Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 346-380

  Hoffman, Elizabeth ^a   McCabe, Kevin ^a   Shachat, Keith ^a   Smith, Vernon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001578263     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1994.1056     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. Binger, B., Hoffman, E., and Libecap, G. (1991). “Experimental Methods to Advance Historical Investigation’. An Examination of Cartel Compliance by Large and Small Firms," in The Vital One; Essays in Honor of Jonathan R. T. Hughes, (Joel Mokyr, Ed. JAI Press).
2. Blank, R. M. (1991). The Effects of Double-Blind versus Single-Blind Reviewing: Experimental Evidence from the American Economic Review. Amer. Econ. Rev. 81, 1041-1067.
3. Bolton, G. E. (1991). “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence,” Amer. Econ. Rev., 81, 1096-1136.
4. Burnell, S. J., Evans, L., and Yao, S., “The Ultimatum Game: Optimal Strategies in the Presence of Rivalry,” preprint, Economics Department, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1992.
5. Burrows, P., and Loom es, G. (1989). “The Impact of Fairness on Bargaining,” manuscript in preparation.
6. Cason, T. N., and Williams, A. W. (1990). “Competitive Equilibrium Convergence in a Posted-Offer Market with Extreme Earnings Inequities,” J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 14, 331-352.
7. Cech, P-A (1988). “Removal of Regulatory Barriers to Entry,” Department of Economics Discussion Paper 88-17, University of Arizona.
8. Davis, D., and Holt C. (1992). Experimental Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, to appear.
9. Epps, T. W., and Sîngleton, K. J.(1986). “An Omnibus Test for the Two Sample Problem Usingthe Empirical Characteristic Function,”. J. Statis, Comput. Simulation, 26, 177-203.
10. Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., and Sefton, M. (1994). “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments,” Games and Econ. Behav. 6, 347-369.
11. Fouraker, L., and Siegel, S. (1963). Bargaining Behavior. New York: Mc Graw-Hill.
12. Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B. (1982). “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,” J. Econ, Behav. Organ. 3, 367-388.
13. Guth, W., and Tietz, R. (1986).” Auctioning Ultimatum Bargaining Positions,” in Issues in West German Decision Research) (R. W. Scholz, Ed. Frankfurt: Lang.
14. Harrison, G., and Mc Kee, M. (1985). “Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem,” J, Law Econ. 28, 653-670.
15. Hawkes, K. (1991). “Sharing and Collective Auction,” preprint, Department of Anthropology, University of Utah, September; to appear in Ecology, Evolution, and Human Behavior, (E. A. Smith and B. P. Winterhalder, Eds.). Berlin: de Gruyter.
16. Hoffman, E., and Spitzer, M. (1982). “The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,” J. Law Eco nom. 25, 73-98.
17. Hoffman, E., and Spitzer, M. (1985). “Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects Concepts of Distributive Justice,” J. Legal Stud. 15, 254-297.
18. Hughes, J. R, T. (1982). “The Great Strike at Nushagak Station, 1951: Institutional Gridlock,” J. Econ. Hist. 42, 1-20.
19. Jenness, D. (1957). Dawn in Arctic Alaska. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
20. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., and Thaler, R. (1986). “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics,” in Rational Choice (R. M. Hogarth and M. W, Reder, Eds.), pp. 101-116. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
21. Kruskal, W. A. (1957). “Historical Notes on the Wilcoxon Unpaired Two-Sample Test,” J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 52, 356-360.
22. McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. J., and V. L. Smith, (1992). “Cooperation and the Repeat Interactions of Anonymous Pairings,” preprint, Department of Accounting, University of Minnesota, September.
23. Ochs, J., and Roth A. E. (1989). “An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 79, 355-384.
24. Roth, A. E. (1990). “Bargaining Experiments,” in Handbook of Experimental Economics (J. Kagel and A. Roth, Eds.), to appear.
25. Roth, A. E., Prasnjkar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., and Zamir, S. (1991). “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 81, 1068-1095.
26. Siegel, S., and Fouraker, L. (1960). Bargaining and Group Decision Making. New York: Mc Graw-Hill.
27. Smith, V. L. (1965). “Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis,” J. Polit. Econ. 73, 387-393.
28. Smith, V. L. (1976). “Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 66, 274-279.
29. Smith, V. L. (1980). “Relevance of Laboratory Experiments in Testing Resource Allocation Theory,” in Evaluation of Econometric Models (J. Kmanta and J. B. Ramsey, Eds.), New York: Academic Press.
30. Smith, V. L., and Williams, A. W. (1990), “The Boundaries of Competitive Price Theory: Convergence, Expectations, and Transactions Costs,” in Advances in Behavioral Economics 2, (L. Green and J. Kagel, Eds.), pp. 3-35. New York: Ablex.
31. Tri vers, R. (1971). “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quart. Rev. Biology 46, 35-57.
32. Wellford, C. P. (1990). Takeovers and Horizontal Mergers: Policy and Performance, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona.