Toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1995, Pages 289-309

  Arora, Seema ^a,b,d   Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis ^c,d  

^a RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

^d Society for Economic Research and Financial Analysis ^*  (India)

Author keywords

Voluntary environmental regulation; Voluntary overcompliance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001762218     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00037-2     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Public disclosure as a means of reducing industrial pollution: A case study of the US
2. An experiment in voluntary environmental regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 program
3. Price competition, quality and income disparities
4. Economic incentives for environmental protection: Integrating theory and practice
5. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted
6. Monopoly, product differentiation and economic welfare
7. A positive theory of environmental quality regulation
8. Monopoly and product quality
9. The net benefits of incentive-based regulation: A case study of environmental standard setting
10. Who scores best on the Environment?
11. Raising rivals' costs
12. On the measurement of environmental performance in firms
13. Markets, networks and control