formation of First Mover Organizations
8. A Two-Stage Model of Research and Development with Endogenous Second-Mover Advantages
9. Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly