The economics of franchise contracts

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 2, Issue 1-2, 1995, Pages 9-37

  Klein, Benjamin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Franchise contracts; Self enforcement commitment; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001510570     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0929-1199(95)00003-Q     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. ABA Antitrust Section: Monograph No. 17
2. The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising
3. The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws
4. An Agency Perspective on Franchising
5. A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts
6. THE EFFECTS OF STATE AUTOMOBILE DEALER ENTRY REGULATION ON NEW CAR PRICES
7. Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Evidence from Litigation, Washington, DCC.: Federal Trade Commission
8. Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees
9. Transaction Cost Determinants of ‘Unfair’ Contractual Arrangements
10. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
11. Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms
12. Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry
13. Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
14. Franchising and Risk Management
15. The Economics of Franchise Contracts
16. Strategyand Transaction Costs: The Organizationofdistributioninthecarbonatedsoftdrinkindustry
17. An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form
18. The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract
19. Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency”, Comment
20. Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution
21. Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?
22. Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade II
23. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange