Budget deficits and redistributive politics

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 909-928

  Lizzeri, Alessandro ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001001504     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00113     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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12. MARTIMORT, D. (1998), "Precautionary Budget Deficit Under Political Uncertainty" (Université' de Toulouse, Mimeo).
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