Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 1-3, 1993, Pages 167-198

  Shivdasani, Anil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001475438     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(93)90009-5     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. Negotiated block trades and corporate control
2. The takeover market corporate board composition and ownership structure The case of banking
3. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments
4. Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids
5. Efficient estimation of discrete-choice models
6. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation
7. The structure of corporate ownership Causes and consequences
8. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
9. Separation of ownership and control
10. Bankruptcy boards banks and blockholders Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default
11. Takeover bids the free-rider problem and the theory of the corporation
12. The determinants of board composition
13. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance
14. Estimation of retrospective probabilities from augmented retrospective observations
15. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers
16. The takeover controversy: Analysis and evidence
17. Performance pay and top management incentives
18. Outside directorships and corporate performance
19. Greenmail A study of board performance in corporate governance
20. Board composition and shareholder wealth The case of management buyouts
21. Free cash flow and shareholder gains in going private transactions
22. Alternative estimators and sample design for discrete choice analysis
23. Managers' voting rights and corporate control
24. Do bad bidders become good targets?
25. Characteristics of targets of hostile and friendly takeovers
26. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis
27. Alternative mechanisms for corporate control
28. Predicting takeover targets: A methodological and empirical analysis
29. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth
30. Large shareholders and corporate control
31. Stock prices and top management changes
32. Outside directors and CEO turnover
33. Equity ownership concentration and firm value: Evidence from private equity financings