Competition and mergers in airline networks

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 1991, Pages 323-342

  Brueckner, Jan K ^a   Spiller, Pablo T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001131307     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(91)90015-D     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Sources of economic rent in the deregulated airline industry
2. Efficiency and entry in a simple airline network
3. Hubs and high fares Airport dominance and market power in the US airline industry
4. Airline deregulation, fares and market behavior: Some empirical evidence
5. The need for coordination among firms with special reference to network industries
6. Benefits and costs of airline mergers A case study
7. Economies of density versus economies of scale Why trunk and local service airline costs differ
8. Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis
9. Deregulating European airlines
10. The implications of hub-and-spoke routing for airline costs and competitiveness
11. Empirical implications and tests of the contestability hypothesis
12. US airline deregulation Its effects on passengers capital and labor
13. Airline competition in deregulated markets: Theory, firm strategy, and public policy
14. Monopoly and the incentive for horizontal mergers
15. Competition and entry in small airline markets
16. Geographic market definition under the US Department of Justice merger guidelines
17. Pricing of hub-and-spoke networks