Bonjour, stagnation: Russia's next years

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 5, 1997, Pages 865-881

  Shlapentokh, Vladimir ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0001218141     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139708412477     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. There are many other data which reveal this split of Russian society into three groups. For instance, in December 1995, 30% of all Russians were for the continuation of reforms, while 28% were strongly against it. The remainder of those polled held some intermediate position. Speaking about the future of the Russian economy, 29% supposed that it would improve, 40% predicted 'some deterioration' and 31% foresaw 'significant deterioration' (all those who responded= 100%) (All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), Ekonomicheskie i Sotsial'nye Peremeny: Monitoring Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, 1996, 1, January-February, pp. 60-61). Russians also split into three almost equal groups on their attitudes toward the type of society which they preferred: one-third supported 'socialism', almost the same amount were for 'capitalism', and the rest took an intermediate position, voting for some son of social democratic model à la Sweden (Segodnya, 27 June 1996).
2. There are many other data which reveal this split of Russian society into three groups. For instance, in December 1995, 30% of all Russians were for the continuation of reforms, while 28% were strongly against it. The remainder of those polled held some intermediate position. Speaking about the future of the Russian economy, 29% supposed that it would improve, 40% predicted 'some deterioration' and 31% foresaw 'significant deterioration' (all those who responded= 100%) (All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), Ekonomicheskie i Sotsial'nye Peremeny: Monitoring Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, 1996, 1, January-February, pp. 60-61). Russians also split into three almost equal groups on their attitudes toward the type of society which they preferred: one-third supported 'socialism', almost the same amount were for 'capitalism', and the rest took an intermediate position, voting for some son of social democratic model à la Sweden (Segodnya, 27 June 1996).
3. In answering the question, 'What is your mood?', 40% of Russians characterised it as either being 'splendid' (3%) or 'normal' (37%), while the rest (60%) revealed that they were in the 'blues', even if to varying degrees. A little more than 50% assessed the material life of their family as being 'very good', 'good' or 'average', while the rest regarded it as 'bad' or 'very bad' (VTsIOM, 1996, p. 570). About two-thirds of all Russians assume that Russia needs its own road to the future, while one-third prefers the Western model (Segodnya, 27 June 1996). At the same time, 64% of all Russians regarded their life as 'tolerable', while one-third declared that 'it is impossible to bear our plight anymore' (VTsIOM, May 1996, unpublished survey).
4. It is astounding how resourceful and cynical these democrats were in the last few months (April-May) when the presidential campaign was gathering strength. Mark Zakharov, a famous theatre director and a member of the presidential council, proposed having a referendum instead of a normal election, which would extend El'tsin's term in office for another five years. Elina Bystritskaya, a famous actress, supported the idea of declaring a moratorium on the election without any fuss. Galina Starovoitova, the leader of the Democratic Russia party, proposed organising a referendum on Russia's re-unification with Belorussia and in this way creating a new legal situation which excluded holding new presidential elections until the adoption of a new constitution. Other democrats actually suggested the organisation of a strong campaign asking Russians not to come to the election booth in order to invalidate the election. Some advisers went so far, as we could read in a Moscow newspaper, as to propose provoking disorders, giving the Kremlin the right to cancel the election. With the same equanimity, democrats discussed what should be done if El'tsin did not legally win the election. Some, as Izvestiya revealed, urged the president's men not to be too fastidious and fudge the election results at the local or, particularly, the central levels. The editors of Moskovskie novosti, also a very liberal weekly newspaper, did not find anything horrendous about the possibility that the Kremlin could refuse to recognise the validity of the election if the results were unfavourable. In this case, the presidential election would be almost the same, if not worse than the notorious Soviet-style elections, where there was only one candidate on the ballot with 99% of the voters supporting him. The authors of this idea were only curious whether El'tsin could rely on the army if he dismissed the election results. Massarsky allayed the fears of these people, stating that the president did not need the support of the military because 'he has élite troops loyal personally to him', who Obey only the President' and 'will bring to their senses not only the masses but also rebellious military units'. See Mark Massarsky in the discussion 'Perenos vyborov: shans ili katastrofa', Moskovskie novosti, 31 March 1996.
5. 'The Gamblers. In Russia, an election puts (quasi) democracy at risk', David Remnick, New Yorker, 17 June 1996, pp. 5-6.
6. After the resolution of the Duma which cancelled the Belovezh Treaty, on 15 March 1996, the Kremlin considered harsh measures against the parliament. It is known that during the night of 16 March, at a meeting in the Kremlin, there were heated debates about the expediency of a new application of force against the parliament and the cancellation of the July presidential election. The lack of consensus among the participants explains why El'tsin abandoned the idea. However, even before the meeting began, on the night of Saturday 16 March, special emergency troops suddenly, without warning the leaders of the parliament, occupied their building. The troops left the building only on Monday morning when the Duma's personnel were allowed to enter the building.
7. In all the surveys from May-June 1996 the number of people who were sure that El'tsin would remain President was 1.5 times higher than the number of those who planned to vote for him.
8. The claims by a few obscure American advisers of their significant contribution to the campaign arouse only a contemptuous smirk among Russians. In the Russians' eyes, the Americans, having no idea about Russian society, could only utter banalities such as the utility of focus groups and other irrelevant stuff (see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 July 1996; Argumenty i fakty, 1996, 28; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 6 July 1996).
9. The claims by a few obscure American advisers of their significant contribution to the campaign arouse only a contemptuous smirk among Russians. In the Russians' eyes, the Americans, having no idea about Russian society, could only utter banalities such as the utility of focus groups and other irrelevant stuff (see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 July 1996; Argumenty i fakty, 1996, 28; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 6 July 1996).
10. The claims by a few obscure American advisers of their significant contribution to the campaign arouse only a contemptuous smirk among Russians. In the Russians' eyes, the Americans, having no idea about Russian society, could only utter banalities such as the utility of focus groups and other irrelevant stuff (see Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 July 1996; Argumenty i fakty, 1996, 28; Sovetskaya Rossiya, 6 July 1996).
11. There are serious grounds to suppose that Mentimir Shaimiev, the Tartar president, had crossed the borders of mere propaganda and ordered his subordinates to tamper with the results, which were not beneficial to his superior in Moscow. Another story which was published is no less remarkable: Nikolai Fedorov, President of the Republic of Chuvashia, submitted his resignation to the Kremlin in July because Chuvashia had voted decidedly for Zyuganov in the second round and, if he continued in power, his republic would suffer from the 'tsar's ire' (see Obshchaya gazeta, 1996, 27; for more on the role of the regional élite in shaping El'tsin's victory, see Segodnya, 1 June 1996).
12. There are serious grounds to suppose that Mentimir Shaimiev, the Tartar president, had crossed the borders of mere propaganda and ordered his subordinates to tamper with the results, which were not beneficial to his superior in Moscow. Another story which was published is no less remarkable: Nikolai Fedorov, President of the Republic of Chuvashia, submitted his resignation to the Kremlin in July because Chuvashia had voted decidedly for Zyuganov in the second round and, if he continued in power, his republic would suffer from the 'tsar's ire' (see Obshchaya gazeta, 1996, 27; for more on the role of the regional élite in shaping El'tsin's victory, see Segodnya, 1 June 1996).
13. VTsIOM, 1996, p. 6 (all those who responded to the survey = 100%).
14. These data, from the Fund of Public Opinion, were gathered at the beginning of 1996 (Open Media Research Institute (OMRI), 11 April 1996).
15. Overall in the first round of the 1996 presidential elections El'tsin won 35% of the vote and Zyuganov 32%. In the two largest cities the corresponding figures were 52% and 18%, while in the top 100 biggest cities they garnered 43% and 23% respectively (Segodnya, 1 July 1996).
16. In a comparison of the wealthiest 10% and the poorest 10% in Russia, we see that 6% from the first group and 24% from the second are 55 or older. The proportion of people with a higher education was 25% and 7% in the same two groups (VTsIOM, 1996, 1, p. 39).
17. It is interesting to note that among the activists of the Communist Party, those apparatchiks from the past who were unable to find themselves a place in the new society prevailed. This group of people mostly includes the least talented and least energetic members of the old nomenklatura.
18. On this group of El'tsin supporters see the brillant article by Sergei Kara-Murza, 'Slepaya volya', Sovetskaya Rossiya, 30 July 1996.
19. The famous television programme 'Kukly' showed that they brilliantly grasped the situation in the wake of the election in July 1996. It showed how 'Ivan', the symbol of Russia, tried to join El'tsin and his myrmidons celebrating the victory, reminding them that it was he who brought it to them, only to be rebuffed by the merry company which explained to him that they had no need for him now.
20. The most thoughtful opponents of the regime, such as Vladimir Isakov, confirmed in their post-election analysis that Zyuganov's orientation toward left radicals and Stalinists was fatal for his campaign (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 15 July 1996).
21. Liberals strongly criticised those 'alarmists' who, in their opinion, exaggerated the problems of Russia (see the article by one such 'alarmist', a prominent expert on the quality of life, Natalya Rimashevskaya, Pravda, 21 May 1996; see also Boris Grushin's article against alarmists, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 January 1996).
22. Liberals strongly criticised those 'alarmists' who, in their opinion, exaggerated the problems of Russia (see the article by one such 'alarmist', a prominent expert on the quality of life, Natalya Rimashevskaya, Pravda, 21 May 1996; see also Boris Grushin's article against alarmists, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 January 1996).
23. The Marxist concept of a period of 'primary accumulation', full of all possible ugly things, is broadly used by Russian liberals for the 'normalisation' of criminality and corruption, among other negative things, in the country.
24. VTsIOM, 1996, p. 5.
25. Russian TV (ORT), 'Vremya', 25 July 1996.
26. Russians rank delays in receiving their salaries first among the problems which the country now faces (VTsIOM, May 1996, unpublished survey, or Argumenty i fakty, 1996, 42, p. 4).
27. See Finansovye Izvestiya, 9 July 1996.
28. Many other economic developments do not irritate a considerable number of Russians. Muscovites, for instance, have forgotten the times when they had metered taxis on their streets and consider it 'normal' that each time they try to 'catch' a private car they are forced to enter short or long debates with the driver over the fare. No one in Moscow, to the best of my knowledge, retains the old frustration that the flower businesses in the Moscow markets are controlled by the mafia, who demand that each old babushka sells her wares at extremely high prices. Only a few continue to grumble about the mafias, which reign over all the Moscow markets, precluding free competition.
29. See Izvestiya, 6 March 1996.
30. VTsIOM, 1996, p. 5.
31. See Vladimir Shlapentokh, 'Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 3, May 1996, pp. 393-41).
32. See Vladimir Shlapentokh, 'Russia as a medieval state', The Washington Quarterly, 19, 1, Winter 1996.
33. With vodka relatively four to five times cheaper than other consumer goods in comparison with the Soviet past, the average Russian had increased consumption of alcohol in 1995 to 25 litres and now firmly holds first place in the world for alcohol consumption. For the World Health Organisation (WHO), eight litres mean that a country has entered a dangerous zone for its gene pool. Alcoholism is particularly rampant in the countryside, where the probation of chronic alcoholics is higher than in other places (Izvestiya, 16 March 1996). According to various data, no less than one-third, and in some cases perhaps one-half, of all males in Russian villages are chronic alcoholics and are not fit for normal work. The division of people in the Russian countryside between those 'who drink' and 'those who do not' is the most important.
34. The great majority of Russian voters polled in 1992-96 were rather pessimistic about the future. Survey results produced by VTsIOM reveal that at least two-thirds of the Russian population are distressed about the future of the country. According to different surveys, the ratio between optimists and pessimists, with regard to Russia's future, fluctuates between 1:5 and 1:3. At the end of 1995 50% of all Russians polled supported the view that 'difficult times are ahead', while only 24% believed that these times were 'behind' or 'now' (VTsIOM, 1996, p. 60).
35. The number of people who thought that a 'feeling of hope' was growing in society rose from 17% in 1993 to 22% in 1995. The number of those who were thinking about the rise in fear declined from 26% to 18%. The percentages of those feeling 'anger and aggressiveness' were 26% and 18% and for 'tiredness and indifference' 54% and 38% (VTsIOM, 1996, p. 6).
36. VTsIOM, 1996, p. 57.