Free will as a problem in neurobiology

Philosophy

Volumn 76, Issue 298, 2001, Pages 491-514

  Searle, John R ^a  

^a NONE

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Indexed keywords

EID: 0001415981     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0031819101000535     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (5)

1. For further discussion, see John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), especially Chapter 5.
2. For the importance of the unified field, see John R. Searle, 'Consciousness,' Annual Review of Neuroscience, 2000, Vol. 23, pp. 557-78.
3. On my view rationality is not a separate faculty, rather the constraints of rationality are already built into intentional phenomena such as beliefs and desires and into thought processes. So a neurobiological account of mental phenomena would already be an account of the rational constraints on such phenomena. For more detailed presentation of this view and the reasons for it, see my Rationality in Action, MIT press, forthcoming, 2001.
4. Chaos theory, as I understand it, implies unpredictability but not indeterminism.
5. For an explanation of the distinction between the building block model and the unified field model, see John R. Searle, 'Consciousness' Annual Review of Neuroscience. 2000, Vol. 23, pp. 557-78.