A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 1991, Pages 106-123

  Nagahisa, Ryo ichi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOYAMA   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001351760     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90108-G     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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2. Nash bargaining theory, I, II, III
3. Nash bargaining theory, I, II, III
4. Walrasian social choice: Some simple axiomatic approaches
5. On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
6. Outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocations at Nash equilibrium points
7. On the economic welfare function
8. Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem
9. Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
10. On the Possibility and Impossibility of Walrasian Social Choice
11. The bargaining problem
12. The supper-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
13. Strategy space reduction in Masin's theorem Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
14. Walrasian analysis via strategic outcome functions
15. A condition guaranteeing the Nash allocation is Walrasian
16. Nash's bargaining solution and utilitarian choice rules
17. Realization and Nash implementation Two aspects of mechanism design