What do firms do with cash windfalls?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 1994, Pages 337-360

  Blanchard, Olivier Jean ^a   Lopez de Silanes, Florencio ^b   Shleifer, Andrei ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Cash flow; Lawsuits

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001059841     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)90009-4     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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9. The success of acquisitions Evidence from divestitures
10. Journal of Financial Economics
11. Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?
12. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
13. Managerial entrenchment: The case for manager-specific investments
14. Managerial discretion and capital structure