To speak of trees: Social constructivism, environmental values, and the future of deep ecology

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 359-375

  Smith, Mick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ABERTAY DUNDEE   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0001463068     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics19992143     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. Bertolt Brecht, "An die Nachgeborenen," The Selected Poems of Bertolt Brecht (New York: Grove Press, 1959), pp. 173-77.
2. Deep ecology is a term coined by Arne Naess in "The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movement," inquiry 16 (1972): 95-100. See also Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985) and Michael Tobias, ed., Deep Ecology (San Marcos Calif.: Avant, 1984).
3. Deep ecology is a term coined by Arne Naess in "The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movement," inquiry 16 (1972): 95-100. See also Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985) and Michael Tobias, ed., Deep Ecology (San Marcos Calif.: Avant, 1984).
4. Deep ecology is a term coined by Arne Naess in "The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movement," inquiry 16 (1972): 95-100. See also Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985) and Michael Tobias, ed., Deep Ecology (San Marcos Calif.: Avant, 1984).
5. There is now an extensive philosophical literature regarding the meaning of intrinsic and inherent values. See Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 1986), esp. pp. 71-76. John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy, Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993) provides a comprehensive if somewhat partisan summary of the debate. On moral standing, see Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Moral Standing? (Los Angeles: Kaufman, 1974), Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 308-24, and Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 35-56.
6. There is now an extensive philosophical literature regarding the meaning of intrinsic and inherent values. See Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 1986), esp. pp. 71-76. John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy, Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993) provides a comprehensive if somewhat partisan summary of the debate. On moral standing, see Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Moral Standing? (Los Angeles: Kaufman, 1974), Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 308-24, and Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 35-56.
7. There is now an extensive philosophical literature regarding the meaning of intrinsic and inherent values. See Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 1986), esp. pp. 71-76. John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy, Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993) provides a comprehensive if somewhat partisan summary of the debate. On moral standing, see Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Moral Standing? (Los Angeles: Kaufman, 1974), Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 308-24, and Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 35-56.
8. There is now an extensive philosophical literature regarding the meaning of intrinsic and inherent values. See Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 1986), esp. pp. 71-76. John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy, Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993) provides a comprehensive if somewhat partisan summary of the debate. On moral standing, see Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Moral Standing? (Los Angeles: Kaufman, 1974), Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 308-24, and Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 35-56.
9. There is now an extensive philosophical literature regarding the meaning of intrinsic and inherent values. See Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton N.J.: University of Princeton Press, 1986), esp. pp. 71-76. John O'Neill, Ecology, Policy, Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993) provides a comprehensive if somewhat partisan summary of the debate. On moral standing, see Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Moral Standing? (Los Angeles: Kaufman, 1974), Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 308-24, and Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 35-56.
10. Although, of course, for Marxism "the economy" is never exclusively social since it is a relation to nature mediated through human labor.
11. The classic example is, of course, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967). This book draws heavily on phenomenology as developed by Alfred Schutz.
12. John Hannigan, Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructivist Perspective (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 32. See also Joel Best, "Afterword: Extending the Constructivist Perspective," in Joel Best, ed., Images and Issues: Typifying Social Problems (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989).
13. John Hannigan, Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructivist Perspective (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 32. See also Joel Best, "Afterword: Extending the Constructivist Perspective," in Joel Best, ed., Images and Issues: Typifying Social Problems (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989).
14. See, for example, Alexander Wilson, The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992).
15. The literature on this topic is truly enormous. For historical examples, see Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana, 1996); John Rennie Short, Imagined Country: Society, Culture and Environment (London: Routledge, 1991); I. G. Simmonds, Environmental History: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). In anthropology, see Philippe Descola and Gisli Palson, eds., Nature and Society: An Anthropological Perspective (London: Routledge, 1996); Kay Milton, Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Cultural Discourse (London: Routledge, 1996). Several of the key sociological texts taking a social constuctivist approach to nature are discussed below.
16. The literature on this topic is truly enormous. For historical examples, see Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana, 1996); John Rennie Short, Imagined Country: Society, Culture and Environment (London: Routledge, 1991); I. G. Simmonds, Environmental History: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). In anthropology, see Philippe Descola and Gisli Palson, eds., Nature and Society: An Anthropological Perspective (London: Routledge, 1996); Kay Milton, Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Cultural Discourse (London: Routledge, 1996). Several of the key sociological texts taking a social constuctivist approach to nature are discussed below.
17. The literature on this topic is truly enormous. For historical examples, see Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana, 1996); John Rennie Short, Imagined Country: Society, Culture and Environment (London: Routledge, 1991); I. G. Simmonds, Environmental History: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). In anthropology, see Philippe Descola and Gisli Palson, eds., Nature and Society: An Anthropological Perspective (London: Routledge, 1996); Kay Milton, Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Cultural Discourse (London: Routledge, 1996). Several of the key sociological texts taking a social constuctivist approach to nature are discussed below.
18. The literature on this topic is truly enormous. For historical examples, see Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana, 1996); John Rennie Short, Imagined Country: Society, Culture and Environment (London: Routledge, 1991); I. G. Simmonds, Environmental History: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). In anthropology, see Philippe Descola and Gisli Palson, eds., Nature and Society: An Anthropological Perspective (London: Routledge, 1996); Kay Milton, Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Cultural Discourse (London: Routledge, 1996). Several of the key sociological texts taking a social constuctivist approach to nature are discussed below.
19. The literature on this topic is truly enormous. For historical examples, see Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana, 1996); John Rennie Short, Imagined Country: Society, Culture and Environment (London: Routledge, 1991); I. G. Simmonds, Environmental History: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). In anthropology, see Philippe Descola and Gisli Palson, eds., Nature and Society: An Anthropological Perspective (London: Routledge, 1996); Kay Milton, Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Cultural Discourse (London: Routledge, 1996). Several of the key sociological texts taking a social constuctivist approach to nature are discussed below.
20. The literature on this topic is truly enormous. For historical examples, see Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984); Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Fontana, 1996); John Rennie Short, Imagined Country: Society, Culture and Environment (London: Routledge, 1991); I. G. Simmonds, Environmental History: A Concise Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). In anthropology, see Philippe Descola and Gisli Palson, eds., Nature and Society: An Anthropological Perspective (London: Routledge, 1996); Kay Milton, Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of Anthropology in Cultural Discourse (London: Routledge, 1996). Several of the key sociological texts taking a social constuctivist approach to nature are discussed below.
21. Phil Macnaghten and John Urry, Contested Natures (London: SAGE, 1998).
22. Michael Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York: Norton, 1994).
23. Michael Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York: Norton, 1994).
24. Cronon, "Uncommon Ground" p. 52.
25. Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).
26. Michael Soulé and Gary Lease, eds., Reinventing Nature? Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1995), p. xv.
27. Ibid. Interestingly, Soulé and Lease while claiming their book to be an apolitical interdisciplinary synthesis on the nature of "nature," one that is neither left nor right, make no attempt to distinguish postmodern deconstructivism from more traditional Marxist materialism: both, they claim, emphasize "economic activity's" role in producing ideas of nature.
28. Ibid. Interestingly, Soulé and Lease while claiming their book to be an apolitical interdisciplinary synthesis on the nature of "nature," one that is neither left nor right, make no attempt to distinguish postmodern deconstructivism from more traditional Marxist materialism: both, they claim, emphasize "economic activity's" role in producing ideas of nature.
29. George Sessions, "Postmodernism, Environmental Justice, and the Demise of the Ecology Movement?" Wild Duck Review 5 (1995): 15.
30. Ibid., p. 15.
31. David Pepper, Eco-Socialism: From Deep Ecology to Social Justice (London: Routledge, 1993), p. xi. (emphasis added).
32. O'Neill, Ecology, Policy, Politics, p. 3 (emphasis added).
33. Peter Dickens, Reconstructing Nature: Alienation, Emancipation and the Division of Labour (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 149.
34. Ibid., p. 16.
35. Andrew Ross, The Chicago Gangster Theory of Life: Nature's Debt to Society (London: Verso, 1994), p. 15.
36. Keith Tester, Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 195.
37. Klaus Eder, The Social Construction of Nature (London: Sage, 1996).
38. Stephen R. Kellert and Edmund O. Wilson, The Biophilia Hypothesis (Washington: Island Press, 1993).
39. Eder, The Social Construction of Nature, p. 7.
40. Ibid., p. 19.
41. Sessions, "Postmodernism, Environmental Justice," p. 15.
42. For a typical Marxist critique of postmodernism, see Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). See also Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism? (London: Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1990). For a postmodern critique of the productivist paradigm, see Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975).
43. For a typical Marxist critique of postmodernism, see Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). See also Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism? (London: Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1990). For a postmodern critique of the productivist paradigm, see Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975).
44. For a typical Marxist critique of postmodernism, see Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). See also Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism? (London: Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1990). For a postmodern critique of the productivist paradigm, see Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975).
45. See Mick Smith, "What's Natural? The Socio-Political Deconstruction of Nature," Environmental Politics 6, no. 2 (1997): 164-68.
46. George Myerson and Yvonne Rydin, The Language of the Environment: A New Rhetoric (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 119.
47. Keith Tester quoted in Dickens, "Reconstructing Nature," p. 72.
48. Ibid., p. 73.
49. The word directly is important here because ontology is indirectly affected by how we classify things. A fish that is classified as food may find itself rapidly changed from a free-swimming state to being fried.
50. Cronon, "Uncommon Ground," p. 458.
51. Tester is a case in point, since even as an extreme constructivist he claims that the "morality [of animal rights] is rather clever at hiding the utter meaninglessness of animals" and that "animals have been made moral subjects . . . for purely social reasons" (Tester, "Animals and Society," pp. 206, 207). His entire analysis depends upon the recognition that certain "nice cuddly mammals" (ibid., p. 16) are more easily anthropomorphised than others, as the "animals that are most like us" (ibid., p. 14). In other words, despite his sociologically reductionist intentions, he still has to depend upon certain accepted claims about the ontology of animals for his thesis to be convincing.
52. Tester is a case in point, since even as an extreme constructivist he claims that the "morality [of animal rights] is rather clever at hiding the utter meaninglessness of animals" and that "animals have been made moral subjects . . . for purely social reasons" (Tester, "Animals and Society," pp. 206, 207). His entire analysis depends upon the recognition that certain "nice cuddly mammals" (ibid., p. 16) are more easily anthropomorphised than others, as the "animals that are most like us" (ibid., p. 14). In other words, despite his sociologically reductionist intentions, he still has to depend upon certain accepted claims about the ontology of animals for his thesis to be convincing.
53. Tester is a case in point, since even as an extreme constructivist he claims that the "morality [of animal rights] is rather clever at hiding the utter meaninglessness of animals" and that "animals have been made moral subjects . . . for purely social reasons" (Tester, "Animals and Society," pp. 206, 207). His entire analysis depends upon the recognition that certain "nice cuddly mammals" (ibid., p. 16) are more easily anthropomorphised than others, as the "animals that are most like us" (ibid., p. 14). In other words, despite his sociologically reductionist intentions, he still has to depend upon certain accepted claims about the ontology of animals for his thesis to be convincing.
54. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a full justification of this statement. But Saussure emphasizes how signs attain meaning though their systemic relationship to each other rather than through a direct reference to an external objective reality. In this sense all attempts to speak of this "outside" reality are always already caught up in the apparently self-referential and infinite interplay of language. For an interesting discussion of the implications of Saussurian linguistics for speaking of nature see Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal (London: Routledge, 1997). Deconstructivists' claim that we cannot grasp an unmediated "nature" might also be seen as an extension of Schutz's phenomenological claim that "All scientific knowledge of the social world is indirect. It is knowledge of the world of contemporaries and the world of predecessors, never of the world of immediate social reality." Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967). The question of whether such extensions (from knowledge of the "social" to knowledge of the "natural" world, and from social science as an indirect method of obtaining objective insight into the lifeworld to all attempts to speak directly of the world at large) are justified is another matter. It should be noted that Schutz himself does not rule out the attainment of direct subjective knowledge.
55. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a full justification of this statement. But Saussure emphasizes how signs attain meaning though their systemic relationship to each other rather than through a direct reference to an external objective reality. In this sense all attempts to speak of this "outside" reality are always already caught up in the apparently self-referential and infinite interplay of language. For an interesting discussion of the implications of Saussurian linguistics for speaking of nature see Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal (London: Routledge, 1997). Deconstructivists' claim that we cannot grasp an unmediated "nature" might also be seen as an extension of Schutz's phenomenological claim that "All scientific knowledge of the social world is indirect. It is knowledge of the world of contemporaries and the world of predecessors, never of the world of immediate social reality." Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967). The question of whether such extensions (from knowledge of the "social" to knowledge of the "natural" world, and from social science as an indirect method of obtaining objective insight into the lifeworld to all attempts to speak directly of the world at large) are justified is another matter. It should be noted that Schutz himself does not rule out the attainment of direct subjective knowledge.
56. Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems (Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings, 1967). In an ironic twist, the particular adaptation of Spector and Kitsuse's model which Hannigan favors has been termed an "ecological model." Hannigan, Environmental Sociology, p. 34.
57. Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems (Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings, 1967). In an ironic twist, the particular adaptation of Spector and Kitsuse's model which Hannigan favors has been termed an "ecological model." Hannigan, Environmental Sociology, p. 34.
58. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
59. Sessions, "Postmodernism, Environmental Justice," p. 15.
60. Schneider and Kitsuse quoted in Kate Burningham and Geoff Cooper, "Being Constructive: Social Constructivism and the Environment," Sociology 33 (1999): 304. Burningham and Cooper go on to defend the merits of "strict constructivism."
61. Always bearing in mind that, even here, the boundaries between these positions are not clear cut.
62. Sessions, "Postmodernism, Environmental Justice," p. 15.
63. Ibid., p. 15.
64. Kellert and Wilson, The Biophilia Hypothesis. Although Shephard seems much more cautious and less deterministic than Sessions suggests.
65. Sessions, "Postmodernism, Environmental Justice," p. 15 (emphasis added).
66. Ross, "Superbiology," in The Chicago Gangster Theory of Life.
67. See for example, Steven Rose, R. C. Lewontin, and Leon J. Kamin, Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985).
68. Freya Mathews, The Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 130 (emphasis added).
69. Ibid., p. 132.
70. Ibid., p. 129. Mathews seems to be espousing a group selectionist analysis that is explicitly rejected by the vast majority of ecologists. See Paul H. Harvey and Paul J. Greenwood, "Antipredator Defence Strategies: Some Evolutionary Problems," in John R. Krebs and N. B. Davies, Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) p. 142.
71. Ibid., p. 129. Mathews seems to be espousing a group selectionist analysis that is explicitly rejected by the vast majority of ecologists. See Paul H. Harvey and Paul J. Greenwood, "Antipredator Defence Strategies: Some Evolutionary Problems," in John R. Krebs and N. B. Davies, Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) p. 142.
72. For example, Mathews' claims about ecosystems embodying a self-organizing "strategy" or any kind of telos are undermined by ecologist Henry S. Horn's "Succession," in Robert M. May, ed., Theoretical Ecology: Principles and Applications, 2d ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981). See also May's remarks about the frequently assumed links between biodiversity and ecosystem stability in the same volume, "this notion has tended to become part of the folk wisdom of ecology. . . . But the empirical evidence is at best equivocal" (ibid., p. 219).
73. For example, Mathews' claims about ecosystems embodying a self-organizing "strategy" or any kind of telos are undermined by ecologist Henry S. Horn's "Succession," in Robert M. May, ed., Theoretical Ecology: Principles and Applications, 2d ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981). See also May's remarks about the frequently assumed links between biodiversity and ecosystem stability in the same volume, "this notion has tended to become part of the folk wisdom of ecology. . . . But the empirical evidence is at best equivocal" (ibid., p. 219).
74. I am not claiming that science per se is responsible for our environmental predicament, but it is certainly not a disinterested observer either.
75. Soulé and Lease, "Reinventing Nature?"
76. Ibid., p. 138; Sessions,"Postmodernism, Environmental Justice," p. 15.
77. Ibid., p. 138; Sessions,"Postmodernism, Environmental Justice," p. 15.
78. See, for example, David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and Tony Davies, Humanism (London: Routledge, 1997).
79. See, for example, David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and Tony Davies, Humanism (London: Routledge, 1997).
80. See, for example, George Bradford, How Deep is Deep Ecology (Ojai, Calif.: Times Change Press, 1989).
81. Stephen Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory (New York: State University of New York, 1996).
82. For an introduction to Baudrillard's use of the term simulacrum and the symbolic exchange of values, see Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992).
83. The phrase "in the last instance" is used by Louis Althusser to recognize that the cultural has a relative autonomy from the economy. It does not assume a straightforward economic determinism of culture. Indeed, in his willingness to produce a holistic interpretation of the relationship between levels, Althusser suggests that "From the first to the last, the lonely hour of the last instance never comes" Louis Althusser, For Marx (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 113.
84. Eder, "The Social Construction of Nature."
85. Holmes Rolston, III, "Nature for Real: Is Nature a Social Construction?" in T. D. J. Chappell, ed., The Philosophy of the Environment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 61.
86. For an analysis of this situation with regard to ethics, see Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) and his more recent Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
87. For an analysis of this situation with regard to ethics, see Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) and his more recent Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
88. I am emphatically not implying that there has to be some formalized equality between all such entities as some deep ecologists sometimes seem to claim. On this issue, see Mick Smith, "A Green Thought in a Green Shade: A Critique of the Rationalisation of Environmental Values," in Yvonne Guerrier et al., eds., Values and the Environment: A Social Science Perspective (Chichester: John Wiley, 1995).