The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 1992, Pages 528-552

  Koller, Daphne ^a,b   Megiddo, Nimrod ^c,d  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b IBM ALMADEN RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

^c IBM Almaden Research Center 650 Harry Road San Jose Californai 95120 6099 USA ^*

^d TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000979731     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90035-Q     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Equivalence of Information Patterns and Essentially Indeterminate Games
2. Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations
3. Finding Mixed Strategies with Small Supports
4. Extensive Games
5. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
6. An Overview of the Mathematical Theory of Games
7. Complete Inflation and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games
8. Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form
9. Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels