Correlated strategies as institutions

Theory and Decision

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 271-285

  Daniel, G ^a   Arce, M ^a  

^a Box 870224 ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Coherence arbitrage; Conflict inflation; Correlated equilibrium; Institutions; Maximin; Minimax

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000918493     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004906403823     Document Type: Article

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