Poland game logic and its applications I

Studia Logica

Volumn 57, Issue 2-3, 1996, Pages 325-354

  Kaneko, Mamoru ^a,b   Nagashima, Takashi ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

^b HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Common knowledge; Infinitary predicate kd4; Nash equilibrium; Undecidability on playability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001621569     PISSN: 00393215     EISSN: 15728730     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf00370838     Document Type: Article

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