John Gray’s pluralist critique of liberalism

Journal of Applied Philosophy

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 287-298

  Crowder, George ^a  

^a FLINDERS UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001758056     PISSN: 02643758     EISSN: 14685930     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5930.00098     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Isaiah Berlin (1969) Two concepts of liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty (London, Oxford University Press).
2. For attempts to argue for the truth of value pluralism, see Berlin, (1969) Two concepts of liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty (London, Oxford University Press)., p. 168
3. John Kekes (1993) The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press), chs 2-4.
4. Berlin, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press)., p. 169.
5. Berlin, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press)., p. 168.
6. Berlin, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press), pp. 167-172. Elsewhere, however, Berlin explicitly rejects this conclusion, insisting that conflict among plural values does not preclude rational judgement: Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams (1994) Pluralism and liberalism: a reply, Political Studies, 42, pp. 306-309
7. This is a reply to George Crowder (1994) Pluralism and liberalism, Political Studies, 42, 293-305.
8. See also the rejoinder: Crowder (1996) Communications, Political Studies, 44, pp. 649-650.
9. Berlin, (1996) Communications, Political Studies, 44., p. 169.
10. Gray, Berlin, p. 1.
11. Gray, Berlin, p. 155.
12. Gray, Berlin, p. 145.
13. Gray, Agonistic liberalism, pp. 119-121.
14. Gray, Agonistic liberalism, p. 121.
15. Gray, Berlin, p. 160-161. For a similar criticism see Crowder, Pluralism and liberalism, pp. 297-299.
16. Gray, Berlin, p. 155.
17. Gray, Berlin, p. 146.
18. Gray, Berlin, p. 161. In this respect Gray's position bears a close resemblance to that of Richard Rorty in (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), and (1991) Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical papers Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
19. Gray, Liberalisms, p. 262.
20. Gray, Liberalisms, p. 263.
21. Gray, Against the new liberalism, p. 13.
22. Derek Parfit (1991) Letter to Times Literary Supplement, 19 July.
23. Michael Stocker (1990) Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford, Clarendon Press), ch. 6;
24. Charles Larmore (1994) Pluralism and reasonable disagreement, Social Philosophy and Policy, 11, 1, pp. 61-79, at pp. 66-70;
25. Berlin and Williams, Pluralism and reasonable disagreement, Social Philosophy and Policy, 11, 1, pp. 61-79, at pp. 66-70.
26. Gray, Berlin, pp. 1, 47;
27. Gray, Berlin Agonistic liberalism, p. 118.
28. Gray, Post-liberalism, p. 309.
29. Gray, Berlin, pp. 154-155.
30. Benjamin Constant (1988) The liberty of the ancients compared with that of the moderns, in Political Writings, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
31. Gray, Berlin, p. 155.
32. Gray, Berlin, p. 163.
33. Gray, Agonistic liberalism, p. 131.
34. See, e.g., John Finnis (1980) Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press), p. 85-90.
35. John Rawls (1993) Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press); Constant, op. cit.;
36. Joseph Raz (1986) The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press);
37. Walzer (1983) Spheres of Justice (Oxford, Martin Robertson).
38. Gray, Berlin, p. 143.
39. Gray, Berlin, p. 142.
40. Berlin (1992) Alleged relativism in eighteenth-century European thought, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York, Vintage), pp. 70-90, at p. 85.
41. Gray, Post-liberalism, p. 291.
42. Gray, Post-liberalism, pp. 290-291
43. Berlin, pp. 46, 62-63, 149-150. On the distinction between pluralism and relativism, see also:
44. Susan Wolf (1992) Two levels of pluralism, Ethics, 102, pp. 785-798
45. John Kekes, Two levels of pluralism, Ethics, 102, pp. 48-52
46. John Kekes (1994) Pluralism and the value of life, Social Philosophy and Policy, 11, 1, pp. 44-60;
47. Steven Lukes (1998) Berlin's dilemma, Times Literary Supplement, 27 March 1998, pp. 8-10.
48. Berlin, Alleged relativism, p. 80.
49. Berlin, Alleged relativism, p. 80.
50. Bernard Williams (1980) Introduction to Isaiah Berlin, Concepts and Categories, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. xvii.
51. Gray, Berlin, p. 154.