Optimal financial contracts

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 1992, Pages 672-693

  Dowd, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001513775     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042070     Document Type: Article

References (52)

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