Moneylenders and bankers: Price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 429-462

  Hoff, Karla ^a   Stiglitz, Joseph E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collectivist strategy; Enforcement; Informal credit; Monopolistic competition; Reputation effects

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001027719     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(96)00443-9     Document Type: Article

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