Politics as the art of confined compromise

Cato Journal

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 365-381

  Boudreaux, Donald J ^a   Lee, Dwight R ^b  

^a CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001752386     PISSN: 02733072     EISSN: 02733072     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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